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AMERICA AT WAR

The Second Quarter

(March–May 1942)

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THE spring months brought the war towards a crisis. Since December 7 the strategic situation of the United Nations had deteriorated steadily; and as these words are being written the Axis Powers are mustering their forces for the summer offensives. The decisive months of what is probably the critical year of combat are at hand, with the future course of world history at stake.

Between February and May, Java and Burma were lost to the Japanese; the tragic epic of the Philippines came to its inevitable end; and the war at sea reached a crisis in many ways comparable with some of the worst months of the unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917. As I write, the total American and Philippine casualties — killed, wounded, prisoners and missing — number between 75,000 and 100,000. We have lost 41 commissioned naval vessels of various types,[1] and probably about 800 to 1,800 planes in combat (plus possibly an equal number in operations, i.e., due to forced landings, crack-ups, etc.). War authorizations and appropriations as of May 10 reached the tremendous sum of $197,267,000,000. Yet war came to the United States less than six months ago and so far we have scarcely begun to fight. There can be no doubt that this war will be by far the most expensive in our history.

The months just passed have witnessed the extension of Ameri-

[1] This figure includes all published losses until May 25, but does *not* include unannounced losses, or damaged ships. By types, the losses are: two battleships (*Arizona* and the capsized *Oklahoma*, the second of which may some day be salvaged); the cruiser *Houston*, nine destroyers, four submarines, and many tenders, small craft and auxiliaries. No army transports or merchant vessels are included in this total.

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can power to territories that a few months ago were known in America only to geographers. Army troops are scattered almost literally from pole to pole. Our one-ocean Navy is fighting a seven-ocean war. Our war effort so far is still in the preparatory stage; the enemy still holds the initiative; we are still on the strategic defensive. Our efforts have been devoted to increasing our armed strength to make it adequate to the exigencies of global war, to transporting that strength to far-flung overseas bases and theatres of action — India, the Middle East, Australia, and the British Isles — and to helping supply other United Nations, particularly Russia. Our difficulties have been terrifically aggravated by the interior position of the enemy; by the nature of the "perimeter war" which we therefore are forced to fight; and by the unprecedented lengths of our water-borne supply lines, often three to fifteen times as long as the largely land-borne supply routes of the enemy. These all emphasized the pertinent fact of the first months of struggle; that this is a "quartermaster's war."

II

The enemy's most serious attack in the spring months was against our long supply lines. It represented an attempt to cut off the United States from the various theatres of action and to defeat us before we had started. Based on the traditional strategy of the *guerre de course*, or war of attrition at sea, it was conducted primarily by the Germans, with some secondary help from the Italians but with surprisingly little as yet from the Japanese. It took the form of: (1) Concentrated submarine attacks upon our coastal shipping. (2) Attacks by air and by submarine and surface raiders upon United Nations convoy routes to Murmansk and Archangel. (3) Attacks upon transatlantic convoys. (4) Attacks upon Mediterranean shipping.

For a time, it appeared that Japanese surface and submarine raiders would play havoc with shipping in the Bay of Bengal. This threat, however, was reduced by what appeared to be the British abandonment of Calcutta as a major Indian port in favor of Bombay, Karachi and other less-exposed ports, and by probable Japanese naval needs elsewhere. The British seizure of Madagascar, the evident concentration of strong British naval forces in the Indian Ocean, and the reënforcement of United Nations air power in India and Ceylon, helped to ease, at least temporarily, a serious situation in the Indian Ocean. The failure

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of the Japanese to follow up their early and ineffective submarine attacks along our West Coast also mitigated a dangerous situation at sea. Nevertheless, by late spring it had to be admitted that the enemy's *guerre de course* had achieved unexpectedly effective results and that no immediate relief was in sight.

The most dangerous threat was to our coastal shipping. Tankers, which carry most of the gasoline for the Eastern states, were being sunk in such great numbers that the greatest oil-producing nation in the world was forced, in May, to institute a stringent system of gasoline rationing for that region. Though no announcement to the effect was made, coastal tanker operations were obviously suspended for a time. Cargo vessels were also sunk in great numbers. No complete statistics of losses were published, but certainly the world-wide rate of ship destruction (the larger part of it represented by losses off our coasts) was for a considerable period during the spring in excess of the world-wide rate of ship construction.[2] Vice Admiral John W. Greenslade emphasized the gravity of the situation in an address to shipyard workers in May when he said: "War goods are piling up at the docks of both coasts and are backing up at some inland war plants. For example, 40,000 military trucks are standing at a single East Coast port waiting for ships."

The success of the German submarine operations off our coasts and in other areas had several causes. In the first place, the means of defense was inadequate because of the fact that we are fighting a seven-ocean war with a one-ocean navy. Secondly, there was an early lack of properly coördinated counter-measures by the several agencies engaged in anti-submarine operations. The third factor was the improvement in combat characteristics of the modern submarine as compared with the submarine of the First World War.

Though shifts of naval strength are not announced in wartime, we may surmise that our entry into the war in the Pacific, our heavy naval losses at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere in the early months, and the demands upon United Nations naval strength to protect convoy routes to Australia and to build up a formidable sea force in the Indian Ocean, have resulted in a world-wide redistribution of naval power. This could have been done, as far as the United States is concerned, only at the expense of our Atlantic

[2] By May 22 the United States, somewhat behind schedule, was launching merchant ships at the rate of two a day. By the end of the year the rate was to be increased to three a day.

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forces. In the case of the British, it would have to be at the expense of the Atlantic and Mediterranean forces. The Italians in late May issued a curiously worded communiqué, which was neither confirmed nor denied by the Navy Department, claiming the sinking off Brazil of a battleship of the *Maryland* class, which had been stationed in the Pacific before December 7;[3] and President Roosevelt, in his address of April 28, revealed that American naval units were then operating in the Mediterranean. The loss of the British carrier *Hermes* in the Indian Ocean, and the sinking near the Netherlands Indies of several Australian vessels formerly stationed in the Mediterranean, showed that the British had drawn to an unknown degree upon their Atlantic and Mediterranean strength to build up their Far Eastern forces.

In any case, it seems clear that the opening up of a new theatre of war in the Pacific had forced some reduction in the naval strength of the United Nations in the Atlantic, and that this was reflected in an increase in merchant ship losses. Nevertheless, the necessity of protecting our overseas supply lines had created such a demand for naval shipping that our Atlantic coast could not have been adequately protected in the early months of war even if the shifts had not occurred.

Submarine chasers, destroyers, escort vessels, patrol planes, radio and sonic detectors, and trained men to operate these instruments of battle, were badly needed. The belated inauguration of an adequate building program of escort vessels, bottlenecks in Diesel engines and other propulsion machinery, and the inescapable need for time for training as well as construction, made it clear in May that, although gradual improvement in the situation along the coastal shipping routes can be expected, there were no grounds for hope for any immediate and startling reduction in the toll taken by the Axis.

Another factor contributing to the success of the Axis coastal attacks was an early lack of proper coördination between our defensive agencies. Army, Navy, Coast Guard, Merchant Marine and civilian agencies were often at odds. Inadequate liaison and the inexperience of personnel contributed to the commission of grave mistakes, including at least one instance of the bombing of one of our own ships. Operations have only recently been adequately decentralized. After some weeks of abortive attempts at

[3] *West Virginia*, *Maryland* and *Colorado:* eight 16-inch guns. The Italian claim, though circumstantial, has not yet been verified from any reliable source.

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coöperation,[4] Army planes engaged in anti-submarine work were put under command of the Navy; but not until May could a naval commander in Virginia, for instance, use Army planes at nearby airfields until specific authorization for a specific mission had been secured from Army air headquarters in New York. The inevitable delay was often serious. These frictions and mistakes are being eliminated, but there is still ample room for improvement.

The improvement in German submarines also militated against our defensive efforts. The improvised vessels pressed into service as anti-submarine units during the First World War no longer serve so useful a purpose. The type of German submarine which is raiding our coast has a displacement of about 750 tons, but major improvements in marine engineering have given this type a cruising range of 12,000 miles or more.[5] This means that they can easily cruise to Atlantic coastal waters, remain on station for two or three weeks, and return to their home bases without refueling. The modern submarine has a surface speed of about 20 to 22 knots, as compared with 10 to 14 for the submarines of the First World War.

Though the effectiveness of aircraft patrol puts a limit on submarine operations near enemy coasts in daylight, the modern submarine is a formidable night raider. Most of the attacks on our coastwise shipping have been made at dusk, at dawn or during the night, and the majority of them have been by submarines operating on the surface and using their high surface speed to deliver quick torpedo attacks, and then to escape into the darkness. Many fast American yachts as well as 50 old destroyers were transferred to Britain before we entered the war, the latter in exchange for needed bases. Most of the remaining yachts, and such vessels as trawlers, hastily armed and assigned to patrol and convoy work, are too slow to meet effectively the menace of such night attacks.

Nor are there, by any means, enough anti-submarine vessels. The Axis probably maintains at least eight submarines off our coast continuously, and many semi-official estimates put the total at three times that number. Most of these are German, but a few are Italian. The focus of the attacks, judging from the announced

[4] Friction and lack of coördination between the Army and Navy is still one of our most serious problems in all theatres of action.

[5] A new type of German submarine engine has been reported, but little is known about it.

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sinkings, was formerly off Hatteras and southward to the Florida coast. Our concentration of anti-submarine units in that area, however, forced the Axis submarines to seek new hunting grounds, and they have moved northward to the Gulf of St. Lawrence area and southward to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. It will take time to build up a force strong enough to protect effectively all the great expanse of Atlantic coastal waters.

The effectiveness of the enemy's offensive at sea was heightened by losses on the Murmansk convoy route. The approach of summer brought almost perpetual daylight to the northern latitudes and deprived Allied convoys of the protection of darkness. Drifting pack ice canalized the convoy route to a narrow lane north of the North Cape. Both developments facilitated the German attacks. Nazi planes based on northern Norway, and submarines and destroyers probably based on the new German naval base at Trondheim and at Narvik, are such a menace to the northern route in summer that the Persian Gulf may have to be used as the main supply line to Russia in the immediate future.

As enemy pressure in other seas increased and forces were shifted to meet it, German attacks upon transatlantic convoys also grew in frequency and intensity, and gained a measure of success greater than they had achieved in the winter months, although not comparable in importance with the losses inflicted upon the United Nations off our Atlantic coast and on the Murmansk route. Intensified Nazi and Italian air attacks upon British shipping in the Mediterranean, particularly upon convoys to Malta, also increased the shipping toll.[6]

Thus at the time I write the war at sea is the most important in our several theatres of action. I have dealt with it at some length because past and present ship losses are crippling the offensive power of the United Nations; because our ability to implement any course of action is restricted and canalized by lack of shipping; and because in the months to come the victory or defeat of the Axis *guerre de course* may well mean victory or defeat in the struggle for the world.

III

But the unceasing struggle to protect our shipping lanes is only one aspect of the war at sea and of course only one of many as-

[6] For a time, at least, convoys to Malta were abandoned and the little island, victim of more than 2,300 bombing raids, was isolated.

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pects of the wider struggle. Troop convoys are more heavily protected than any other type of convoy. These, despite enemy attacks, were reaching their destinations without losses, although the quantity of troops transported was not nearly so large as popularly supposed. And naval task forces were operating successfully in many seas.

The process of building up an AEF in Northern Ireland and Scotland started with the transport of a small infantry force across the Atlantic in January. It was continued, and in May a large convoy with more infantry units and units plainly identifiable from the Army communiqué as armored units, made port safely in Northern Ireland. As I write, however, the forces in the British Isles are as yet not large, nor are they as yet adequately trained or equipped for immediate action. American air forces in the British Isles are being quietly built up, a process which will probably be speeded during the summer months by utilization of a fighter-plane air ferry route by way of Labrador, Greenland and Iceland to Britain. American pilots and planes obviously are being prepared to join in the great and growing British air offensive against Western Europe. In late May and early June this offensive had already developed into the greatest air raids in history. Over a thousand planes participated in the mass raids that blasted Cologne, Essen and other cities in the industrial Rhineland and Ruhr.

The objectives of this offensive are four: to strike against German industry, against German communications and against German morale, and to create a diversion by forcing the Germans to transfer planes from the Russian front to Western Europe. Major-General James E. Chaney commands all American Army forces, ground and air, in the British Isles. Admiral Harold R. Stark, former Chief of Naval Operations, commands United States naval forces in European waters. These appointments, and our steadily mounting strength in the British Isles, plainly indicate the strategic importance we attach to those Isles and to the eastern Atlantic area. Such recognition was also implied by the strengthening of our garrison in Iceland, the replacement of all Marines there by Army troops, and the assumption of supreme command from the British by an American officer, Major-General Charles H. Bonesteel.

In the Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area, American power was also being moved slowly into position at the time of writing.

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In addition to the utilization of American naval units in the Mediterranean,[7] American technical and supply troops in the Egyptian-Eritrean-Red Sea area were increased in number, though no combat units had as yet been sent to the Middle East. Engineers and transportation experts were also working in the Persian Gulf ports and on the Trans-Iranian Railway and along the Middle Eastern railroad and road network to expedite the transport of supplies into Russia. In Russia itself a lease-lend military mission, headed by Brigadier-General Philip R. Faymonville, was clearing Russian applications and speeding the despatch of matériel from the Arsenal of Democracy to the Arsenal of Man Power.

Small numbers of American forces — mainly transport and plane experts, engineers, etc. — were toiling in widely-scattered parts of Africa to set up, develop and guard the air ferry and supply routes and ports. Increasing numbers of long-range planes were being ferried across the North Atlantic to Britain, as well as by way of the Caribbean islands and Brazilian airports to West Africa, and thence by way of equatorial airports to the Middle East and on to India.[8] Defenses of some of the West African ports were also being built up slowly against a possible threat from Dakar.[9] And American naval units, in addition to patrolling the Caribbean and watching Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana, were mounting guard off Brazil and Africa and, in the waters of the South Atlantic, helping to guard supply routes to West Africa and around the Cape of Good Hope.

But rightly or wrongly, American attention was concentrated on the Pacific during the spring months. For the Pacific is an American responsibility; the war there will be decided primarily by what we do or fail to do. The British Empire shares in that responsibility only in so far as the relatively small though well-seasoned forces of Australia and Canada are able to help. It is a responsibility that, as I write, we have not acquitted ourselves of too well. The Philippine Archipelago has fallen to the enemy,

[7] President Roosevelt did not reveal their number, location or purpose, but it seems likely that these units may include some battleships. The latter have been of little use in the Pacific, but based on Gibraltar they might act as a check to the French fleet.

[8] The Air Ferry Command of the Army Air Forces was also flying bombers to Hawaii, Australia and the Pacific islands. The scope of its operations is unprecedented; already it is far larger than the peacetime commercial operations of all the American airlines put together. The Air Ferry Command is commanded by Brigadier-General Harold George.

[9] This threat was slight. There was positive information that no German forces had used Dakar at least until early in 1942.

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after a gallant but inadequate defense; the Netherlands Indies, richest islands of the world, were overrun following the surprisingly quick fall of Singapore; Burma is gone; and the Japanese stand ready to try for new conquests.

IV

The Philippine campaign cannot be adequately described at this time; it must be judged in the light of history. But in fairness to the British, whose quick loss of Singapore has been much criticized in this country, it should be emphasized that the main Japanese effort was directed initially against Malaya and Singapore; then against the Netherlands Indies and Java; and not until these efforts had been completed did Japan divert her attention to the scattered centers of resistance remaining on Bataan, Corregidor and elsewhere. And in fairness to General Douglas MacArthur, an effort should be made to see the Philippine campaign in truer perspective. A hero-worshipping press and public have ridiculously distorted his fine achievements. The men of Bataan fought well and gallantly; but not everything in the Philippine campaign deserves praise.

We lost the Philippine campaign on the opening days of the war. More correctly, we lost it before the war started. Our foreign policies and our military policies in the Far East were not coördinated. We were not in any proper sense prepared to implement militarily our political opposition to the Japanese course of empire, or even to defend what we owned.

The initial Japanese blows at the Philippines, like the initial Japanese blow against Pearl Harbor, had one purpose: to neutralize our *offensive* power. The attack on Pearl Harbor further reduced the ability of our fleet, already weakened by transfers to the Atlantic, to interfere with the Japanese drive toward the Southwestern Pacific; the blow against the Philippines destroyed most of our air power in the islands. In the words of Clark Lee of the Associated Press, who was on the scene: "The fate of Luzon and Bataan was sealed just before 1 P.M. on December 8, just ten hours after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor." Most of the 36 heavy bombers on Luzon, and many of the medium bombers and pursuit ships, some of them parked in neatly-lined rows, were destroyed on the ground at Clark and Iba Fields. On December 10 the Japanese wrecked the Cavite Naval Base. Fortunately, most of the ships of the Asiatic Fleet (which was not a

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"fleet" at all, but a weak squadron) were not in port; but the evacuation of Cavite, in accordance with prior war plans, quickly became a necessity.

The subsequent land operations necessarily became a side show. The Japanese were content to land enough troops on Luzon (and subsequently on other islands) to seize the bases which they needed immediately and to contain our land forces. They were secure in the knowledge that those forces were powerless to interfere with their supply lines through the South China Sea. Whatever "punch" we retained in the Philippines was gone when our surface ships and submarines were driven southward to bases in Java and Australia and our bombers were destroyed or forced to evacuate. From then on, the main operation was one of siege, while the Japanese slowly rounded up what, in many islands, amounted to little more than guerrilla bands.

The exact number of troops under General MacArthur's command in the Philippines has never been revealed, but the total was far under the figures usually quoted at the beginning of the war. There were only a handful of white troops, probably not more than 8,000 to 15,000 in all. The great bulk of the forces was composed of inadequately trained and equipped Philippine Army reservists, hastily called to the colors at the start of hostilities.

In the island of Cebu, for instance, Colonel Irvine C. Scudder had called some 50,000 men to the colors, but the only equipment available consisted of about 1,500 old rifles and one .50-caliber and a few .30-caliber machine guns. There was no artillery. In Mindanao, the second most important island of the Philippines, Major-General W. F. Sharp was not much better off. He probably had a total of about 30,000 men, led in part by white officers, but there were only two companies of Philippine Scouts, the finely trained professionals who have long been a part of the Regular Army and who amply proved the value of training in the Philippine campaign. General Sharp's men were equipped with Lee-Enfield rifles of First World War vintage, the extractors of many of which crystallized with use. General Sharp employed Moro metal workers to make new parts, but not enough could be supplied; bamboo sticks were sometimes used to pull the empty cartridge cases from the rifles. There were about 50 rounds of ammunition per man, a handful of machine guns, and four old mountain guns which served as field artillery.

The forces on Luzon, "stronghold" of the Philippines, had

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more modern equipment than those in the rest of the archipelago; but at best it was a conglomerate army which was commanded by General MacArthur, and later by Lieutenant-General Jonathan M. Wainwright. It included large numbers of inadequately trained Philippine Army troops; sailors without ships and aviators without planes; the Fourth Marine Regiment, transferred from Shanghai just before the war; National Guardsmen from New Mexico (anti-aircraft gunners), Illinois, Ohio, Kentucky and California (a provisional tank group); the Thirty-first Infantry, which had never seen service except in the Far East; and the Philippine Scouts. The Scouts and the Thirty-first bore the brunt of the struggle; if it had not been for them the Battle of Bataan would have ended much sooner than it did.

The withdrawal of our delaying forces — half-mobilized, half-trained — from the Lingayen Gulf area in the north and from the Lamon Bay region in the south, where the Japanese made their principal landings, and the evacuation of Manila, united the American forces on Bataan Peninsula in early January. The shore end of the peninsula and the entrance to the secondary naval base on Subic Bay were held for a short time; then a withdrawal to a second delaying line was made; and then the main line of resistance, roughly across the center of the peninsula, was taken up. American troops suffered and earned glory in the foxholes of Bataan from mid-January until the final Japanese assault on April 1. There was skirmishing and patrol activity by both sides. The Japanese made sporadic attempts to filter through our lines and to land from barges on our flanks and in our rear. There was more or less constant shelling and bombing; for which, however, the rocky terrain and the thick jungle offered good cover.

A careful effort to eke out food and medicines could carry the defenders along only for a limited time. The attempts made between January and April to send in supplies from outside were bound to fail. A submarine (whose name is well known to the Japanese but is withheld from the American people by the strange inconsistencies of censorship) early ran the blockade, brought in anti-aircraft ammunition, and removed some American securities and gold. Another submarine, also unidentified except to the enemy, subsequently evacuated High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre and his family. Surface ships brought food and other supplies from Australia and New Zealand to southern islands in the Philippines and a small amount of these eventually found

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their way, by inter-island steamer or small boat, to Bataan and Corregidor; one blockade runner brought in a substantial supply of rations. But for every ship that got through, several were sunk; the effort was hopeless from the start and the authorities must have known it.

Before the middle of March General MacArthur was ordered to Australia by President Roosevelt, there to assume a new Southwestern Pacific command for the United Nations. General Wainwright took over command of the Philippines. General MacArthur and his party were evacuated, probably to Mindanao, by motor torpedo boats of a squadron led by Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, whose small vessels sank several Japanese ships before and after the trip. The trip from Mindanao to Australia was made by plane.

The Japanese assault in Bataan at the beginning of April was made against men worn down by months of siege, by malnutrition and sickness, and cut off, as they themselves had known since the President's speech of late February, from possible succor.[10] The Japanese attack was overwhelming and the enemy broke through. On April 8, after a conference with his commanders, General Wainwright agreed that further resistance was hopeless, and on April 9 the tattered, starving, bloody remnants of the Army of Luzon surrendered. Major-General Edward P. King, Jr., who was in immediate command on Bataan, surrendered a total of between 35,000 and 40,000 American and Philippine troops, many of them wounded. In addition, there were about 25,000 civilians on Bataan, nearly all of them Filipinos, at the time of surrender.

The surrender of Bataan sealed the fate of Corregidor and its satellite fortresses in Manila Bay, although these held out until May 7. Like Bataan, Corregidor was without air support.[11] Unlike Bataan, it was subjected to extremely heavy plunging fire from 240-mm. batteries emplaced in the mountains of Bataan Peninsula, as well as to intensive air bombardment. A battle of 33 hours preceded the final surrender, with Japanese shock troops

[10] The Army had lived on carabao, horse and mule meat, stewed monkey and rice; 20,000 men had malaria. The insufficiency of quinine on Bataan, which is near the greatest quinine-producing area in the world, is only one of many inadequacies for which an accounting must be given after the war.

[11] A few Curtiss P-40's, gradually dwindling in number and held together almost literally with baling wire, had been Bataan's sole air defense. They operated from makeshift fields, hewn out of the jungle, and were occasionally equipped with improvised bomb racks and used as bombers.

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swarming across the narrow channel between Bataan and Corregidor during the night to land on the shell-torn beaches of the rocky islet. The beach defenses had been torn to shreds and heavy casualties had been caused by the intensive bombardment. For, contrary to the previous impressions which were given, officers who escaped from Corregidor earlier in the fighting have now made it clear that practically all of the fortress's guns were emplaced in the open in obsolescent mountings, that the famous tunnels in the rocks were virtually uninhabitable, and that in consequence the defenders of the fortress were constantly exposed.

And so the short-lived and disastrous Philippine campaign came to an end sometime on May 7 (Philippine time) as General Wainwright "haggard from lack of sleep and from worry," as the Japanese described him, sought the Japanese commander to ask terms. They were hard: unconditional surrender of all armed forces in the Philippine Islands. Communications with the Philippines ended on May 6, so it is not yet certain whether or not Wainwright complied, or if he did, whether or not his orders were heeded. All that is known is that 11,574 soldiers, sailors, Marines and civilians, Filipinos and Americans, became Japanese prisoners when Corregidor and its three companion forts fell. The Japanese later reported that General Sharp in Mindanao had heeded General Wainwright's "command to surrender." If so, that was not remarkable, for the enemy had already occupied most of the key points on this and other islands. Except for guerrilla warfare, then, which may last as long as the war lasts but cannot affect its outcome, the most costly and the most tragic campaign in America's military history has ended.

V

The most tragic thing about the Philippine campaign was that its not inconsiderable losses were incurred in what from the first was bound to be a military side-show. And in the last phases the Japanese had long before overrun the Netherlands Indies and the case of "The Islands" was hopeless.

The saga of the Asiatic Fleet is more properly a part of the story of the Netherlands Indies campaign than of the Philippine campaign, although men of that fleet fought on land in Bataan and elsewhere in the Philippines, and Bulkeley and his mates fought in small craft in and around Manila Bay.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart's little fleet was made up of two

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cruisers, 24 patrol planes of "Patwing Ten,"[12] a squadron of destroyers, the old aircraft tender *Langley* and a considerable number of submarines. Bombed, harassed and chivvied, opposed by overwhelming air power and sea power, only one fate was possible for the Asiatic Fleet. It helped to bring 10 convoys into Singapore, it fought delaying actions in Macassar Strait and the Java Sea, it carried out orders and exacted the blood of the enemy. And, with the exception of considerable remaining strength in submarines, it was virtually wiped out. The heavy cruiser *Houston*, damaged by bombing and apparently further damaged in the Battle of the Java Sea, was lost some time after that battle in a manner that has never been described. The light cruiser *Marblehead*, the "ship that was bombed to hell," was kept afloat after action off Borneo by the will of her crew and the efficiency of her officers, and limped home in a voyage that is already a naval epic. Most of the destroyers were sunk in various engagements, many of them by bombing; some were destroyed by their crews, after incurring damage, in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. Many small units — tenders, auxiliaries and minesweepers — were lost in and around Manila Bay and in the Philippines. The tanker *Pecos* was sunk by bombing in the Indian Ocean. "Patwing Ten" ended its brief epic of combat with two left out of 40 Consolidated Catalina flying boats.

Soon after the evacuation of Cavite, Admiral Hart turned over command of American naval forces in the Southwestern Pacific to Vice Admiral William A. Glassford Jr. He himself assumed command of all the United Nations naval forces in that area under General Sir Archibald P. Wavell. It was an ill-fated command. Malaya and Singapore and the outposts of the Netherlands Indies fell before it could really start to function. The quick Japanese conquest of Malaya and Singapore decided the fate of the Indies. General Wavell was wisely named supreme commander in India; his strategic decisions were no longer needed in the Southwestern Pacific and plans for General MacArthur's transfer to Australia had already been initiated. The Dutch took over the local command in Java. The Netherlands Indies Fleet, reinforced by damaged units of the Asiatic Fleet and by British and Australian ships, was destroyed in a heroic action in the Java

[12] Later additions and replacements raised the total to 40, including six planes which had been sent to the Dutch but which they had refused to fly because the old-design Consolidated Catalinas had proved to be "flying coffins."

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Sea. The way thus cleared, Japanese forces landed on Java on February 28 and quickly overran the island. Military and naval establishments and important oil developments on the island were largely destroyed by the Dutch in an efficient but hurried application of the "scorched earth" policy. The official radio station at Bandung sent out its last message on March 8: "We are shutting down now. Good-bye until better times. Long live the Queen!"

The American share in the battles for Java and the Netherlands Indies was not very great. The scattered and damaged units of the Asiatic Fleet, particularly the submarines, were a factor in the defense of the islands, and some of the patrol planes of "Patwing Ten" did effective reconnaissance and bombing work. Long-range and medium dive bombers of the Army Air Corps also did yeoman service. But planes never reached the Indies in sufficient quantity to tilt the balance in our favor; and those that did were handicapped by technical difficulties, including the chemical reaction of Dutch aviation gasoline on our leak-proof tanks. The air fields were inadequate and there were few anti-aircraft guns or fighter planes to defend them. Again and again our air bases were almost literally bombed out of existence. The old *Langley*, which had been pressed into service to ferry fighter planes from Darwin to Java, was sunk with a deckload of fighters before she ever reached Java. In general, it was the same old story of "too little and too late."

The number of American fighting men who participated in the defense of Java has never been revealed. They were headed by Admiral Glassford, who succeeded Admiral Hart (under Dutch naval command) after the latter had requested relief and the original Wavell command had been abrogated. A Texas National Guard field artillery outfit, a battalion of the 131st Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Tharp, fought in Java, and was left there when the island fell. These men have received little official recognition. If we are to judge by War Department communiqués, they are the "forgotten men" of our current chapter of history.

The fall of Java and Japanese mopping-up operations in the Philippines brought no pause to Japan's offensive. The scattered remnants of the Asiatic Fleet made their way first to Darwin, from which they were bombed out; and later, according to published Australian reports, to Perth. In the meantime, while the

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Japanese drive toward the Southwestern Pacific had been under way, the United States had been greatly reënforcing the few troops originally sent to Australia, and the Australian Government had brought home some divisions from the Middle East. A supreme command for the Southwestern Pacific was set up under General MacArthur, with the Australians and the units of our Navy acting under his orders in an area around Australia and up to, but not including, New Zealand. Planes were ferried to Australia; air bases were set up on York Peninsula, Port Moresby, Darwin and elsewhere; and our fliers commenced to exchange raids with the enemy. As the spring wore on, it was plain that our air and surface strength in the Australian area was increasing and in April and May we struck more blows against the enemy in this area than he did against us.

At the same time, American troops were sent to New Zealand, New Caledonia and other Pacific islands in order to safeguard the transpacific supply route to Australia. Apparently it was the beginning of an enemy attempt to cut this route which led to the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 4 to 9), the largest naval encounter in the Pacific since the war started. It also was the only naval battle that has resulted in a clear-cut American victory. Like the Battle of the Java Sea, which led eventually to the loss of the *Houston* and other units of the Asiatic Fleet, it involved losses, which had not been announced as this was written. In any event, however, the Japanese received a definite check and suffered the loss of two aircraft carriers and damage to a third, in addition to the loss of two cruisers and many small vessels. This battle increased Japan's naval losses since the war started to perhaps one-third of her cruiser fleet, 21 destroyers and 11 submarines.

While pressing southward toward Australia, the Japanese continued their drive into Burma. American participation in that campaign was at first limited to the dauntless exploits of the small American Volunteer Group of fliers, who with 100 shark-nosed P-40 pursuit planes held initial mastery of the air, but who gradually were worn down and forced from their Burmese airfields back into China. Later, heavy American bombers, operating from Indian bases under command of Major-General Lewis H. Brereton, conducted bombing raids against Rangoon and other bases which had been seized by the Japanese in Burma, and American planes of the Ferry Command brought in supplies and evacuated personnel. Lieutenant-General Joseph W. Stilwell,

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USA, who was appointed Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, commanded the Chinese forces which tried to help the beleaguered British save the day, but the entire campaign was futile and the Burma Road was eventually closed by the Japanese.

During the operations in the Far East, the United States was also busy reënforcing and strengthening its position in other parts of the Pacific. A highway to Alaska and a rail link between the Canadian and Alaskan railway systems were started. Hawaii's position was greatly strengthened; other islands in the group besides the traditional citadel of Oahu became strong points. The Pacific Fleet, under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, operating in detached units as carrier striking forces or task groups, made a series of raids on Japanese positions. Some of the raids were as far north as Japanese-conquered Wake and Marcus Islands, others were made on the Marshall and Gilbert groups, and some were made in the New Guinea area. They were of varying effect: some exacted a heavy toll of enemy light units, others had minor results.

The first air raid in history upon Japan, led by "Jimmy" Doolittle, famous army and racing pilot, who was promoted to Brigadier-General for his exploit, was made on April 18. Apparently its effect on Japanese psychology was greater than had been expected and it produced some military results. Executed by a relatively small number of B-25 medium bombers, which may have been flown off a carrier's deck to land at some Asiatic base, the raid gave a great "lift" to the morale of the United Nations; but since it could not be followed up immediately by other raids it necessarily could have little lasting effect.

VI

Important as were the operations of American forces in the various theatres of action, perhaps our greatest accomplishment in the spring months was the slow but steady progress made toward putting our own wartime house in order. I do not refer only to production of munitions and the sinews of war. The period was one of military planning as well as of military operations. The visit to London of Harry Hopkins and General George C. Marshall, followed later by the visit of the chiefs of the Army and Navy air arms, indicated that plans were being made and decisions taken. In the first months of war we obviously had been groping in the strategical dark. There had been considerable

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danger — and one cannot say that it has been entirely ended — that we might attempt to be strong everywhere, with the inevitable result that we would be weak everywhere. General Marshall's visit many months after the start of the war was not, in one sense, encouraging, for it revealed that so far no final decision had been taken, that our strategy was still in the making. But as these final lines are being written our plans seem to be gradually crystallizing at last.

Our main initial offensive is obviously going to be made in the air against Germany. Possibly it will be followed, if opportunity offers, by thrusts by amphibian and land forces. Meanwhile, American tanks and planes already are operating in Russia, and American supplies of other sorts have been shipped there in great quantities. To compensate China at least partly for the closing of the Burma Road, the system of air transport to that country will be greatly enlarged. We plan to meet the enemy from the skies of Western Europe to the hinterland of China, and to strike him harder and harder. The test of all our plans, the culmination of all the operations to date, will come in the critical months of summer now at hand.

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POLICY AND STRATEGY IN THE WAR IN RUSSIA

The Winter Interlude

By X

POLITICAL and strategical designs are still subject to the fortunes of war. Strategical initiative may be paralyzed at any time by unforeseen and unpredictable factors. A totalitarian government may suddenly attack a country with which it is formally at peace, and thereby gain the advantages of the strategical initiative. A democratic government, even if it foresees armed conflict, must generally wait to take any military action until its people have learned from the failure of patient and prolonged negotiation that there is no alternative to war. This handicap on democracies at the outset of hostilities is of course well known. We may remember, however, that what are advantages and handicaps at the start may become the opposite in the course of a long war entailing grievous disappointments and heavy sacrifices.

Thus a nation which has limited military and economic resources for a long war may, by seizing the political and strategical initiative, secure an initial preponderance that holds the promise of real victory. The hopes based on this likelihood of victory constitute a great national asset — so long as the likelihood lasts. But the reaction to even a delay in achieving victory can be much more violent and more dangerous in a nation which is under a dictatorship than in a democratic nation which has had slowly to overcome its initial military disadvantages and disillusionments. For example, the equilibrium of a nation like Germany, which knows that it can win a war only by keeping the strategic initiative, may easily become unstable. The older generation in particular, which only 25 years ago underwent experiences similar to those it is undergoing today, may be expected to be particularly sensitive to the sudden, almost instinctive, impression of having lost the strategical initiative even without having suffered any strategic reverse. This may be the reason why Hitler eventually decided to make out that the terribly hard winter was even more of a delaying factor in the war in Russia than actually was the case.

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True, this winter in northeastern Europe was the coldest in more than 150 years. It set in, too, a week or a fortnight earlier than usual. The cold had not only a paralyzing effect on men and horses, but grave consequences for machines as well. It is for physicists to decide how serious are the effects of a temperature of 50 or 60 degrees below zero on synthetic rubber, gasoline and *ersatz* metals. That they were serious in Russia last winter the German reports openly admit. But the fact remains that the German advance in Russia reached the furthest point which it could safely attain about the second week of November. The reasons why this was so were given in a previous article in these pages, written before that date.[1] The results of the causes there described were in practice aggravated by the extremely severe weather; but the weather was not a main cause.

This view of the position of the German Army in Russia has to be maintained in face of the barrage of news and information released from all sides in the past six months. It is strongly and sufficiently supported by the official communiqués of the Russian and German General Headquarters. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine the text of these communiqués word by word, checking the names of towns and villages as they changed hands, and analyzing the figures given of losses in men and matériel, will need no "inside" information to come to a definite conclusion. Even to people of little military insight or experience, the disproportion between the numbers of Germans killed and the amounts of German matériel captured as given in the Russian reports must reveal the truth through the wartime fog.

In the darkest and most ominous hour of the war, Russian General Headquarters had to do everything possible to foster the morale of the Russian people. The Russian communiqués, then, were formulated with the utmost care in order to convey the impression of great victories to the Russian nation without becoming ridiculous in the eyes of military experts. Why, for example, should they not report the recapture of a "populated" place in a vast thinly-populated area even if it did consist only of a former great estate with a few peasant houses? Why not state that raiders 40 miles away from a given town were advancing "in the direction of" that town, if there was no habita-

[1] "Russia and Germany: Political and Military Reflections," by X, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1942.

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tion in between, only swamp and forest? Readers of these Russian communiqués, furthermore, should have realized that they could not reasonably add up German losses given for separate actions at different places and then combine them with the total German losses reported in later Russian accounts of long phases of the campaign over the whole front. Only if due allowance is made for the fact that it is impossible to count the dead except by burying them (as only the masters of the field of battle can do)[2] are casualty figures indicative of the actual strategical position.

II

It is impossible to suppose that the German General Staff were unaware of the dangers lurking in the Russian winter and in the country's immense distances. The guarded tone used in the reports from German General Headquarters about the twin battles of Vyazma and Bryansk in the middle of October, and about General Rundstedt's advance toward the bend in the Donets River north of Taganrog, contrasted markedly with an announcement by Hitler's personal press chief, Dietrich. This announcement Goebbels himself immediately, if somewhat tentatively, debunked, very likely under pressure from the military authorities in Berlin. But it would be rash to conclude from this that Hitler had really made himself independent of the judgment of the General Staff. Perhaps the personal interview given by Hitler to Dietrich had a special aim. Perhaps it was meant to influence the makers of Japanese policy. This point must be examined as a possible clue to the whole mystery of the assault carried on against Moscow from November until just two days before Pearl Harbor, that is to say, until the Japanese fleet was already well on the way to strike its treacherous blow.

The statements of military spokesmen in Berlin from the beginning of November gradually prepared the public for the realization that climate and distance would set a limit to any further German advance. This was natural. Every German staff officer for a hundred years has had to study the book by General Clausewitz on the campaign of 1812. There can be no doubt that Tukhachevsky's general strategical conception of time and space

[2] The Stockholm correspondent of the London *Times*, April 4, 1942, commenting on a detailed German claim of Russian losses, writes: "Such exactitude immediately after a battle of such magnitude would be remarkable at any time; in present conditions, with bodies sunk in mud, ditches, pools, streams, and still unmelted snow, it is most astonishing."

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

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and his great scheme of fortifications were influenced by the same writer. Now it is true that, since Clausewitz's time, rail and motor transportation and, even more, the close tactical coöperation of air forces and mechanized ground forces, have produced revolutionary changes in both time and space as vital elements of strategy. But it must be repeated again and again that geography and human endurance limit the effects of these changes, as General Groener foresaw that they might do even in a comparatively small country like France.[3] In a vast country like Russia, not even the unforeseen mistakes committed by the Russian General Staff in concentrating too great masses of troops on the western frontier far beyond the Stalin Line could prevent the limitless extent of the country from becoming the essential factor in the campaign.

In 1811 and 1812 Scharnhorst imbued Prussian officers like Gneisenau, Wolzogen, and Clausewitz, as well as the Russian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Lieven, with the paramount importance of the vastness of Russian distances in any campaign in that country.[4] There was another Prussian officer who, like these, preferred to quit the Prussian service in the hope of fighting against Napoleon in Russia, General Phull. His strategical imagination was not equal to Scharnhorst's; but his personal influence over the Tsar might have permitted him to lead Russia to disaster if Clausewitz had not persuaded him at the last moment to resign. Perhaps, too, General Phull was not able to foresee, as Scharnhorst and Clausewitz did (though Gneisenau did not),[5] how stoically Russian soldiers would withstand the disappointments and hardships of constant retreat. There are no soldiers in Europe, except the British, who can be compared with the Russians in this characteristic.

But General Phull had one good idea which is strikingly similar to certain elements in Tukhachevsky's plan of defense. This was the establishment of a strong defensive position on the River Drissa (a small tributary of the Dvina just east of Dvinsk) which was well adapted to preventing tactical coöperation between Napoleon's northern and central armies. In case Napoleon turned

[3] *Cf.* "German Strategy: 1914 and 1940," by X, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1941.

[4] Clausewitz, "La Campagne de 1812 en Russie," edited by M. Bégouën, Capitaine Commandant Brevete d'Etat-Major, Paris, 1900, p. 22.

[5] This is possibly why Gneisenau, with his lifelong craving for offensive action, left Russia in order to fight against Napoleon with the British. Clausewitz generously stresses the importance of other reasons for Gneisenau's departure.

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back from his advance into the vastness of Russia, this position would threaten his retreating armies with disaster. Tukhachevsky chose a much better location and a more grandiose and modern form for his stronghold; in this respect he benefited by Clausewitz's criticism of the Phull plan. But that Phull was right in principle has been shown by the whole present campaign. The German General Staff must have appreciated the vital importance of the Drissa position from the very beginning, as Leeb's and Bock's armies, acting in close coöperation, attacked it with strong forces. Once this fortified position was in their hands, they ran no risk, later on, in permitting the Russians to advance as far as Velikie Luki.

It is only now possible, in the spring of 1942, to appreciate fully the constructive imagination and the strategical genius of Tukhachevsky and his fellow officers of the General Staff, diluted or perverted as their plans have been in execution by the lack of equal imagination on the part of troopers like Marshal Budenny and other amateur commanders. In order to understand what has happened, and what may very likely happen this summer, it is worth while to try to get a picture of Tukhachevsky's strategical vision.

In an ordinary grouping of the Powers, a Russian chief of staff shares one advantage with the chiefs of staff of Great Britain, France, and almost every other great country of Europe except Poland and Germany: his country cannot be overrun in a few months, as Germany can be unless an initial German success compensates for the disadvantage of her unprotected natural frontiers. In the eyes of a great Russian chief of staff, the successful defense of the country resolves itself into one main problem: how prevent an invader from the west from threatening the direct communications between Kharkov and Moscow, which are the life-line of Russia, until mobilization throughout the vast Russian empire has been completed and the Russian Army has been concentrated west of this life-line?

Great swamps, lakes and rivers mark Russia's natural western frontier, running from Lake Peipus down through the Pripet Marshes to Korosten, and thence to the middle course of the Dniester and so to the Black Sea. This line requires strong fortification in the south, between Korosten and the Dniester; and in the north between Lake Peipus and the pivotal Drissa position. Although this line is, geographically, very long, the natural

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obstacles which it presents to an invader make it a comparatively short line to defend, provided the fortifications at critical points are sufficiently deep. If all the army corps which in time of peace are stationed west of the Moscow-Kharkov-Crimea line, and which draw their reserves from the local population, are brought into these fortifications promptly, the Russians have unique possibilities for waging a successful defense. West of the fortified line, only very weak forces should be left — to delay the enemy, to maintain contact with him, and to observe his deployment. The Russians can "sell space for time." Time is what they need in order to concentrate all their forces for the defense of Moscow and the industrial area of the eastern Ukraine. When the bulk of the Russian Army has been concentrated in these two regions, with a large striking force of élite troops between Kiev and Kursk (to prevent a junction of the southern and central invading armies in case of breaks north and south of the Pripet Marshes in the fortified line), then the Russians can risk retreats of a hundred miles and more even behind the fortified line.

Lenin during his exile read Clausewitz and was fascinated by him. With his genius for simplification, he captured the essence of Clausewitz's vision. Tukhachevsky embodied it in a technical system of defense far ahead of any in existence at the time he conceived it. In his scheme Leningrad can have figured only as an isolated advanced fortification of no decisive importance. One may surmise that as long as Finland and Estonia were not in Russian hands Tukhachevsky did not care greatly for a strong Baltic fleet or the arsenals of Kronstadt — that is, unless an offensive were ordered against Germany. General Rundstedt's difficulties in the Crimea and in his advance on Rostov, which were due to the domination of the Black Sea by the Russian fleet, proved conclusively that so long as Russia avoided a war of aggression every additional ship she kept in the Black Sea at the expense of her Baltic fleet could be of vital importance.

The armed camp of Moscow — nearly 350 miles in circumference — is protected by vast stretches of swamp and forest, not only to the northwest, but also to the north, the northeast, and the east down to the River Oka between Kolomna and Ryazan. In the ring of towns surrounding Moscow are located sufficient armament and other industries for a long war, provided coal, steel and oil can be brought in either from the east or from the Ukraine. When the German attack actually started, the possibil-

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ities of securing such supplies from the east had not yet been developed adequately. There remained the supply base of the Ukraine. This threatened to become the weak spot in the gigantic scheme of defense.

How to protect the Ukraine must therefore have been uppermost in Tukhachevsky's mind. In that region, once the Stalin Line had been broken, there were not the same natural advantages as could be utilized in the north. Except for the Dnieper, panzer divisions rapidly advancing in the south would encounter few and unimportant obstacles until they came to the densely populated Donets basin. For this reason the Stalin Line was made especially strong from the Pripet Marshes down to the River Dniester; and it was manned by Russian élite troops, who, when the time came, fought extremely well. As long as the Russians can hold the Kiev region, an invading army runs grave risks in advancing further toward Kharkov. Large forces would have to be detached to the south to prevent a Russian army from attacking from the Crimea, by nature an extremely strong position. Another threat would be from the Donets basin, where large masses of troops can easily be hidden; these could attack the southern invading army as it tried to cross the Dnieper immediately south of Kiev to join the northern invading army moving against Moscow from above the Pripet Marshes. Thus Kiev and its hinterland are vital, as a wedge between the main forces of the invaders, both to the defense of the region of Moscow and also to that of the Ukraine. In Tukhachevsky's grandiose scheme of defense Kiev was the pivotal point. To man the Stalin Line west of Kiev as strongly as possible was therefore right and necessary. But the placing of large forces far west of the Stalin Line itself, as was actually done, was a grave mistake. It spoiled Tukhachevsky's plan altogether.

A second mistake was to denude the Dnieper line immediately south of Kiev and to concentrate forces further south at Dniepropetrovsk, the bridgehead to the Donets basin. This was responsible for Rundstedt's easy crossing of the Dnieper at Cherkasy. It enabled Bock and Rundstedt to join forces east of Kiev and annihilate the Russian forces covering the most vulnerable part of the entire system of defense — the railways linking Moscow and the Ukraine. The whole strategy of the leaders of the Russian Army should have been directed to preventing that junction at any price. Even by withdrawing their forces towards the line

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Kaluga-Tula-Orel from around Smolensk immediately after the German capture of that city, instead of permitting the Germans to destroy the majority of their forces in the area that is strategically the most dangerous for Russian armies, they could have frustrated the whole German plan. That is what Clausewitz had advised the Russians to do in a similar danger, and what Tukhachevsky probably would have done. But they did not have either Clausewitz's or Tukhachevsky's understanding of grand strategy. The Russian armies employed to halt the invader after he had broken through the Stalin Line did not operate according to any integrated strategical plan. They never had the initiative and were defeated in separate units.

Rundstedt was thereupon free to turn his attention to the Crimea, the Donets basin, and Kharkov. Bock's troops, in combination with such of Leeb's forces as were available after they had destroyed the last Russian positions in the Baltic countries, were free to attack the Russian armies covering the approach to Moscow from the southwest. That is the only direction from which it is vulnerable from a military and supply point of view. Were the Russians hypnotized by the presence of General Hoth's panzer army which, after a single stupendous dash in early July, had arrived at Vyazma, only 120 miles west of Moscow? In spite of heavy losses, General Hoth's army seems to have fully accomplished its tactical function of distracting Russian attention from the more important area northeast of Kiev.

Such, in brief, was the way in which the natural and strategical advantages embodied in Tukhachevsky's great conception were discarded by people who probably never comprehended it. It is an old story — a repetition of the unimaginative execution of the Schlieffen plan by the younger Moltke. Clausewitz, criticizing another Prussian General Staff officer in the Russian Army in 1812, wrote that his pedantry offset his other great qualities; and he added:

> He who moves in the element of war must not burden himself with anything that he has found in writing. Only the training of his mind matters. If he comes with ready-made plans, not derived from the clash with reality, not formed from his own flesh and blood, events will overthrow the whole structure even before he is able to complete it.[6]

These words by Clausewitz could be used as the epilogue of last year's campaign in Russia. They should be present to the

[6] "La Campagne de 1812 en Russie," p. 32.

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mind of every commander, and especially so in a war in which the apparent preponderance of mechanized forces exercises such a power of fascination.

III

On October 16, after four months of war, Tukhachevsky's system was shattered, and the strength of Russia's first-line European army was broken. This was a vital gain for the German Army. Unquestionably it was achieved at enormous sacrifices. The front around Leningrad remained quiet. Leeb had not men enough to do more than eliminate the Russian threats in the Valdai Hills and to the north, on the River Volkov. In this way he protected the northern flank of Bock's Army Group, which needed time for regrouping before its assault on Moscow from the west and southwest.

Very difficult tasks faced Rundstedt, both in the Crimea and in pursuing the remnant of Budenny's army before it could reach the Donets basin. Rundstedt's line, stretched out as far north as Kursk, became thin. Under these conditions, any divisions which the Russians could bring up from Asia or the Caucasus must have seemed a serious threat to him. While the Crimea remained unconquered, Rundstedt — who had nothing to match the Russian Black Sea fleet — must have excluded from his mind all idea of an advance to the Caucasus. For him to have crossed the Don at Rostov and turned to the south, where there were only two passable roads, would have exposed his flank and rear. Attacks on them under those conditions might have been dangerous even if delivered by comparatively small forces. In addition, his advance (like Bock's) was hampered by a fortnight of torrential rain. He could no longer depend on any strong supporting tactical pressure from Bock's army in the north. In fact, the German line was now extended beyond the maximum of safety. If first-class Russian armies had still been available, they might have gained a great strategical victory in the Belgorod-Kursk area north of Kharkov.

All in all, considering the manpower which he had available, the conditions of supply, and the weather, Rundstedt had accomplished his task for the year in occupying the Donets basin and in taking all but one of the railways from there to Moscow.

The ideal winter line for the German Army would of course have been along the railway running northward from Rostov

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to Ryazan and Vladimir, with the bend of the Oka and its neighboring wide zone of swamps to protect the front for nearly two hundred miles to the east. In those circumstances the Russians would have been deprived of the chance of moving troops north and south. But this meant that Moscow would first have to be captured. And it would have to be captured under conditions in which the German lines had been extended to a maximum; under menace of cold, which occurs in Moscow, as Caulaincourt remarks in his memoirs, as suddenly as the explosion of a hidden bomb; and in face of the threatened arrival of Russian divisions from the Caucasus, from Asia, and even — as actually occurred at the end of November — from eastern Siberia. Furthermore, possibly over a third of Budenny's southern army had been brought back safely behind the Don, there (especially those evacuated from Odessa and Nikolaev by boat) to be regrouped. Once his advance had reached the densely populated industrial area of the Ukraine, Rundstedt had no further opportunity for great battles of encirclement. No "Cannae," in Count Schlieffen's sense, is possible in such terrain. Converging pressure must be exerted on one town after another, under conditions which are very unfavorable to air reconnaissance.

Once Moscow had been cut off from the oil of the Caucasus, the coal of the Donets basin, and the iron ore of the Ukraine, Rostov might have been considered an ideal advanced German station for a winter lull. In fact, although it would have provided excellent winter quarters for a large number of troops, it was not. But — and this was the first clue to further movements — Rostov was in fact occupied by rather weak forces. To judge from both the German and the Russian reports, there was hardly one full S.S. division in Rostov when the Russian attack was made. That was a division which had been in the vanguard of the advance from the mouth of the Dnieper to the Don, and must have suffered severe losses.

As early as the end of October, reports from German General Headquarters mentioned that snow and sleet were hampering operations. Yet a month later, after the German capture of Rostov, Goebbels wrote and spoke of an advance against Astrakhan and the Caucasus. Was this a conflict of views or a smoke-screen to prevent the rest of the world from perceiving the German plans? While Bock, after taking Kaluga during the battles of Vyazma and Bryansk, was reorganizing his armies

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rather slowly to move forward against Moscow, conflicting information about both weather and plans originated daily from official sources in Berlin and from unofficial sources in other European capitals. Was there real uncertainty as to what the final decision was to be? Or was there a conflict between Hitler's political purposes — or his state of possible elation — and the deliberate military judgment of the generals? Would not the generals have preferred to stop at the line Kursk-Orel-Bryansk-Vyazma-Valdai Hills?

Only history will provide the conclusive answers to these questions. Even now, however, basing our judgment on the official military communiqués alone, we can venture an interpretation. A German military spokesman estimated the Russian armies around Moscow in the third week of October at 1,500,000 men, and those in the south under Marshal Timoshenko at 1,600,000 men. Adding the 400,000 men in the northern sector, this would mean that the Russians still had 3,500,000 in their western front line. That is probably many more than were available in the German front line. On October 21 a military spokesman in Berlin stated that out of 500 Russian divisions there remained 200, or 4,000,000 men, of whom perhaps 500,000 were east of the Ural Mountains. This meant that Russian losses were estimated at 6,000,000 men, more than half of them prisoners. Hitler had announced a "final blow" twelve days before. The military spokesman, however, without excluding the possibility of a drive against Moscow, minimized its importance.

One sure conclusion emerges. German General Headquarters did not underestimate the Russian military strength still available. The October 21 statement, in combination with a report on the same date about heavy snowstorms and freezing nights, left the impression that German General Headquarters were doubtful whether, in face of climatic conditions, the advance should be carried further. But in fact the cold was not at all like the bombshell of 1812.[7] Clausewitz, describing Napoleon's campaign in that year, makes little of the sudden cold even then. As chief of staff in General Platen's Cavalry Corps, which harassed Napoleon's Army incessantly, he was in a better position than anybody else to appreciate its importance. He confines himself for the most part to very sober calculations of Napoleon's losses

[7] "Memoirs du General de Caulaincourt." Paris: Librairie Plon, 1936, v. II, p. 66 (American edition, "No Peace with Napoleon." New York: Morrow, 1936).

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in each phase of the campaign. On the basis of these actual losses he concludes that there was nothing for Napoleon to do but to retreat in time over the road by which he had advanced. It was only on the way back that Napoleon's Army suffered from the cold.

In this connection Clausewitz makes certain conjectures, which we now know from Caulaincourt [8] to be perfectly correct. Writing of Napoleon's attack on Kaluga on October 23, 1812, at the same time that the order to evacuate Moscow was issued, he calls such a thrust against Kutusov's armies the natural beginning of Napoleon's retreat, and adds that "it was most important for Bonaparte to begin his retreat by a sham offensive toward the south." The German generals in 1941 may have had this manœuvre in mind. If so, it would explain much that otherwise is obscure in the German as well as in the Russian reports.

But there must be an additional explanation for the fact that the northern wing of General Bock's Army, which moved a hundred miles north of Moscow from Kalinin through Klin and crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal due north of the center of Moscow, was strengthened to include four panzer and two motorized infantry divisions, and was supported on its southern flank by three more panzer divisions. The terrain between the Volga and the northern ring of fortifications around Moscow offers no chance for such a mass of tank and motorized divisions even to deploy fully. South of Moscow, on the other hand, the terrain, at least as far as the River Oka at Ryazan, is ideal for panzer divisions. But there, where opportunities for German progress were infinitely greater than in the north, only four panzer and three motorized divisions were present. Both the northern and the southern wings were very weak in infantry. In the north there were only four infantry divisions; and in the south, on an extremely extended "double-looping" front, twice as long as the rest of the entire front around Moscow, there were only seven infantry divisions. Twenty-two infantry divisions, supported by two tank divisions, were concentrated in the center. This disposition of forces is hard to explain except on the assumption that it made provision for a retreat even before the assault was begun. The massing of twenty-two infantry divisions in the center of the battle front, with only eleven infantry divisions in the attacking wings, and half of these apparently as much as 50

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 86–87.

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miles behind the panzer divisions in echelon,[9] provided for the possibility of a quick withdrawal of the wings and of stubborn resistance in the center west of Moscow against a Russian counter-attack, but not for the complete encirclement of Moscow. The final encirclement of fortifications or of armies harassed by tanks can only be executed by infantry divisions.

Russian reports of the development of the battle lend further support to this view. In the first two weeks of November, however, the reports from Berlin and other European countries became more and more confusing. November 1 was the date of the Hitler interview which was censored in Berlin. On the same day the German radio broadcast very exact and distressing descriptions of the hardships undergone by German troops as a result of the intense cold. Three days later, while the German attack was progressing north and south of Moscow, there were rumors in Finland of a withdrawal. On November 12 there were rumors in Berlin of an imminent withdrawal from Moscow. From that time, the attacks made north of Moscow, in spite of the heavy tank forces concentrated there, were merely demonstrative; but south of the city further important progress was made, to Venev and Kashira on the middle Oka and to Skopin on the road to Ryazan. Russian reports unintentionally suggest that the 1st Panzer Division in the north had already withdrawn. On December 4 came reports of defensive Russian actions along the Moscow-Volga Canal, of flanking attacks against the German tank column farthest to the southeast (south of Skopin), and of claws of a German pincer movement only three or four miles apart north of Tula. The next day German General Headquarters reported heavy air attacks against Russian troop concentrations. On December 6 they reported nothing about the Moscow front. On December 7 occurred the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Promptly on the morning of December 8 Berlin issued a statement — enlarged the following day — to the effect that no strategical movements, but only local actions of purely tactical significance for the rectification of the line, were to be expected. The German report for that day, as quoted in London, contained these significant expressions: "In some places positions are being

[9] These divisions, far in the rear of the advancing tank armies, had been taken in part from Serbia and Poland. Possibly they were those destined later in the winter to defend chosen strong points. The Ninth Army Corps, at least, which the Russians reported west of Moscow opposite their center, was afterwards allotted the defense of Mozhaisk and Gjatsk.

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occupied which will make defense in the winter easier. Where far advanced units of certain attack wedges are in unfavorable positions for the winter, these positions are now being brought back to a certain line."

On the southern front, meanwhile, General Kleist's Army had suffered a setback north of Rostov on November 20. Kleist nevertheless took that city four days later, and on November 26 the Germans reported heavy fighting continuing there. Russian counter-attacks were repulsed, according to German reports, on November 27. The Russian reports of General Demidov's recapture of Rostov on November 29 stated significantly that "it was cavalrymen who first returned to the city, moving hard on the heels of *retreating* Germans"; and further, that street fighting continued for two days, and that thin ice on the river "slowed up" the "Russian advance." The Germans reported that "German troops of occupation at Rostov have evacuated the center of the town, in accordance with orders, so that the necessary measures of reprisal may be taken against the population, who have illegally taken part in the battle in the rear of the German Army." On November 30 the Russians reported an attack on Taganrog, further west; but of this there has been no further mention in official Russian sources.

On December 3, the day before the general withdrawal from Moscow began, Goebbels suddenly changed his tune. He said: "The Caucasus is not so important as Moscow." But he added, with typical cynicism: "German news policy is a first-class weapon. For instance, during the battle of Flanders the press was given information that was contrary to fact, and the enemy fell into the trap and paid dearly." These words at that precise hour are more significant than the other considerations which point to the same conclusion. There was no plan for, and no possibility of, an advance against Astrakhan or the Caucasus.

The best and shortest line for German defense in the southern arena through the winter was from Taganrog northwest through Slavyansk to Kharkov and Kursk. This left in German hands the coal production of the Donets basin, with the exception of two mines producing 1,400 tons a day, and the major part of the armament industry of the Ukraine. In addition, it provided ample winter quarters for the troops and left the Russians with only one north-and-south railway connection west of the Ural Mountains.

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The German Army was exhausted and lacked fuel for its mechanized forces. It could not advance further. But its feats in the south as well as before Moscow had not merely used up its own resources; they had achieved a political purpose — not as near the heart of the German General Staff, perhaps, as Hitler's — the transfer of Russian reserves from the Far East. This permitted Japan to enter the war without being seriously hampered by fear of Russia. Having succeeded in this, Hitler may have been convinced that he had won the war. Following his "inner voice," he put himself definitely — although only formally — in the place of Brauchitsch, who may have been glad to be relieved of the responsibility for military operations dictated solely by tactical political considerations.

To achieve Hitler's political purposes, as here indicated, the German Army had to assume grave risks with regard to the weather and had to make heavy payment in losses. The Russian report of 130,000 German officers and men killed in the drive against Moscow, from the beginning until the Germans took up their final defensive positions, may not be much exaggerated. But it is strange that the Russians do not stress the number of German prisoners, but only the captured matériel. This confirms two assumptions. The drive against Moscow was a demonstration for political purposes. The withdrawal of large masses of troops began when tank divisions north and south of Moscow — especially the latter — were still pressing forward. Rear-guard actions were fought by comparatively small forces. The whole vast retreat, involving thirteen tank divisions and about a million men, probably began about the third week of November. Control over its schedule was never lost.

IV

A close study of the official communiqués of the two armies reveals the tactics pursued by the Germans during their retreat and in their winter defensive operations, and corroborates to some extent the reasons assumed above for the assault on Moscow.

In the conditions prevailing, the task of withdrawing a million men and thirteen tank divisions a distance varying from 100 to 220 miles was truly formidable. The weather was most unfavorable and there were very few roads. In such circumstances, the effort to move tanks and heavy guns on tractors must have been

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costly; the troops, who were not clothed for a winter campaign, must have suffered severely; and the strain on the general staff and other officers must have been terrific. No wonder the health of many of the high commanders broke down. The fact is that the whole attack on Moscow was a dangerous political gamble, hardly to the taste of military experts. Probably it would never have been attempted if the Russian forces in and around Moscow, though numerically stronger than their attackers, had not been known to be poorly equipped and to be able to muster little striking force outside the capital's own fortifications.

All this adds to the plausibility of the thesis that while the German wings were still advancing many divisions already had begun marching in the other direction. If the retreat was to be executed safely, as planned, any pursuit by the fairly strong Russian forces north of Moscow would have to be checked long enough to enable the most advanced German southern wing to get back at least in line with the most advanced German central position. The comparatively strong mechanized German army northwest of Moscow, already mentioned, protected the withdrawal of the very strong northern wing, which had advanced as far as the Moscow-Volga Canal; it also covered the line of the German center until the two wings had withdrawn sufficiently far. Therefore it was only this northwestern mechanized army which was reported as still attacking on December 6 — smashing at the pivot of the Russian front — when the mass of the German Army already was in retreat.

The withdrawal of German divisions from a small wedge which had cut the Moscow-Tula railway was first reported by the Russians on December 8. Four days later the Russians occupied Yakhroma, the furthest point reached by the German northern wing. A fortnight later the tank groups furthest south were still at Volovo, southeast of Tula. Petrovsk, a small place east of Volokolamsk, was taken at the same time — the first indication of any rearward movement in the German center. On December 23 the German line ran fairly straight, north-and-south, not more than five or ten miles behind the most advanced positions in the German center of a fortnight earlier. Two days later the evacuation of Volokolamsk was reported. This indicated that the Russian advance in the center had totalled 35 miles in 20 days. Six days later the Germans abandoned their positions west of Volokolamsk. Only Rzhev was left as a strong point to guard the north-

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ern wing; while the whole German central army had already arrived west of Smolensk. A day later, on January 7, the Russians reported the capture of Nelidovo, on the railway west of Rzhev. Between Velikie Luki and Moscow no German troops now remained. In fact, the bulk of Bock's Army had withdrawn in four weeks to winter quarters either in the Baltic countries, not far from where they had started their offensive in June, or in White Russia west of Bryansk.

A small number of divisions were left to hold certain strong points — Staraya Russa, Kholm and Velikie Luki, all on the Lovat River, which runs north into Lake Peipus, and Velizh (northwest of Smolensk), all of these protected on the flank and rear by swamps; Bely (north of Smolensk), Rzhev, Gjatsk (east of Vyazma), Bolkhov (northwest of Orel), Mtsensk (northeast of Orel), and Kursk (at the junction with the army in the Ukraine). The only strong point evacuated, after nearly ten weeks of siege, was Mozhaisk. North of a line slightly south of the railway from Rzhev to Velikie Luki and west of a line from that point to Staraya Russa no German troops were left. They had retreated to the Leningrad railway, leaving as an insuperable obstacle to the Russians an enormous area of swamp and forest and lakes, protected by the strong points mentioned.[10] All these strong points were railway and road junctions. Only one vital junction, Sukhinichi, where the railway from Moscow to Bryansk crosses that from Smolensk to the east, seems to have been left unprotected. Whether this was with certain future operations in view, or whether it simply was evacuated too soon, cannot be determined from the published reports.

Behind these strong points some divisions were left in reserve to prevent the infiltration of Russian forces in too great numbers. Most of the troops so stationed, like the divisions left in strong points, had not participated in the battles of the summer and fall, and had mostly belonged to armies of occupation in other European countries. In fact, of the 51 German divisions specifically mentioned in Russian reports as participating in the assault on Moscow, only seven have been mentioned in later engagements.

Several important conclusions can be drawn from these facts and figures. The Russians were too weak to disturb the German

[10] The Germans were able to take this great risk because they held the Drissa position, the importance of which has already been described.

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withdrawal to any significant degree. They followed the retreating Germans but did not pursue them. Undoubtedly they were able to force those German troops which were not far away in winter quarters to undergo great hardships; and they also captured a certain amount of heavy matériel. But they were not able to conquer any strong point that the Germans chose to keep. The German General Staff must have been convinced that their opponents no longer were in a position to advance or to attack in force during the winter. Their own troops of course held the vital points; and they knew that the Russians would not find it any easier than they would themselves to solve the problem of supply in the midst of the Russian winter. The Russians, in fact, were unable to bring supplies or support up by rail to their most advanced positions, beyond the German strong points, either in the north or in the Ukraine. There was one exception to this general situation: the open gap between Vyazma and Bryansk permitted the Russians to use the Moscow-Bryansk railway to Sukhinichi and the railway thence to Smolensk.

In the north Leeb had evacuated his most advanced positions east of the River Volkov early in January. He seems to have held Novgorod, on the Volkov, and Staraya Russa, further south, in spite of very heavy pressure and complete encirclement for twelve weeks by the Russians. These could exert pressure there because of good rail and road connections with Moscow. Sensational unofficial reports of the "capture" of a whole German army in this neighborhood quickly evaporated.

The method of defense used by the Germans through the winter must have surprised many military experts. It was indeed audacious to retire the bulk of the army so far, leaving only weak forces at a few strong points, sometimes as far as 200 miles beyond the winter quarters. The method would of course have been impracticable in central or western Europe, which lack the immense forests and swamps of Russia, which have dense networks of railways and roads, and where the climate is milder. It would have been less successful in Russia if the Russians had not been exhausted and in need of time to reorganize the remainder of their forces. When the Germans boasted of Russian losses in this winter fighting, the Russians angrily but correctly retorted that in the raids of the past four months relatively weak forces had been employed. Anything else would have been suicidal. Their task for the winter was to build up, with the help of equip-

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ment coming from their allies, a new army with striking power.

The system of defense used by the Germans, first in their retreat and then in the maintenance of widely separated strong points, was based on experiences in the latter part of the First World War. The Russian report of the defense of Klin, on the railway from Moscow to Kalinin, must have indicated to many combatants of that war, and to anyone who had happened to read German publications of that time, that the highly successful tactic of using special machine gun squadrons for the defense of isolated vital points had been revived. When the German reports became more expansive, making references to the "hedgehog system" and to the feats of "sharpshooters" in the Crimea in face of heavy Russian tank attacks, it was evident that there had been a further development of the same method of resistance which had prevented catastrophic German defeats in Flanders and at Cambrai in 1917 as well as on many occasions during the retreat in the summer of 1918.

Unfortunately, histories of these machine-gun squadrons, which were special General Headquarters formations, either are poorly written or are not available in this country. As far as can be gathered, they were tentatively established in small detachments by General von Falkenhayn. As soon as Ludendorff came to the Western Front he organized 60 so-called Machine-Gun Sharpshooter Squadrons, each consisting of three companies. They were composed of élite officers and men, and they had authority to reject anyone who in battle failed to maintain their own high standards. They were loaned to whatever armies were under greatest pressure, for rapid placement wherever break-throughs threatened or had already occurred. In the last phase of the war they usually were transported by motor trucks and were supplied with additional armament of anti-tank rifles. They were especially trained to combat tanks and low-flying planes which machine-gunned or dropped light bombs on light artillery and infantry — the "dive bombers" of that date. Normally they were not used in the first line but in depth defense from 400 to 6,000 yards behind the first line. They covered the retreat into the Hindenburg Line in January 1917. They were the only German troops allowed complete fluidity, and could change their positions indefinitely within specified areas without permission from divisional or brigade commanders. This revolutionary departure from tradition seems to have caused such commanders to look on them with suspicion.

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But the young General Staff officers of that time — the same men who now command the German Army — doubtless observed with interest that these formations developed, on their own, a new tactic of defense. These officers now have employed that tactic on a large scale and scientifically in the winter in Russia.

It was not due to any special circumstances that in the last war a single one of these squadrons of 300 men, with one or two light cannon, sometimes held a village against the repeated attacks of several divisions, accompanied by tanks, for days after it had been entirely surrounded. In October 1917, in spite of having no infantry or artillery, and with no reserves behind them, they stopped Haig's big assault between Poelcappelle and Pashendaele. In this hour of the greatest danger, Ludendorff, much against his will, decided to sacrifice them. They were ordered to stand to the last man — even after the infantry had retreated and artillery had been abandoned — like islands breaking the waves of the mass attacks. To Ludendorff's surprise, they succeeded without too great losses. So in August 1918 they were sent, without any initial support, into the areas of break-through where no other German troops remained. They would be ordered to form a "hedgehog" around a village and defend it until they received a written order by the army corps commander to withdraw. They were extremely successful. Due solely to their skill and bravery, the German army commanders were able after each break-through to reform their lines some miles behind the isolated points of resistance.

It is of the utmost importance fully to appreciate this whole evolution in defense tactics. Where climatic and topographic conditions do not permit great strategical break-throughs and pincer movements, defense may again become superior to attack by mechanized weapons. The tactics of defense may undergo great changes, with important consequences for the final outcome of the war. This has been a revelation of the winter campaign in Russia.[11]

The weakness of this German tactic of defense in the last war lay in the difficulty of supplying troops in isolated strong points. Supply from the air has now overcome this difficulty, not simply for small forces, but even for whole divisions or army corps; and

[11] One can imagine with what pride German General Headquarters reported on April 10 that two corporals had put 11 Russian tanks out of action with anti-tank guns at close range in a single encounter, and in March that in 11 days one isolated division had destroyed 162 Russian tanks.

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the latter — as at Rzhev and Staraya Russa — have thus been enabled to adopt the same tactic. It can be surmised that the strong points in Russia were fortified weeks in advance and supplied with food and ammunition for months ahead. They may very well have been supplied with a new type of anti-tank gun as well.[12] The strategical success of the German system of withdrawal and use of strong points has been that it enabled the Germans to maintain contact with the Russians. They lured the Russians far from their supply bases, while themselves remaining as near as possible to their own. It would be much easier for the German Army to crush Russian resistance definitely once the remaining Russian armies advanced against the strong points and into the open mouse-traps between. This is true not only in the north, but especially in the Ukraine. Runstedt's army chose its winter positions with this in view. It would be difficult to open a spring offensive from Rostov and the bend of the Don. But having retreated to the line Taganrog-Slavyansk, the Germans had every chance to make pincer movements to the north and east in the spring. It will also be interesting to watch what happens further north, at the Sukhinichi gap. But the element of surprise can no longer be as effective in this spring's German offensive as it was in May 1940 or June 1941. An able Chief of Staff such as the Russians now have, a former Tsarist officer, should be able from close contact with the Germans to guess their possible lines of attack and to prepare counter-thrusts.

The skill, endurance and heroism of both the German troops in the strong points and the Russian troops who infiltrated between them and lived for weeks in the severest cold in half ruined huts or hastily built block-houses were extraordinary and admirable. Such tactics on either side would have been impossible, of course, without airplanes for supply and the radio for communication. It is beyond our imagination to picture what they meant in the frozen swamps around Staraya Russa, on the edges of impenetrable forests, or on the tundra-like open spaces, where hardly a noise was to be heard except the light whisper of falling snow, the cracking of trees under the cold, or the whipping by of the wind. Officers and men constantly had to struggle against the temptation to fall asleep outdoors under the combined

[12] In the London *Times* of April 6, 1942, the author of a very interesting study about the Libyan campaign, in which the same method has been employed by the Germans, reaches the conclusion that most of the losses in tanks on both sides were due to ground anti-tank guns, especially the new German 105 millimeter gun with a tapered barrel.

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effects of cold, snow and fatigue. If attacks were made, they were possible only over frozen snow or on skis. A wounded man could hardly ever be saved. On neither side did the soldiers know when they would be in contact again with their main armies.

There are two explanations for the fact that the success of the Russian pursuit fell short of expectations raised by the press. First of all, modern technical invention permitted the Germans to enlarge to an unprecedented scale the normal form of protection for stationary divisions evolved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They extended this protection more than 200 miles in depth, whereas even in Russia during the last war advanced guards were hardly ever posted more than five or ten miles from their main forces. Thus one can call the forces scattered at isolated strong points over a distance of 2,000 miles, perhaps amounting altogether to 40 divisions, the "pickets" of the main German Army, which had retired safely to winter quarters.

The second explanation is that the possibilities of pursuit are commonly exaggerated. General Wavell has given an evaluation of the difficulties of pursuit in his book on Allenby. A few sentences from it may be quoted here:

> To the uninitiated pursuit seems the easiest possible form of war. To chase a flying, presumably demoralized enemy must be a simple matter, promising much gain at the expense of some exertion and hardship, but little danger. Yet the successful or sustained pursuits of history have been few, the escapes from a lost battle many.[13]

These are the words of a man equal to Clausewitz in courage and modesty, akin to him in genius, and superior in style.

V

What has been the cost to both sides in the campaigns so far? Any forecast of the war's future progress is contingent on the size of the losses and the possibilities of replacement. Close study of the day-to-day reports of the Russian and German Headquarters makes clear that the number of officers and men killed cannot possibly equal the figures published by credulous reporters and writers in the past few months.

Comparisons between losses in this war and in the last can easily be misleading. One unofficial German estimate arrives at a figure for the number of Russians killed this time by adopting the ratio between the numbers killed and taken prisoner in the

[13] "Allenby: A Study in Greatness," London, 1940, p. 217. See also p. 133.

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whole period of the last war. That is obviously inexact. Comparisons could in any case be made only between offensive or defensive phases of the last war and similar phases of this. On the average, there are fewer casualties in defensive than in offensive actions. Even so, comparisons are more or less worthless. The tactics of modern mechanized warfare are too different from those of the last war (at least up till August 1918). One fact, however, seems incontestable. The number of Russians taken prisoner must be extremely high, and that of Germans taken prisoner must be extremely low. None of the reports from Russian Headquarters has made any attempt to deny this. Whether the German figures of the number of Russians taken prisoner are correct or not, nobody, of course, can prove. But the likelihood is that the total must be well above 3,000,000, including, of course, prisoners wounded.

The strategy of break-through and encirclement by large tank and motorized divisions follows a now familiar pattern. The weak spot in the enemy's line is felt out; the mass of tanks is concentrated at that spot; they break through; and finally they fan out behind the line, destroying rear communications and pushing the enemy forces closer and closer together in a small area. When a large army is encircled in this way, it is only a question of days until it runs short of food and ammunition. Also, enemy bombers will now be enabled to attack from all sides, destroying airdromes and making reconnaissance utterly impossible. Up to this point, unless they have been called upon to take strongly fortified positions, the attacking tank and motorized divisions cannot have suffered heavy losses.[14] There ensues a second phase. The encircled enemy divisions must be sawn through by new tank attacks, which destroy their communications, make it impossible for individual commanders to carry out orders, and break morale. Infantry divisions meanwhile close up, narrowing the ring around the encircled mass.

One must have all this in mind when one compares casualties in this war and in the last. At Verdun and in Flanders, of course, the tactics were very different. There frontal attacks were made along a front of 25 miles or more. Each division held only a small section of the front line, sometimes as little as 800 or 1,200 yards.

[14] Of course, tank attacks against strong permanent fortifications like those opposite Kiev, around Moscow, and, especially, in the bunker area of Leningrad, must entail heavy losses for the attackers.

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Strong consideration was given to defense in depth. Dents were made in the enemy front line in close fighting. The artillery knew the exact range for each successive position, and inflicted heavy losses; and the fire of the machine guns at close range was also very deadly. In consequence of all this, the number of killed and wounded was very high and the number of prisoners relatively low. That is the difference between the results of a tactical break-through and of a big strategical break-through. Except in the latter half of 1918, the strategy of break-through and encirclement always failed on the Western Front. In consequence, the ratio of those killed to those taken prisoner was entirely different from what it must be in the present war.

This reduces any estimate of the losses in the war in Russia to a mere guess. According to unofficial German reports, as mentioned above, Russian losses in killed, wounded and prisoners would have reached 6,000,000 by the time the assault on Moscow started. On December 1 the Germans reported a total of 3,800,000 Russian prisoners. It can be assumed that the Russians saved the majority of their wounded in the far north and in Leningrad during the period of siege, though not, of course, in the big battles of encirclement. They also may have been able to evacuate their wounded from Kiev, Odessa, Nikolaev and the Donets basin, as well as most of those in the Crimea. We can go so far as to estimate the wounded saved by the Russians, and not included among the Russians taken prisoner, at 400,000. If we accepted the German figure of total Russian losses of 6,000,000 we should have to conclude that by the beginning of December 1,800,000 Russians had been killed.

In every war the number of Russian soldiers killed has been extremely high in proportion to the losses of their enemies. But the discrepancy between the figure of 1,800,000 Russian dead and that of 162,000 German dead up to December 1 is so great that both figures must be dismissed as unreliable. When we have made every allowance for the Russian tradition to fight on stubbornly long after orders no longer are clear, and for the devastating attacks by low-flying German airplanes on the chaotic mass of an encircled army, we still cannot accept such a disproportion. Either the number of German killed must have been higher or the number of Russian killed must have been lower. German losses in killed during the withdrawal from Moscow will certainly have been higher than the Russian. Since that time, in

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spite of the boasting of both sides, the numbers killed must have been relatively low, though the likelihood is that Russian losses have exceeded the German.

The losses among trained officers on both sides, and the losses in both air fleets, must have been enormous. Since such losses are difficult to replace they will have a deteriorating effect in both armies. We can deduce that Russian losses in tanks, airplanes and other equipment were several times as high as the German from the fact that large Russian armies were encircled and annihilated. German losses in equipment may have been made good in the meanwhile. A recent article in the London *Times* mentions that the number of German tank divisions in Russia had increased to twenty-one.

The German armies of occupation in Russia can be replaced by other Axis troops. One should not exaggerate the number of troops so required, since the Russian armies carried most of the civilian population with them in their retreat. On the other hand, Germany must keep a relatively large number of divisions in France, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway to meet the possible threat of an attempted invasion. In addition, an increasing number of semi-military guards are needed in Germany to control prisoners' camps and the masses of imported foreign workmen. One recent report makes it appear that even the S.A. have in large part been pressed into the military and semi-military forces.

Germany has been taking extraordinary measures to concentrate more and more of her armament production in large plants possessing the most modern techniques of mass production and to close down the smaller firms. Also, all the women available are being used in factories. Together, these two steps will probably permit Germany not only to make up quantitatively for the German Army's losses in manpower in Russia, heavy as they may have been, but also to improve its equipment to some extent. But the quantitative optimum, as regards men and machinery, will be reached at the end of this year. And *qualitatively*, especially as regards trained officers, there already must be a rather serious deterioration.

Russia, on the other hand, has unlimited reserves of manpower, but she will suffer much more seriously from the inability to replace losses in trained officers and aviators and in equipment. Having lost the major part of her armament industry, and of her

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coal and iron production, she will be in dire difficulties even with the assistance of her allies, who simultaneously have to arm themselves and who suffer from the disadvantage of very extended supply lines. From this standpoint the occupation of the Ukraine represents an enormous German success. It means that the food supply of unoccupied Russia will diminish seriously in the fall, while that of Germany and her allies will improve. But Germany's armament production can hardly be maintained at its present level in 1943, while in that year American production will reach its peak. Nor will Germany be able to replace this year's losses in manpower if they are as serious as last year's.

In mechanized warfare everything depends on the synchronization of strategical action and maximum production. It would be very difficult for the United Nations to make good the loss of valuable months if the two factors got out of gear. For Germany and Italy it would be almost impossible. The development of the technique of mechanized warfare accordingly leads to the constant narrowing of the influence of even great strategical imagination. The arithmetic of the production schedule gains at the expense of military genius. That is why ten years ago, when there was still a chance that the preparations for total technical warfare might be stopped, generals of many nations struggled in vain against the military technicians. In the present phase of the war, when the whole world has been geared to produce arms, there is little possibility that a suitable balance in the military situation will lead, as in former wars, to peace negotiations. The very momentum of the industrial war effort, when it reaches its peak, drives nations either to struggle for total victory or to sustain a long war of attrition. It is for this reason that every nation is exerting its utmost effort in this fateful year.

Month by month the German generals must take the threat of an attempt at the invasion of the European Continent increasingly into account, even if the attempt does not amount to more than sporadic actions aimed at exciting riots in the occupied countries. They therefore must deal a decisive blow this year to the positions of their foes either in Russia *and* the Near East or in the British Isles. The success of a large invasion by sea is always uncertain if the defenders are fully prepared. Even a slight hitch or setback in it can lead to immediate and permanent reverses. This is equally true for all the present belligerents. The statement stands in spite of the Japanese successes, for these were secured

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by means of surprise attacks which temporarily upset prearranged schedules of defense in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

The Germans cannot stay where they are in Russia indefinitely, whether or not they have to reckon with a serious British attempt to open a second front on the European Continent. If they cannot negotiate a separate peace they must face the same eternal problem of space in Russia that beset Napoleon. They must either retire to the shortest line from the Baltic to the Dniester, or they must advance so far into Russia that it becomes impossible for her to recover. But it is their fate that not even such an ultimate success in Russia would in itself be sufficient. If they decide to strike to the east, they must take the Caucasus and threaten the Allied position in the Near East *this year*. Whether their first main attack is concentrated on Moscow and the Caucasus or on Leningrad and the Caucasus may be clear by the time these words appear in print. Whatever happens, one thing is certain: in order to meet the adverse factors threatening them next year, including the menace of increasing damage from air attack, they must before then deal a blow to the British position either in the Near East or in the British Isles themselves. Otherwise they will lose the strategical initiative, and it is this initiative which has been largely responsible for their successes so far.

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THE MIDWEST AND THE WAR

By Robert J. Blakely

WHAT is the war doing to Midwestern thinking about our country's rôle in world affairs? It would be a bold Midwesterner who, after reading the analyses written on the Eastern seaboard, persisted in considering the question still unanswered. From them he ought to know that "the people out there" are complacent. "They really don't know that we are at war," he will have heard over and over again; "it's true they are fighting well, but only for the inalienable right of the United States to be isolated." This attitude persists in the East despite proof provided by public opinion polls of the past several years that the Middle West is no more isolationist than the nation as a whole.[1]

A Middle Westerner who demurred at the East's interpretation would be even bolder to try to answer it on the basis of his own personal acquaintanceship. The Midwest can be defined broadly as stretching from Western Pennsylvania to Colorado and from mid-Missouri to Canada. What kind of personal acquaintanceship can one have with a population nearly as large as that of Italy, in an area four times that of Weimar Germany, and possessing the most variously developed of all our regional economies? Moreover, the war is still in an early stage for the United States, and opinions are still in process of formation. And finally if one has lived in the Midwest steadily enough since December 7 to have gotten the "feel" of it, he probably has lived there too long to possess any real basis for offering judgments of it in comparison with adventures in opinion in other parts of the country. The fact remains that the Midwest, for all its motley population, probably has a more nearly uniform *Volksgeist* than Hitler's blue-eyed Germany. A Midwesterner who has shared the war experience with many persons in many groups and different strata can at least make an attempt at sensing what people throughout the region are thinking.

The most apparent thing is that they *are* thinking. Every kind of occasion is used for serious discussions — the meeting of a farm

[1] One reason for the Eastern belief, of course, is the record of the Republican Representatives from the Middle West. On the nine major bills concerning foreign policy and preparation for war considered in Congress between February 2, 1939, and November 13, 1941, the 84 Representatives from that region cast 633 out of 650 votes, or 97 percent, against the Administration's policies.

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loan association, for example, or a district Rotary convention, or a reunion of the alumni of a small high school. If time and again the discussion leaps to the postwar problems, this is not because the participants do not realize the necessity and difficulty of winning the war; rather, it is because of their realization that one of the things for which we are fighting is the privilege of helping to build the postwar world, and because they are determined that we shall give our ordeal and our victory some meaning. This thinking is not haphazard. It is based on conclusions beaten out during the long debate on foreign policy which ended December 7, 1941. One is weary but grateful as he reviews the amount of talking done in the Midwest since the conference at Munich. The rough logic of the argument can be traced, and there may be profit in doing so briefly.

II

The nub of the story is in the growth of the conviction that the two things which the people of the Midwest had long regarded as vital interests — peace and the security of American institutions — were contradictory. Before September 1939 these interests seemed reconcilable. We regarded the war in Asia as remote and we did not feel that war was imminent in Europe. From the beginning of the war in Europe until the fall of France they seemed reconcilable because we saw little relation between the two wars and expected Britain and France to win in Europe.

Then we had to find out why we did not want a Nazi victory. Was it merely out of morality and sentiment? If so, we would have permitted a Nazi victory. But we decided the war was for more than that. From a conviction that the aggressor states threatened our peace but not our security, we graduated to a conviction that the Nazi system threatened the existence of our system. The steps in this intellectual progression followed but did not anticipate events. The argument was really over whether the United States had any choice. If its existence was at stake, of course everybody would fight — but was it? At each particular point the people of the Midwest were sufficiently fearful lest it might indeed be at stake for them to be willing to take risks. As a result, there, as in the nation as a whole, about 50 percent approved of each of the President's successive moves to aid the opponents of aggression and about 20 percent more urged even stronger action.

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But it was when we turned our eyes southward and westward beyond our own frontiers that we made real progress in defining America's vital interests. Several years ago, when Midwesterners saw no threat to those interests, they used to say that Latin America and Canada were the only territories (other than our own) which they would fight to defend. By the time the lend-lease bill was passed we saw that a threat did exist; and we realized that we could ward it off in Asia and Europe more easily than in Latin America because in Asia and Europe we would not have to fight alone. We had learned quite a lot about Latin America. We had gotten a vague idea of cultural and political differences and a clear idea of economic similarities. Much would have to be done, we perceived, before Pan-Americanism would offer us a haven in a storm. We were willing to try to put the ideals of Pan-Americanism into practice (with varying degrees of opposition to specific measures from specific groups). But meantime the storm was upon us. We began to think of our Good Neighbor policy as a *part of* instead of as a *substitute for* a consistent world policy.

Midwesterners also came to perceive the need for a world policy by looking at Asia. Several years ago (to put it charitably) we knew even less about Asia than about Latin America. The situation in Asia was complicated. We did not seem to have vital interests there.[2] We were bolder there than in Europe — perhaps because of our racial snobbery and the fact that our expansion had always been westward. Of course, we chose our hero and our villain. But though we enjoyed cheering one and hissing the other, we Midwesterners were for quitting the Asiatic theater. Meantime, however, we did not see the contradiction between our mild intervention there and our doctrinaire isolation from Europe.

Until the fall of France the only change which occurred in our thinking with regard to Asia was an increase in our dislike of the Japanese. This expressed itself in approval of anti-Japanese economic measures but not in any pronounced increase in pro-Chinese feeling. Our attitude was negative. The fall of France, the Japanese advance into Indo-China, and the German menace to Britain revealed to the Middle West the spherical nature of the world. At first, however, we did not take events personally. The German-Japanese pact against us in 1940 excited us neither to

[2] The magnanimous grant of independence to the Filipinos was motivated at least in part by a sublimation of the desire of sugar beet and animal fat farmers to be rid of competitors.

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fear nor to anger. By the time of the Nazi attack on Russia we knew that we were committed to a Nazi defeat, that the Japanese were committed to a Nazi victory, and that unless we checked Japan the Nazis would win. So we favored checking Japan; but we wished to do it by threat and bluff rather than by aid to the Chinese. Emotionally we still did not expect to have to go to war.

Between 20 and 25 percent of the people of the Midwest opposed the President's foreign policy. The citizens in this minority fought each new step in advance; but (unlike most of their political leaders) they accepted the one just made. It was not that they did not want to stop Nazism. They merely thought war was unnecessary and wanted to avoid it.

To this opposition four Midwestern characteristics contributed, as follows:

Pacifism. The influence of the "Bible Belt's" traditional condemnation of war on moral and religious grounds must not be underrated. Moreover, the "munition-makers" theory of the origins of war had a strong appeal, particularly in Nye's North Dakota, where of all regions in the Midwest the people were, and probably still are, the most confused. It was not lessened by a strong anti-capitalistic vein of thought remaining from the radical revolts of the Midwest against the industrial East.

Politics. The Midwestern members of the lower house in Congress are Republican. Of the 84 Republican Representatives from the area only Cunningham of Iowa has not been consistently isolationist. When the editors of the *New Republic* recently picked 23 "obstructionist" Representatives in Congress they chose 14 from the Midwest, 12 of them Republicans. These men, whose organ is the *Chicago Tribune*, reflect, though they exaggerate, a regional condition in their party which has been tolerated or encouraged by political traditions dating back to the Civil War, the development of railroads and the opening of homesteads, and by social conservatism, the stronghold of which is the numerous small towns and cities of the Midwest. Of 49 Democratic Representatives in the House from the Midwest only 10 have voted consistently isolationist.

Isolation. To farmers in beet sugar, cattle, wheat and other one-commodity branches of Midwestern agriculture, world trade means less than it does to farmers producing several commodities. In the eyes of most of them it plays the rôle of the villain — "cheap foreign competition." The structure and nature of labor

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unions differ widely throughout the region, of course; but, in general, labor has still to win its battle for the recognition of twentieth century standards. Labor leaders therefore are more preoccupied with the inter-group struggle and less interested in world affairs than elsewhere. It was not an accident that the Midwest produced John L. Lewis, prototype of the warrior as opposed to the statesman.

Anti-British feeling and anti-imperialism. The factors here are the Irish and German groups, and also one aspect of the anti-capitalism of Midwest radical thought.

The approach and technique of the minority which fought President Roosevelt's foreign policy were negative. They harped on the horrors of war, the alleged shortcomings of Britain and Russia, or worse, and the hopelessness of victory. They did not endeavor to show how the United States could coöperate with victorious Fascism or live securely and prosperously within a moated hemisphere. This negativism was in part due to their mottled make-up (Robert Hutchins and Charles Coughlin; Philip LaFollette and Clare Hoffman). Toward the end of the debate the isolationist leaders tended to break into two factions, one desperate, the other despairing. Lindbergh heaved his anti-Semitic boomerang in Des Moines; the *Chicago Tribune* printed secret war plans. Some other isolationists, regarding war as inevitable, subsided. An honorable few — too few — repudiated the Fascist outbreaks of their desperate colleagues.

By the fall of 1941 the Midwest was intellectually prepared to wage war in Europe and Asia. We had decided that we must fight there soon with allies or later at home alone. But our soul was still troubled by our hatred for war and by the divisions within our national counsels. And essentially we must have doubted the conclusions we had reached by intellectual processes, for we were completely unready for the attack on us at Pearl Harbor.

That we were attacked from two directions may be one of the most influential facts in American history. The immediate effect was galvanic. The great majority of Midwesterners concluded that if President Roosevelt had erred it was in having been too moderate. Of course, a persistent group of haters — haters of Roosevelt, haters of war, haters of the British, haters of the Russians — was driven underground, there to bide their time. Their strength cannot yet be measured. But fundamentally the Midwest was unified as it never had been before, and with the

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rest of the nation it exulted in the new national unity. As the weeks go by we see more and more clearly the full extent of the havoc done by the Japanese attack to the Midwest's old sense of American impregnability.

The remaining question is: "Now that we have received concrete proof of the correctness of our intellectual persuasion that the existence of the United States is at stake, will we progress to the conclusion that, since we must *fight* and *win* wars abroad, our policy must be to *prevent* wars abroad?" If I cannot confidently answer "Yes," it is out of respect for the complexity of the steps that will be required to prevent foreign wars and not because of any doubt about the permanence of the Midwest's conversion. We have moved farther than is recognized elsewhere. My hope is that the nation as a whole has moved as far.

III

Now that we are in the war the Midwest wants to carry it to the enemy. This is only distantly connected with an awareness of the power position of the United States. It merely expresses our basic will to win. There is little fanfare about it. Deep as is the Midwest's conviction that we must win *this* war, war itself is not being glorified. Indeed, the hatred of war, pacifism thwarted and isolation denied, may turn out to be the main supports of a drive for an orderly solution of the world's greatest problem.

The arguments for waging only a defensive war still persist, slyly, subtly, often masquerading as merely hatred of the necessity of war and as criticism of our war effort. These arguments may find expression merely in the emphasis of a headline. But they are there, getting no converts, just waiting. . . .

So far, Midwesterners identify the enemy chiefly as the Japanese. We are aware of the many-fronted and global nature of the war. Indeed, most of us probably have the conviction that Nazi Germany is the real culprit. But our attention is focussed on the theater where we are doing the most dramatic fighting.

We expect a long, hard struggle. At first our anger and our native cockiness colored our judgment. But reverses brought sobriety. According to the survey made by the National Opinion Research Center at Denver, 50 percent of the Midwest now expects a war lasting two years or more (probably a slightly higher percentage than in the nation as a whole) and only 8 percent expects a war of less than a year. But our support of the war does not

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rest on any estimate as to its probable length. We'll adjust our sights but not our determination.

It is thrilling to observe the Midwest's sublime inability to conceive defeat for the United States. We have full confidence, despite battles lost, in our armed forces. This is particularly true of the Navy, in which the Middle West has a peculiar sense of participation because of the disproportionately large enlistment of our Midwestern boys. Similarly, despite our defeats, the popularity of President Roosevelt and the general confidence of the region in him mount. Personal impressions check with what the Gallup polls show: neither "honest and loyal criticism" nor nasty sniping seems to have made much difference.

The fact is that we seem to be healthy-minded today — that is, compared to our prewar selves. Immoderate impulses are being held in check. For example, we are wary, in the main, of the spy and witch hunt. Civil liberties seem to be more secure than they were during the depression. In fact, when we discuss how to win the war we are able to submit to analysis the milk of sacred cows hitherto regarded, though unpasteurized, as pure. When now and then a pro-Nazi rears his head people of course get excited; but there does not seem any tendency for them to usurp the law in trying to inflict punishment.

Thus we have been treating our Italian and German minorities in the Midwest decently. This is due partly to the fact that they are better assimilated, by one generation, than were the Germans in 1917, but partly to experience and education. We remember previous excesses with shame. The lesson apparently will have to be learned anew with the Japanese. We are hostile towards the few that are in the Midwest and are set against getting any more of them. Blood patriots were going to deny Iowa the services of some irreplaceable Japanese chicken-sexers (including several who were American soldiers on leave), but justice and common sense spoke and in the end were heeded. In the spring of 1942, Nebraska badly needed workers in the sugar beet fields. The importation of Japanese laborers from other parts of the country was considered. Governor Griswold warned: "I do not feel that I can guarantee order will be maintained." If the Governor had wanted to come out for reason and beet sugar he probably would have found enough Nebraskans to maintain order.

If we Midwesterners *were* to take the law into our hands it would likely be against the East for calling us complacent. We

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don't think we are. We don't feel that we are doing everything we should, but we don't know what else to do. The truth probably is that we are ignorant of the civilian's rôle in total war. No Midwestern state, probably no community, has a program of civil mobilization appropriate to the size of the problem. Valuable analyses by social scientists are ignored by Midwestern governors, some of whom are preoccupied trying to enlist in the Senate of the United States. What is and is not being done in the meantime can be illustrated by two examples. In one country school eight miles from a town of 250 population, 15 miles from a town of 2,500, and 50 miles from a city of 80,000, the eight primary pupils solemnly practise crawling under tables to escape flying fragments of bombs. Yet labor grows scarce in cities and on farms, with no mobilization of women, children and white-collar workers under way. And scrap iron rusts on nearly every farm. As the need for a scientific civilian program of war work burns deeper into the popular consciousness, the Midwest will go to school for total war. Let us hope it will not go alone.

Another inadequacy is our indifference to the "spiritual offensive." Few pause to think how much other peoples are interested in our war aims. We abound in good will, but we seem to take it for granted that our benevolence is as apparent to the Chinese, the Indian, the European in conquered and occupied countries, and even to our enemies, as it is to ourselves. In the Midwest there is slight pressure, so far, for a dynamic statement of American war purposes. But there would be considerable response to one.

IV

Midwesterners have no real sense of the vitality of the "United Nations." We look at our allies separately, and feel that the common ground uniting us is more negative than affirmative.

Towards the British most of us feel admiration and affection — perhaps more so towards our neighbors the Canadians and towards the Australians than towards the English. When the British botch a job their good friends feel competent to speak plainly. The same friends haven't yet heard about jobs the British doubtless know we have botched. Less discriminating and perhaps less well-intentioned criticism is heard in the Midwest from obstructionists who continue their prewar line of thought and talk; but it also comes from some ardent supporters of the

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war. The fact that these latter feel as they do even under the emergency conditions which now prevail indicates a weakness in Anglo-American relations which may later on prove even more serious.

Our admiration of the Russians is a more complex affair. Being good Americans, Midwesterners worship success. Some, taking up at this point, argue that we shall have to fight Russia later on. This fear, like the suspicion felt towards the British, is played upon by those who deliberately oppose the war as well as by some others who support the war. Among the latter are found some openly if innocently cynical sponsors of Russian war relief. But there also is another factor in the situation — a revaluation of the Soviet experiment is being made by thoughtful persons in all groups and strata. Here it is not the military consideration which counts but the spirit of the Russian people. "They've got something they want to hold on to." Increasing numbers of Midwesterners are interested in understanding the Soviet Union and in reviewing past American-Russian relations.

Our reactions to the Chinese are simply stated: remote and enormous admiration (particularly since the Japanese began kicking us around), but little sense of comradeship and even less understanding of or enthusiasm for the Chinese revolution. Interest and understanding are growing, however, promoted by a group which calls for reform of the old imperialist methods, for the declaration and practice of racial equality (at home, we hope, as well as internationally) and help for China in building herself into a cornerstone of a stable Asia.

Our thoughts on the Latin Americas are the most easily described — satisfaction and indifference.

Midwesterners have little patience with the "have and have-not" theory of the origins of this war. When we consider how vicious and powerful the Axis nations are we conclude that it is a good thing they had no more than they did have. So far we have not worked up much direct hatred for them, however, and what we do feel is mostly directed towards the Japanese (this may, of course, change as our American troops come to grips with the Nazis in Europe). Increasingly one hears the behavior of the Japanese and Germans explained in terms of race and culture; but a formidable and articulate group opposes this line of argument.

People of the Midwest listen readily to objective explanations

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of the problems of the German, Italian and Japanese peoples and the factors, including American bungling, which led to Fascism and war. Perhaps half of us agree that the United States must help these peoples contrive sane solutions to their problems. We are truly perplexed, however, as to what to do with the indoctrinated generations; and this perplexity is being exploited by that minority, which includes some leading isolationists, which calls for a "just peace and plenty of it!" We make more of a distinction between governments and peoples in the case of the Germans and Italians than the Japanese. This too may change. But the National Opinion Research Center reveals that a substantially smaller percentage of the Midwest than of the nation as a whole believes that the enemy peoples will always want to go to war, and substantially more believe that eventually they could become good citizens of the world.

V

The Midwest's strongest conviction concerning the future is that "the attack upon our territory and institutions must never be permitted again." This may prove the foundation upon which support for America's participation in world affairs can be built. Speculation on specific problems raised by the nature of the task is just beginning. The argument is being developed that the United States will be the only great source of supply in a world of want, that Britain will have been weakened and that our other allies and the enemy peoples will be badly in need of reconstruction. According to the polls, 87 percent of the Midwest (compared to 85 percent of the nation) believe that the United States should take part in a world organization to help keep peace and order. Of this 87 percent, 86 percent would have such an organization include all the United Nations; 58 percent (7 percent more than in the nation) would include the enemy peoples.

Most of the thought we are giving to problems of world order is general and finds expression in terms of a "stronger League." Clarence Streit's program of federalism is attractive to many; but the suggestion of anything that seems like an exclusive Anglo-American or democratic union excites fears that counter-blocs would be constructed. *Fortune's* proposal of an Anglo-American economic union is too new and perhaps too complicated to have attracted either widespread criticism or approval as yet.

The reactions of two elements within the ranks of former

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opponents of war are significant. Pacifists in considerable numbers are swinging (some of them back) to support collective security. So are some isolationists. One Iowa editor with a long history of opposition to world coöperation wrote after Pearl Harbor: "Here's one who has had his fill of isolationism and self-sufficiency for America." Some other isolationists — the number of them cannot be measured yet — seem to be turning their thoughts in the direction of a balance-of-power policy toward Europe and Asia.

Midwesterners seem to be more hard-boiled than the run of Americans generally toward the "repayment" of lend-lease. We incline to be a bit more lenient toward China than toward Russia and Britain. But during the past 20 years we have done a lot of thinking about the nature of repayment. We joke about the uselessness of our gold in the Kentucky hills. We are impressed with the fact that most of the old war debts were repudiated, and with the thought that if they had been paid in gold we would have had to bury more gold still. Many and powerful makers of opinion, including leaders in farm and business organizations, develop this point.

Concerning the possibility of the payment of reparations, the people of the Midwest are a bit more skeptical but no more wise than Americans generally. Fewer think the United Nations should make the enemy peoples pay all the cost of the war (35 percent in the nation, 27 percent in the Midwest, according to the National Opinion Research Center); but more think they should pay all they can over a period set by the victors (49 percent in the nation, 57 percent in the Midwest).

Behind these thoughts on specific problems is the conviction, held however dimly by a majority of Midwesterners, that any system of world order must have economic substance. This undoubtedly will be the crux of the argument over American participation in such a system. Already the lines are being drawn. "After the war, what?" — wrote George Peak recently to Illinois Republicans. There are two possibilities, he answered: Internationalism, as outlined in the point of the Atlantic Charter promising equal access to markets and raw materials, which (he said) would mean a lower standard of living and a foreign type of government for Americans; or Nationalism, which (he said) would mean the protection of our higher standards and the working out of our life in our own way.

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The Republican Party will continue to be the army of isolationism unless it is hopelessly crushed (which is improbable in the Midwest, although the indications now are that the Democrats will gain next fall) or reformed according to the philosophy of Willkie and Stassen. So far the Grand Old Party has sat on the fence. The resolution passed by the national committeemen in Chicago during April, besides being merely a resolution, is pretty meaningless. It has been interpreted in their own sense by both isolationists and participationists. On the more important point of whether isolationist incumbents are to be "purged" the Party balks. "This war is more important than any question of isolation versus intervention," said an Iowa committeeman.

VI

The thought Midwesterners are giving to the postwar world is deepened by their reflections on the changes in the American economy which are being forced by the war effort.

The expansion of our agriculture is being set by the needs of our armies and of our allies abroad and of a war economy at home. Corn and hogs, flax and soybeans, furnish examples. "Inefficient" branches of our agriculture are being fostered and will become entrenched. The production of cattle and sugar is being pushed, and spokesmen for those interests are not neglecting to argue their case for the future. A revolution in the mechanization of agriculture has long been under way. Now, stimulated by the need for greater output with less manpower, this is going ahead despite the increasing difficulty of getting machinery. After the war, the "economic unit" in some areas and in some segments of agriculture is likely to be larger and the number of persons and families productively engaged in agriculture therefore smaller.

The labor supply is being expanded in the Midwest as elsewhere. The training and retraining of machinists is a particularly big job in this area on account of the number of its automobile, airplane and farm implement industries. What is being done to the chief industries of the region, like mining, meat-packing and machine-making, is widely known. "Small business" in many fields is depressed, in others it is distorted, thanks to the chaos of subcontracting. A few "inefficient" industries are being developed — for example, corn alcohol. Undoubtedly, too, the war is intensifying the concentration of population, bleeding the small towns and rural areas and congesting cities large and small.

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The importance of these developments in their effect on our Midwestern thinking about foreign affairs cannot be overestimated. We fear the shock of readjustment. The memory of the past is with us like a pain. We worry about national debt and taxes, about how we are to reabsorb returning warriors and workers, about the fact that the farmer entered this war still battered from the last and with twice the mortgaged indebtedness he had in 1917. To some of us the logic seems clear. Agriculture and industry can maintain productivity and employment only if both are healthy throughout the nation, and the nation can be well only in a rationally planned world. The "efficient" farmer and industrialist need a planetary market for which to produce. (At least one major automobile company is reported to be preparing to stay in the airplane business.) The "inefficient" farmer and industrialist need a world of rising purchasing power and economic opportunity in order to cushion the conflict with their more efficient competitors and to permit their gradual absorption into other fields.

The Midwest has spokesmen able to develop this logical argument. Many leaders in many groups are coming to realize the necessity of a *world* approach. Millions more are as yet merely shaken in their blind hope in a narrow solution. But the drive away from a crabbed conception of the true basis of national welfare seems inexorable. Before the drive can be intelligently directed, however, much elementary education must be done (particularly in the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas and westward, and in Chicago), and specific proposals to aid in solving specific problems of adjustment must be made. The important debate of the future probably will be over, not the general question of participation in world affairs, but concrete measures involved in that participation. For example, over 80 percent of the people in the Rocky Mountain states oppose the free importation of foreign beef, sugar and wool. The people of the Dakotas, Nebraska and Kansas probably feel much the same.

If in the past the two chief factors working toward world-mindedness in the Midwest have been the revolt of agriculture against protectionism and the development of efficient industries, then it seems likely that the current of our thoughts will continue to flow in the same direction, swollen by our experiences in this war. Our agriculture is more than ever diverted towards producing for a world market; with the rest of the world destitute, we plainly

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cannot sell and refuse to buy. Our automobile industry has now become in part an airplane industry, conforming to the fact that the human race is on the threshold of the Air Age.

This movement may be obstructed by one development and aided by a second. In the boiling up of war activity, social pressures are mounting. As women, Negroes and low-income groups gain in responsibility and economic power, reactions are provoked which may impede a coördinated national and world program. Two alliances seem to be in the making, running horizontally across our Midwestern economy: one between the low-income farmers and laborers; the other between upper-income farmers, employers and the more venerable labor organizations. The alliance in the upper stratum, being older, has gone farther; the alliance in the lower, long an unrealized hope of Midwestern reformers, is being promoted by the Farmers' Union.

The second development, incipient as yet but intense and aggressive and growing, is part of the search for the meaning of the war. Fascist aggression is being seen as a total counter-revolution made possible because the liberal revolution of modern times was not extended to colonial peoples in non-occidental societies or to the masses within occidental society. What is required, it is being argued, is a resumed total offensive by the forces of the liberal revolution, to end racial and economic exploitation abroad and at home. An increasing number of Midwesterners proclaim this, and are receiving a quickening response. To the credit of the vitality of Midwestern democracy, this is no "class line." The interpretation is spreading among members of all groups and classes. As the submerged portion of humanity becomes the foundation of victory, and as we all become enrolled in the classless fellowship of sorrow, the Midwest will search deeply into what President Roosevelt has inappropriately called "the war for survival."

VII

What is the kind of world which the Midwest hopes will survive the fighting and evolve in the peace? So far I have spoken mainly about the kind of world which we do not want. We don't want Hitlerism. Neither do we want the American world of the past generation. Our desires, in so far as we have given them voice, are expressed well in our own Henry Wallace's analysis of the world revolution against fear and want. His statement can be said to be negative in comparison with Jefferson's "life, liberty and the pur-

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suit of happiness." You cannot free man from fear and want; you can only free him to pursue happiness; and the pursuit, not the happiness, is the glory of life. True. But, since Jefferson's affirmative language has so often been used in recent decades to justify denying man, particularly the farmer, both the pursuit and the happiness, we must not misread the apparent negativism of Henry Wallace and his Midwestern followers.

Actually, it is a highly affirmative philosophy mirrored backward in the misery of our time. The Midwest has taken the conditions of the pursuit of happiness for granted, and emphasized the job of removing the obstacles. Having been a territory, we accepted our political union as granted; we did not have to fight to *form it, only to prevent its destruction.* We *took vast productivity* as the natural order; when our system broke down we saw, side by side, food spoiling and people starving. While waiting for a basic correction of the maladjustment, our liberals thought in terms of relieving want by distributing plenty and not immediately in terms of producing more. The conservative Midwest was inclined to oppose fundamental alterations in the distributive system out of respect for a productive system which had worked so well for so many for so long.

But, liberal or conservative, we want freedom, peace and productivity. (No one who knows the thought of Henry Wallace or the Midwestern farmer can suspect that they enjoyed trying to restrict agricultural production. Programs for conserving soil and developing hybrid corn were much more to their liking.) Now that the foundation of the nation's peace has been shattered, now that the nation and particularly the Midwest are producing for the world so enormously that the very volume threatens to choke and starve us if we try to retreat back into ourselves — now what?

Several years ago the editors of *Fortune* wrote that nothing has ever been good enough for the American, and that when he accepts the world as his concern, it won't be good enough either. The observation applies particularly to that "most American" region, the Midwest. Given luck and leadership, it will coöperate in securing humanity's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The beginning of wisdom in leadership is the knowledge that the people of the Midwest are likely to give what is asked of them.

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SOUTH AMERICAN PERPLEXITIES

By Fernando de los Rios

THE Second World War has brought the countries of South America a feeling of concern and responsibility. It has turned their thoughts inward. The temporary silence of the cultural voices of Spain, France and Italy, the three nations which are closest to the soul of Ibero-America, has deeply affected the thinking people of the continent, while the collapse of France has bewildered them.

The influence of Spain has been strong among conservative elements in the South American countries ever since they became independent; and the authority of Spanish reformers at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries kept it alive among liberals as well. Spanish influence declined during the second half of the nineteenth century. But in the twentieth it reasserted itself and became stronger than ever. There has, however, been one important difference in this renaissance of Spanish culture and Spanish intellectual prestige in South America; the greatest contributions of Spain in this century have been to the liberal, democratic and humanitarian conceptions of life.

Spain has also been responsible for carrying much of the culture of Germany to Ibero-America. During the past forty years most Spanish scientific workers have been educated, directly or indirectly, in Germany; and their transfer to South America, in turn, of what they had learnt in Germany has undoubtedly added to German prestige and influence. German romanticism, neo-Kantism and spiritual vitalism have been enormously influential in Spain. They have not only been spread through all that country, but recently through Hispanic-America as well, by the academic authority of the Madrid publishing firm, Revista de Occidente, and its director, José Ortega y Gasset. It would be hard to exaggerate the part which that firm and the philosopher who guides it have played in the intellectual life of Ibero-America, and in particular of Argentina, during the past 25 years. The personal standing of Ortega has made him the literary and philosophical educator of several generations. He always has followed the line of German philosophy, but, politically speaking, with an unequivocal liberal slant. The publishing house has specialized in

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excellent translations of the works of German thinkers. Professors and students of all Spanish-speaking countries have studied these books for a quarter of a century.

There have been three periods of French influence in South America. The first was the era of Rousseau and the French Revolutionary ideology, from which the liberators drew inspiration. This period was lengthened by the appearance of romanticism. The second period was symbolized by the positivism of Comte and his school — of the school rather than of Comte himself. For three-quarters of a century the prestige of its scientific dogma, rejuvenated by the meteoric brilliance of Spencer, who was interpreted in terms of the French school, was strong in South America. This period was a dynamic and fruitful one, a period of action that lasted until the first decade of this century. Then came the sunset of positivism, and with it a decline in the dominance of French thought. The third period has been less luminous. Writers like Bergson, Meyerson and Proust brought new French influences to South America, but it was already late. The spiritualism of Bergson encountered the reborn tradition of Spain and a new Spanish generation represented by Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset, and was forced to share its place with them. The philosophy of science represented by Meyerson reached South America only to find Spanish translations of German books on the same subject already in the windows of bookstores. As for Proust, he is a terminal station rather than a point of departure. But France has always been a moving influence in the countries of Ibero-America, and without doubt still is.

The genius of a youthful Italy emerged in the literature, art, philosophy, jurisprudence and science of the Risorgimento, and this had an echo in some of the countries of South America. The Italian influence has been neither so widespread nor so intense as that of Spain and France, but it would be a mistake to minimize it, especially in Argentina and Uruguay. The two Italian thinkers most admired have been Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile, both of the Hegelian school. Gentile is incorporated in the Fascist movement and is the author of a positive cultural interpretation of Fascism. Croce's influence is visible in the work of many thinkers on this side of the Atlantic; but, like the Spaniards educated in Germany, he has almost always inculcated in his adherents a devotion to liberty as it was understood by the liberal mind of Milton. This fact has been confusing, for instead of offering a sure

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refuge to those who sought solutions for their problems, German culture presents itself as a riddle. Evidently the German spirit has two faces. Which is the true one?

South America, then, is living through a period of intellectual orphanage, of serious self-analysis. The self-analysis will be not merely profound, I believe, but fertile also. But meantime these are not years of what could be called firm faith. South America is not moving forward into the unknown unfalteringly and with undaunted confidence. In one matter, however, it has determined to persevere, and that is with respect to nationalism. I sensed there on a recent visit an exacerbated feeling of national sovereignty, an integration of the national personality. Without exception, South Americans, are, in that sense, living in an era of political romanticism.

II

South America is divided into three different political sections, each with different problems conditioned by geographic, economic and, in some cases, ethnographic factors. The countries located on the Pacific coast form one section; those situated on the *altiplano* another; and those lying along the Atlantic coast a third. Besides this vertical stratification there is a horizontal one which divides the continent between a region with a tropic economy complementary to that of North America and a temperate zone in the south whose products are largely competitive.

I was with a group of political and commercial leaders in the splendid city of Viña del Mar, on the coast of Chile, when news of the attack on Pearl Harbor arrived. A feeling of uneasiness immediately gripped the gathering. For the first time in history the most representative peoples of the Pacific area were plunged into a general war. Nobody present denied that in this war the future of Chile and of all the other Pacific countries was at stake. The fact that the initiative had been taken by Japan was enough to give the struggle the aspect of a clash between the yellow and white races. China's participation rules out, strictly speaking, that interpretation; but there is justification for it in the fact that an imperialistic country such as had never existed in that part of the world has now appeared in the Pacific.

This feeling of uneasiness, which spread rapidly through all the countries of the Pacific, is enough to explain many political events. A few days after the attack on Pearl Harbor a Chilean

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of high military standing said: "Had this war begun as one between Germany and the United States, our internal political situation might have been very serious. It cannot be denied that Chile has a traditional admiration for the German Army, even a feeling of gratitude towards it. But because the initiative of the attack came from Japan, a Pacific nation which has long boasted of its imperialism, everybody has realized that, for the American countries along the Pacific, the basic aspect of this war is the conflict between the United States and Japan, the duel between the white man and the aggressive yellow man. That solved the political problem latent in our army."

The recent elections in Chile were not so favorable to the cause of democracy as might perhaps have been desired. The elimination of Cruz-Coke, representative of a small conservative group, was unfortunate, for he possesses an acute social and religious vision of the problems of our age. So was the failure of such a dynamic enthusiast as González Videla to win the support of the Radical Party. Finally, it may be considered that the left parties as a whole made a mistake in not choosing a moderate and far-sighted Socialist like Oscar Schnake as the coalition candidate. Schnake has a long experience in administration and an exceptional cultural background. His platform speech was a real political masterpiece. In contrast to these three men, Juan Antonio Ríos, imposed on the coalition by the dominant Radical Party, seems to be rather colorless and to lack a real sense of the movement of history.

Where is Chile going? The attitude of that intelligent, energetic and charming country seems equivocal not only to North Americans but to most of the nations of Ibero-America. Chile, with the United States, initiated the Rio de Janeiro Conference. Her attitude before the Conference was generally interpreted as committing her without serious reservations to the cause of continental solidarity. On January 12 her Foreign Minister, Juan Bautista Rosetti, gave a statement to the Buenos Aires press that aroused great enthusiasm among the partisans of solidarity. Yet it was clear to an observer in Santiago before the Conference and in Buenos Aires during it that official Chile was not committing itself irrevocably. The attitude of some of the most representative men in the government of Chile was in fact very different from what had been attributed to them. They were far from ready to embark on a policy that could accentuate the dangers

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which in their opinion were menacing Chile unless they were assured of far-reaching guarantees in exchange. Ideological as well as economic factors inclined Chile toward the United Nations, and more particularly towards the United States. But the country is completely defenseless. A Chilean minister remarked confidentially, some days after Pearl Harbor: "We do not have guns or ammunition, warships or aircraft. How then can we justify a break in relations that could precipitate an attack upon our copper mines and nitrate fields?"

But was this the only reason which impelled Chile to take the stand she did at Rio? In my view two other factors were involved. One is political apprehension for the future. The other is a psychological factor which is very strong in Chile, as in many other countries of South America: a high respect for the German immigrants who settled there and gratitude to the German countries from which they came. I would like to stress this attitude. Between 1845 and 1854, 2,000 German families arrived in Chile and colonized the southern regions. These regions form the richest agricultural zone in Chile, that is to say, its most prosperous. From 1880 onwards the army and public education were both orientated toward Germany. German professors were invited to come to the normal schools, later to the Pedagogical Institute and finally to the *liceos*. At the same time, officers of the German Army were invited to take over the military education of Chilean cadets. These facts have shaped the psychological trend now dominant in Chile. It is not necessarily a permanent one. But to remove it will require time and some unequivocal military successes on the part of the United Nations.

A feeling of uneasiness very similar to that prevalent in Chile, but aggravated by the problem of Japanese immigration, brought about a sudden change in the international political attitude of Peru. Everyone knows how close a relationship there was, and is, between the governments of Peru and Spain. Everyone knows the powerful influence exercised in Peru by the Banca Italiana and the Deutsche Übersee Bank, which together control the greater part of the country's commercial credit. What is not so well known is the way the Japanese have succeeded in insinuating themselves into Peru's economic life and in establishing homogeneous groups in strategic parts of the country.

There are five definite Japanese nuclei in Peru. Three are along the coast — at Piura, Chimbote and Lima-Callao. The other two

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are in the interior: one expanding from the head of the Marañon River in the direction of Iquitos, the other extending from the source of the River Madre de Dios to the border of Bolivia. The Japanese in the first three colonies exploit fertile cotton land. The Piura area is also rich in oil. The Marañon river affords access to the riches of the Amazon valley. The Mitsui trust has set up several companies through which the two colonies of the interior have been consolidated and it has worked out a plan for the exploitation of these regions. The principal activities of the Japanese are in agriculture and, to a lesser degree, in small industries and shops. They are so sober in temperament and have such endurance that white men find it impossible to compete with them economically. This factor brought about the plot of May 15, 1939, which was followed by mob assaults on Japanese department stores and shops. According to the press, the Tokyo government presented a strong protest in Lima and claimed an indemnity amounting to 100,000,000 Peruvian *soles*, approximately $16,600,000. How many Japanese are there in Peru? Not over 25,000, according to the official census of 1940; more than 50,000, according to figures usually accepted in intellectually responsible circles.

At Rio de Janeiro the Peruvian Government embraced the cause of the United States. Its attitude was perfectly honest and serious. But Peru too is a Pacific country, and she is uneasy as she watches the progress of Japan in the Pacific area.

Ecuador, too, scans the Pacific horizon with concern. As far back as June 1935, Captain Eloy Alfaro, the Ecuadorian Ambassador in Washington, one of the ablest diplomats of Hispanic-America, began persistently calling the attention of his Government to the military policy of Japan. He was one of the few diplomats who realized the full seriousness of the Tanaka Memorial. Instead of considering it the dream of a former Japanese Premier who once had been described as "more aggressive than tactful," he saw that the Memorial was really a logical plan developed out of the historical ambitions of the Japanese ruling classes. Ambassador Alfaro has called repeatedly for the protection of the Galapagos Archipelago. Any nation in possession of those islands is in a position to menace both Ecuador and Peru. That is the chief reason why Japan's triumphal progress has been followed with breathless interest in those two countries. But there also is another reason.

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III

The population of the *altiplano* of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia is 90 to 95 percent Indian. A few Indian groups are physically impressive and arrogant in demeanor—for example, the unforgettable Otavalos in Ecuador, the Indians in the regions between Arequipa and Cuzco, or those of Oruro, Bolivia. In most cases, however, they strike one as being depressed and exhausted. It is difficult to imagine life on a lower level than among the Indians of the *altiplano*. Not a trace of articles of personal hygiene can be found in their mud and straw huts, not even rudimentary wash bowls or bits of coarse soap. The whole family sleeps on a single litter, with all their clothes on, and covered with furs, seeking protection from the cold which so easily penetrates the fragile walls of their dwellings.

The Indians are withdrawing within themselves. What are they discovering there — a well of hope, or despair and concentrated hate? Do they still nourish some remnants of the verities of ancient Inca culture, or has that completely disintegrated and fled? To us occidentals that remains a mystery. But plainly the misery of the Indians, in a material sense, is becoming more and more acute. Many of the lands that were reserved for them in the colonial period have either been expropriated or illegally seized. The religious emotions which at one time served to protect them in part have been destroyed by the acquisitive instincts released in society by economic liberalism. As a result, these natives, who by race are more contemplative than active, have become impoverished to an extreme.

Of course this in any case is not the Promised Land. Treeless, and covered almost entirely with a high, tough grass called by the natives *paja brava*, it can at best maintain only a very limited amount of livestock. The *altiplano* is the land of the strong vicuña, the alpaca and the llama. But though it is hard and unfertile it has a grandiose, dramatic beauty that makes the visitor feel at times that it must be a land of destiny. Its mystery is symbolized by the stones of Tiahuanaco, on the shores of Lake Titicaca, whose cultural significance is unknown.

A study of conditions among the Indians of the *altiplano* led me to the following conclusions:

1. None of the three nations, Ecuador, Peru or Bolivia, can fully achieve national unity while it is handicapped by the lack

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of coöperation on the part of the Indians. For this lack of cooperation the Indians themselves can by no means be held responsible. True, national unity is in addition damaged by political and economic rivalries between Guayaquil and Quito in Ecuador; by cultural and racial opposition between Cuzco and Lima in Peru; and by a bitter political and economic struggle against La Paz by Sucre and Cochabamba in Bolivia. But beyond these the attitude of the exploited Indian population is a fundamental obstacle to unity in all three countries.

2. The separation and differentiation between the Indians and the white men is being deepened by the love of the vernacular Indian language, Quechua, which is growing up all over the *altiplano*.

3. There is at least a possibility that some non-American country may exploit the feelings of rancor which have become so deeply rooted in the Indians. Although there is no evidence of any organized action by the Japanese in the Indian communities, white inhabitants of many parts of the *altiplano*, especially in the zones in which the most energetic Indians live, are openly apprehensive. They agree that the attitude of the Indians has been changing rapidly in recent years, and that the change has become a menace to the whites.

The only solution to this problem is the one already adopted by Mexico, Colombia and Brazil: fusion of the races and a greatly increased spirit of consideration for the Indians.

Bolivia, the heart of the *altiplano*, became an independent state in 1825, against the wishes of those who preferred to merge with Peru or Argentina. Its status was decided by men from Venezuela who, like the Colombians, visualized an independent Bolivia as a check to the possible expansionist ambitions of Peru and Argentina. The problem carried over from then still exists. The risk of Bolivia's disintegration has not yet been finally averted.

The pressing needs of Bolivia are for immigration, education, public works, sanitation, agrarian reform and, above all, roads. The people who live on the fresh, rich lands watered by the Beni River, and those who exploit the fruitful belt of northern Santa Cruz, face enormous difficulties in getting to La Paz and in delivering their crops. The same lack of roads prevents Bolivia from using the oil of the Choreti region, in the province of Tarija; and as a result most of this oil is now turned over to Argentina under the terms of a trade treaty. Enough foodstuffs are pro-

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duced in the Amazon region and in the Plata provinces of Bolivia to change completely living conditions on the *altiplano* and in the nation as a whole, but the lack of highways makes distribution difficult. In short, Bolivia has not yet set up the technical organs of regional interrelationship. The basis for an integrated national economy has not yet been created.

Militarily and politically, Bolivia is the strategic key to South America. Germany learned that many years ago and has been acting accordingly. Many officers of the Bolivian Army were educated in Germany. The best pedagogical institution in La Paz was founded by the Germans. German farmers have been settled along all the borders. But action taken by the Bolivian Government last autumn at least temporarily destroyed the plans laid so painstakingly by the Nazis.

Bolivia borders on Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Chile, and thus would make an ideal center of radiation for any non-American power which, like Germany, controls minorities in the neighboring countries. The former Nazi organization in Bolivia, however, has now been brought under control and at least partly dispersed. The country also served for many years as a line of communication between the two principal centers of Japanese concentration in South America — in Peru on the Pacific coast and Brazil on the Atlantic. We do not as yet know definitely whether that corridor has been completely or partly closed or whether it is simply being watched.

IV

The great state of Argentina, on the Atlantic, took the same position at the Rio Conference that Chile did. Was it for the same reasons?

Public opinion and the Government of Argentina at present speak different languages. The Government has taken its stand against something which almost all the people of Argentina wish to avoid — involvement in the war. On the other hand, it does not do what the people do want, which is to sever relations with the Axis and so maintain their prestige in South America. The Germans in Argentina have not been able to play a rôle comparable to that fulfilled by their compatriots in Chile. Immigrants in Argentina have not attained a collective personality, and though they have been active in many directions they have not exhibited the singleness of purpose that would have permitted them to

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influence the life of Argentina as they have that of Chile. Other factors, then, must be found to explain the Argentine Government's attitude.

Although 42 percent of all aliens in Argentina are Italians, only a minority are active Fascists. Pressure from them cannot explain the political attitude of the Argentine Government. Still less are the Spaniards responsible. They form 44 percent of the alien population, but 90 or 95 percent of them are liberals and hostile to the Falangist creed.

What social forces, then, does the Government in fact represent? Certainly not those which find a voice in the Argentine press. As conservative a newspaper as *La Prensa* and as moderate a one as *La Nación* are completely opposed to the Government's foreign policy. Nor can we discover its sources in the platforms of the political parties.

The parties do, however, form one of the most disturbing phenomena of Argentine life. The Radical Party, which for half a century has represented the liberal middle class elements of the country, and large parts of the masses and of the intellectuals as well, is politically crippled and morally almost ruined. The conservative elements are divided. The only party whose moral prestige has survived the decomposition precipitated by the military dictatorship of 1930 is the Socialist Party; and so far its strength is confined to Buenos Aires. Under these circumstances, political power has been transferred back and forth by the oligarchs who took it over in 1930. The oligarchy, supported by the military forces and a large part of the bureaucracy and upper classes, has reinforced its power with Congressional legislation. In consequence, a feeling of discouragement spread among the citizens. The ideological crisis in which the whole world has been gripped favored, of course, the only group that possesses force and that has shown it has the will to use it.

In addition, of course, Argentina is almost helpless militarily speaking, although not perhaps to the same degree as Chile. The Argentine Navy is the best in Ibero-America, but even so it is quite insufficient to patrol and defend the country's extensive coast line. The richest oil wells in Argentina, located on the shore at Comodoro Rivadavia were said to be without the protection of a single powerful battery, and thus totally at the mercy of a possible attacker. In all, Argentina was reported to have four anti-aircraft batteries for the defense of the nation at the begin-

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ning of February; and one of them was needed for training cadets. This was not, however, the decisive factor that made the Argentine Government isolationist. The risks run by Argentina, after all, could not be compared with those facing Brazil and Uruguay — both of which, like the other Atlantic countries of South America, Colombia and Venezuela, were willing to sever relations with the Axis. The Government of Argentina, therefore, must have had its own reasons for adopting its attitude. I might summarize the principal ones as follows:

1. It is manifestly sympathetic to military régimes as such.

2. It felt that, in choosing its present attitude, it was following the historic policy of Argentina — namely, to oppose the United States and to assume the leadership of the Hispanic-American countries.

3. It was influenced by a fear which exists, openly or latently, in all the countries of Ibero-America. This is the fear which asks: "After the war, will the loans, credits, purchases and investments, obtainable today only in the United States, be converted into bonds of political subjugation?" In other words, will the Good Neighbor Policy last? This was, perhaps, the biggest factor in the attitude of the Argentine Government.

The war has faced the American nations with the need to strengthen their political as well as their economic positions. In Argentina, the Government has isolated the country politically, and in so doing it has created a bad economic situation. The trade agreements made with Chile may have some political value, although that is problematical; but economically they are meaningless, for the economies of the two countries are not complementary nor do the degree and nature of their industrial development make it possible for them to exchange and consume the vast amounts of raw materials and foodstuffs which they produce. Each requires large industrial markets for its products and each badly needs capital with which to utilize its resources fully, so that per capita consumption and the purchasing power of the nation as a whole may be increased. Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and Peru are seeking these economic objectives. The Argentine Government, on the contrary, is following a different course. The fact of the matter is that at the time of the Rio de Janeiro Conference it visualized the war as ending either in an Axis victory or a stalemate. Its own wishful thinking decided it to gamble on these possibilities.

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The people of Argentina do not follow their government in spirit. More than those of any other Ibero-American country, they have been convinced of their missionary function in the Western Hemisphere. They have absorbed voraciously the Latin culture of Europe and have dreamed of becoming its spokesmen on this continent. Now, suddenly, they see that at this momentous hour, when the mother nations of that culture are silent, they, too, are being pushed in the wrong direction, away from the leadership they would like to exercise. Instead of speaking a youthful language, full of promise and faith, such as would be fitting to the Argentina of their dreams, they find themselves reticent and cautious, more symbolical of discouragement than of a bold creativeness.

Up to 1930 the voice of Argentina, her political customs and her social thought, influenced most of the countries of Hispanic-America. Today it is Mexico, Colombia and Chile which are influential. The Argentine people are conscious of their psychological isolation. They are thinking deeply, and with painful results. They are anxiously seeking for an ideal of their own. They are going, in other words, through a crisis. Judging by the mood of the nation, the crisis can end triumphantly.

In the neighboring state of Brazil, President Getulio Vargas, a man with an acute political sense and a passion for personal power, flirts with all kinds of ideas and all sorts of forms of government. He is aided in the administration of his country by a courageous and enormously attractive man who is endowed both with powerful political intuition and a strong sense of the movements of history — Oswaldo Aranha, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Aranha may or may not be a democrat, but unquestionably he is a liberal in the sense that he has a respect for the rights of dissenting forces. Like most of the statesmen of South America, Aranha believes that this is the hour for continental solidarity in the Americas. Perhaps he thinks, too, that this is the time to promote the industrialization of his country and to create a badly-needed framework within which the riches of Brazil might be made useful to the nation and available to the world.

Another factor, too, is operating deep in the national mind of Brazil in these critical times. The people of Brazil have come to look to the democracy of the United States as a pattern for their own development, as the incarnation of the ideal they are seeking. Brazil, therefore, shows the same dualism as Peru. Both govern-

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ments pursue a reactionary internal policy, while internationally they follow the lead of the United States.

V

Whether or not the policy of the Argentine Government and the fears felt by other Hispanic-American countries will be justified will depend on the policy pursued by the United States, both now and after the war. The Atlantic Charter and, in more specific terms, the resolutions adopted at the Rio Conference, have opened the way for a program of economic coöperation under international auspices. That is particularly true of Resolutions II, VII and XXV adopted at Rio, concerning, respectively, the formulation of plans for economic mobilization in each country, the study of a customs union for the Western Hemisphere, and the convocation of an inter-American technical economic conference.

But that is only the start of what must be done. Hereafter contracts for purchases from, or sales to, the Ibero-American countries should be considered from political as well as economic points of view. The status of investments should be settled by international courts, not interpreted unilaterally. Solutions for problems of development which arise in the South American countries should be sought through public international corporations. The problems of nationalism and national sovereignty which are sure to arise will call for a tactful political approach and will demand a fine knowledge of national psychologies.

Here we reach the heart of the great cultural problem of the relationship between North and South America. Real comprehension requires detailed knowledge. It also requires us to enlarge our capacity to understand what is different from ourselves. Comprehension and understanding, the bases of tolerance, made possible the formation of the United States. Now a new epoch is beginning. The United States, following the vision of its founders, is trying to strengthen, to make real and active, the solidarity of this continent. The Rio de Janeiro Conference shows that the idea is advancing. But it shows, too, that the problems involved cannot be solved by purely economic ideas and methods. There must be actions inspired by the political ideals which promote vital faith and international peace.

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GERMAN PREPARATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By C. L. Sulzberger

THE geographical triangle stretching between the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Indian Ocean, and vaguely known as the Middle East, is the most important link between the key members of the United Nations: the United States, Britain and her central Asian empire, China and the U.S.S.R. The Suez Canal and the shipping lanes westward through the Mediterranean, eastward to India and southward around the Cape are the heart of an area including the richest petroleum deposits in the Old World, the greatest road and air network between East and West, and regions valuable not only from a purely strategical point of view but for cotton, grain, fruit, gold and chromium. Finally, the Middle East is not only the barrier between the two expanding ends of the Axis — in Europe and Asia — but contains the gateway to Europe through the Balkans, the backdoor to the Soviet Union through the Dardanelles and over the Caucasus, the road to India through Iran and Baluchistan, and the main route to Central Africa along the Nile valley. In itself it is a vitally important section of the world and from the strategical point of view in a military sense it is the most important single geographical area of the war.

The German Empire before and during the last World War was fully aware of this as were the Allies who, after the unsuccessful Dardanelles campaign by which they sought to split the Central Powers, began the systematic destruction of the Ottoman Empire accompanied and followed by the development of the Salonika operations which eventually penetrated into the heart of the Austro-Hungarian position from the rear. Kaiser Wilhelm, looking towards the commercial riches of the British East, obtained the assent of the Sultan to the construction of the Berlin to Baghdad rail system (completed by British engineers in 'Iraq in the summer of 1940) and dispersed agents as far East as Kuwait, Persia and Afghanistan devoted to the cause of furthering German imperialism and fomenting trouble in areas under British domination.

Even before the actual outbreak of war in 1914 a series of German politicians and diplomats envisioned the military value

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of the Middle East and its Moslem population as an anti-British factor. While the Kaiser was seeking to set himself up as the protector of Islam by such acts as rebuilding Saladdin's Damascus shrine, German political strategists such as Professor Max von Oppenheim (in 1914 Oriental Secretary to the German consulate-general in Cairo) were studying plans for a possible *Jihad*, or Moslem Holy War, this to be turned into a revolt against Britain and her Allies by the world of Islam organized by German agents and conducted by leaders paid by Berlin or the Constantinople Caliphate.

It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the reasons for the failure of this move or Britain's means in combating it through Hussein and the religious machinery of Mecca. It is, however, interesting to note that both sets of combatants today are employing in the Middle East men who rose to prominence in that area more than two decades ago. Britain's Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Armies, now guarding that region, include dozens of officers who participated in the Allenby campaign. Colonel Blunt, assistant military attaché in Ankara, was partially responsible for the seizure of von Papen's documents in that area. Colonel Stirling, Lawrence's staff chief, continues his wandering between Aleppo and Cairo.

Herr von Papen himself spent most of his World War career, after his expulsion from Washington, in the Middle East; and it was there that he began his acquaintanceship with von Ribbentrop who later recommended him as Ambassador to Turkey. After being recalled from the United States, von Papen was transferred to his regiment which was at that time on the Western Front. While serving there, von Papen prepared several reports suggesting various methods of bringing about a *Jihad*, and presented these to the German General Staff. It was in this connection that von Papen met von Hindenburg and developed a friendship which was later to pave the way for Hitler's seizure of power. Von Papen's ideas proved to be of special interest to German GHQ, and after Turkey entered the war he was transferred to the Eastern Front by order of von Falkenhayn, at that time Chief of the Imperial General Staff. There he was attached to the Fourth Turkish Army, and sent to Palestine, where he had to face Allenby's attack. He was nearly captured in the neighborhood of Jerusalem but was saved by von Ribbentrop, a lieutenant in the same regiment.

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In this connection one incident which a few Turks repeat among themselves from time to time is worth recalling. During the retreat before Allenby, Ismet Pasha (now President of the Turkish Republic) was riding along the Ottoman lines accompanied by staff officers, including von Papen. A few English batteries began shelling the vicinity. According to the story, von Papen dropped off his horse and took cover. The Turks rode on. Later, when von Papen rejoined them at a canter, he apologized, explaining the British "were after him." This incident remains impressed on Ismet's mind; the President is not yet sure whether von Papen is exceptionally nervous physically or suffers from a persecution complex.

Von Papen's most important documents fell into Allenby's hands during the advance into Palestine. Considerable information relating to the *Jihad* was found among them. Here again it is interesting to note that von Papen's friendship with von Ribbentrop developed further. Ribbentrop was suspected of quitting his regiment without official permission. A mix-up in military files caused the documents relating to his transfer by GHQ to be misplaced and he was accused of desertion after the war. Von Papen established by his testimony before a special court of honor that the young lieutenant had participated actively on the Eastern Front. It is perhaps not by chance that when Hitler named him Ambassador to Turkey he announced that the appointment had been made on the recommendation of von Ribbentrop. Thus, von Papen has a distinct interest and background of experience in this part of the world — an experience recognized by his immediate chief in the Wilhelmstrasse. Now, years later, he has an opportunity, with large funds and many assistants at his disposal, to make good his failures of the last war and perhaps to acquire fame in a field of work better known for the conspiratorial activities of such men as Lawrence and Wassmuss.

In order to embarrass the British in the Middle East the Germans have spent millions of reichsmarks and distributed billions of words of propaganda on an ever-increasing scale during the past four years. Although the Nazis have not the advantage of an alliance with Turkey — which lacks, anyway, the physical assets possessed by the old Ottoman Empire, extending almost to Suez — they are in a better position to secure Arab aid than during the last war for the very reason that this

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time it is they and not the British who promise to free the *Fellahin* and the *Bedouin* from "oppression." This time they are outside looking in, and they can elaborate upon any mistakes in British administration instead of apologizing for errors in Ottoman administration. The German sets himself up as a savior to the Moslem world. Every ounce of gold distributed and every word pronounced by the German agents is establishing that Hitler, a descendant of the Prophet, the enemy of the Jews and the British, the Protector of Islam, is devoting his energies to the establishment of a Free Arab Federation. His own "Free Arabia" radio station in occupied Athens says so.

Just as the British in the last war employed the aspirations of the Sherif of Mecca, Hussein, to give weight to their promises of freedom from the Turk, the Germans are now using Haj Amin al-Hussaini, the exiled Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, as their principal spokesman, abetted by the Gailani leader, Rashid Ali. Both are in Germany at this time and busily shuttling about between Berlin, Rome and Athens maintaining constant contact between renegade Arab leaders and the Axis foreign offices. Their movements are faithfully reported on the Berlin, Rome, Bari and Athens radio stations, as well as in secret literature slipped over the borders of Syria and 'Iraq from Turkey or brought in by occasional parachutists.

II

There is, these days, a tendency to dismiss the Mufti as an unimportant influence. The Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan recently told the writer that the Mufti no longer had any adherents; that he had forfeited all respect by running away. If this is true, it is true only to a degree. The Mufti is still an extremely important man who could become vastly more important if the *Wehrmacht* were ever to gain a success in the Middle East. His essential importance is in the intricate and extensive political machine which he has left behind him in Palestine, in Syria, in 'Iraq and, to a very minor degree, in Iran. Despite British policing efforts, this mechanism continues functioning secretly and it will be a very difficult thing to eradicate it completely.

When the present war broke out in the autumn of 1939 the Mufti fled from Syria to 'Iraq and was acclaimed as an Arab hero; he was fêted by everyone from the Prime Minister down. Parties were given for him as demonstrations of Arab nationalist

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feeling, and during such fêtes anti-British propaganda was spread. The 'Iraqi dream that their country would become the nucleus for a united Arabia was given new impetus. Although the Mufti had promised Nuri es-Said Pasha, then as now Prime Minister, that he would refrain from political activity during his stay in 'Iraq, he calmly ignored this pledge; and the 'Iraqi Government did nothing noticeable about it. The British Minister, since replaced, watched the situation develop.

The Mufti established headquarters with, among others, the following key officials: Jamal al-Hussaini, chief of staff; Sheik Musa beg al-'Alami, Islamic religious adviser and critic on occidental (British) affairs; Salim Abdur Rahman, press officer and head publicist; and a foreign relations committee responsible for propaganda and intrigue. The Mufti controlled disbursements and receipt of funds to keep this organization functioning. He was voted 18,000 'Iraqi dinars by the 'Iraqi Parliament and was paid 1,000 'Iraqi dinars monthly by the 'Iraq secret service from its hidden funds. Under a check-off system he was paid two percent of the salary of every 'Iraqi government official, including the military and the police. He was paid special sums by the Palestine Defense Society, the Red Crescent and public collections supposedly for other purposes. He is believed to have been paid 60,000 'Iraqi dinars by the Germans and 40,000 'Iraqi dinars by the Italians. He received gifts from Egypt and from King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. A year ago the British Secret Service was in a position to state categorically that the Mufti had accepted a subsidy of 10,000 pounds sterling from the Italian Minister in Baghdad and had agreed to start another revolt in Palestine if and when supplied with 20,000 pounds gold monthly.

Backed by this very considerable wealth, unhampered in his virtually open operations, the Mufti furnished the 'Iraq Government with Palestinian and Syrian Arab refugee nominees to fill essential government positions which the state of illiteracy prevailing in the country prevented its own subjects from assuming — teachers, doctors, various types of minor experts. Thus a sizable number of political undesirables (from the British viewpoint) came to be established in 'Iraq, the core of the Middle Eastern world. The Mufti more or less controlled their hire and discharge. They were used as cells for his propaganda campaign and they continually worked to spread his influence.

The Mufti also gained for his cause the support of divers Arab

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nationalist organizations. Some of these were already receiving German funds, which after the beginning of the Polish campaign reached 'Iraq through the diplomatic pouches of the Italian Legation. The Mufti concentrated his efforts on establishing a controlling influence over large numbers of the police force, the army, teachers, doctors and lawyers; and he was able to exert considerable pressure in such affairs of state as the granting of passports. Arab refugees from Palestine when approved by him were often permitted to enter 'Iraq without payment of taxes. Publications under his control were not interfered with much by the Baghdad press department; and his paper *Istiqlal* was left unhindered, although it was edited by Osman Qassim, the former editor of the paper *Al Liwa*, in Palestine, a publication subsidized by both German and 'Iraqi funds.

Until the Gailani coup and rebellion of the spring of 1941 the Mufti was a frequent guest of honor at important functions and the feeling grew among all categories of Arabs, even many who were not in agreement with the Mufti's aims, that England, in the throes of war, might be willing to buy Arab friendship by striking a bargain with Islam over the Palestinian question. Several 'Iraqi politicians hoped to gain prestige by negotiating such a bargain; and even Prime Minister Nuri permitted the press to carry on ardent Arab nationalist (and, to a lesser degree anti-British) propaganda. Because there were few valid grounds for discontent in 'Iraq itself, popular feeling against Britain was actively and deliberately worked up over the Palestine issue.

In this connection a key man was Taha Pasha al-Hashimi, who had become 'Iraqi Defense Minister in December 1938, and who before that had been president of the 'Iraqi Palestine Defense Society which issued the Mufti's propaganda and prepared much of the broadcast matter for the Nazi Arabic programs. Taha Pasha remained in exceedingly close contact with the German legation and was a close friend of Germany's number one Arab agent, Dr. Amin Ruwaiha. Taha Pasha also exercised his gifts for intrigue with the group of 'Iraqi army officers later known as the "Golden Square" and he encouraged them to try a coup d'état to force the King to bring him and his own followers into positions of power. Eventually he succeeded in this latter aim and at the end of 1938 became Minister of Defense in a new Nuri es-Said cabinet. Rashid Ali al-Gailani was rewarded for his part in the plot by being named Chief of the Royal Diwan and

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having the guardianship of the Gailani Waqfs returned to him.

Although Nuri became suspicious of Amin Ruwaiha and other leaders in 1939 he continued to minimize the importance of Taha Pasha, whom he categorized as stupid. Indeed, he only realized how important the combined Mufti-German machine was becoming when, after he broke off 'Iraqi-German diplomatic relations after the war started, he was accused by military circles of being Britain's tool. He then befriended the Mufti in order to popularize himself; and the Mufti, benefiting from this trend, began to hold meetings with army officers, including the commander of the cavalry, Mahmud Salman, a member of the Golden Square and later chief of the 'Iraqi Royal Air Force. Mahmud's friendship for the Mufti dated back to the last war.

As the *Wehrmacht* continued to win impressive victories the belief grew in 'Iraq (cultivated, of course, by Axis friends) that Britain would lose the war. Rumors were deliberately spread that Nuri had promised to send 'Iraqi soldiers to aid the Allies. With this situation prevailing in the background, Rashid Ali (who was well situated with the military clique and with Taha Pasha) began to hold a series of secret conferences with the Italian Minister and with members of the latter's staff. Certain 'Iraqi leaders, chiefly General Hussain Fawzi and General Amin al-Umari, respectively chief of the general staff and commander of the first division, became alarmed at the increasing hold of the Golden Square group and early in 1940 they contemplated a coup d'état to get rid not only of the Taha Pasha clique but also of Nuri es-Said Pasha. The powerful Golden Square foiled this, and both generals were pensioned off.

The Golden Square now held virtually complete control. They established handpicked officers in key positions, and these began more and more openly to interfere in political matters and to proclaim themselves pro-Axis. In January 1940, Nuri, unpopular and upset by the assassination of his old friend and Finance Minister, Rustum Haidar, resigned; Rashid Ali al-Gailani took over the Prime Ministry and, in compliance with army insistence, named Taha Pasha as Defense Minister. The Mufti, acting partially behind the scenes and partially as a representative of Axis desires, played a major rôle in making the arrangements. It is interesting to note that these events took place on the eve of a scheduled visit by Nuri to King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud at

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Riadh, where questions about the friendship treaty between 'Iraq and Saudi Arabia were to be cleared up; but Nuri feared to make the visit because of a belief that the Germans might seek to have him assassinated in the south.

The career of the Rashid Ali Government is too well known to bear detailed repetition here. The Minister of Justice was a renowned pro-German who had maintained close personal contact with von Papen in Turkey during the summer of 1940. The press director, a nominee of Taha Pasha and the Golden Square, placed in high posts two leading members of the Moslem Guidance Society under the Mufti's influence. A policy of "strict neutrality" for 'Iraq began to be openly expounded, while agitators including the Mufti's religious adviser, Sheik Hassan abu Saud, began to broadcast talks on Islam. Despite Italy's distinct unpopularity in the Arab world, Rashid Ali maintained diplomatic relations with that country after it entered the war; and the final collapse of France brought about much rejoicing, as it was felt not only that French hegemony in Syria and the Lebanon was at an end but that the Axis would win the war in 1940, displacing Britain from the Middle East.

Following their occupation of 'Iraq and the reëstablishment of Abdul Illah and Nuri es-Said Pasha, the British were faced with the problem of eliminating the extensive machine carefully built up by the Mufti and Rashid Ali (both of whom succeeded in escaping first to Iran, then to Germany) and replacing not only its key members, many of whom had fled, but of destroying the less noticeable but very important minor mechanisms created over a period of many months. According to the latest reports available to the writer, Yunis as-Sab'awi, former youth movement leader and Minister of Economics, and several influential members of the Golden Square have already been executed; while Ali Mahmud al Shaikh Ali, former Minister of Justice, and General Amin Zaki Sulaiman, former acting chief of the general staff, have been sentenced to long prison terms. Rashid Ali al-Gailani has been sentenced to death, *in absentia*.

The difficulty facing the British is that the opposition machine, which for the sake of convenience can well be termed the Mufti machine, is so deeply entrenched in 'Iraq that it is virtually impossible to uproot it entirely. It is still a very important factor in the life of the country and would be a very dangerous force in the military sense should the *Wehrmacht* ever manage to establish

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itself in the Middle East. It is the potential mechanism for an Arab guerrilla revolt; it still extends its tentacles deep into the structure of the army and the civil service; and it still receives its orders by secret channels across Syria and across Turkey, as well as its broad directives from Axis-controlled radio stations broadcasting in Arabic.

The writer has recited in some detail the method by which the Mufti managed to entrench his machine (and thus the Axis machine) in the most typical of the Arabic countries. There is no space here to discuss the extensive political difficulties arising from interior and exterior differences between Britain and the local populations of Egypt, Palestine and the French mandated states. However, to complete the picture of Axis machinations in the Middle East it is necessary to devote some time to the establishment of the German espionage system in Syria before reverting to the complete picture as a whole and linking up these various actions with the directives issued from Turkey and Europe and with the possible plans of the German General Staff for setting in motion all this apparatus to coincide with a direct attack upon this area.

III

In Syria and the Lebanon the Germans had a heaven-sent opportunity to get a strong footing in the Middle East from within after the Franco-German armistice of June 22, 1940. German subjects in French concentration camps in the Levant were released and began once more to mix into the life of the country. The German gift for organization was immediately evinced by the appointment of Roland Eilender, a German born in Beirut, as temporary head of the German population and at least spiritual *Gauleiter*. At the end of September 1940, a special agent named Rudolf Roser, formerly representative of a German exporting firm in Beirut and later agent of the Voigtländer optical firm, who had a wide acquaintanceship in the Levant, was sent out from the Reich. He took up residence in the Hotel Metropole, Beirut, which he established as the center of German propaganda and espionage activities in the Levant; it remained so until the Allied occupation of 1941.

One by one purely military agents also began to arrive. In October 1940 a Major von Prat, accompanied by three other *Wehrmacht* officers, began an intensive study of the Syrian-'Iraqi

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frontier in the important region of Fort Abu-Kemal. In December other groups of German officers appeared and made similar frontier inspection tours. At the end of January 1941, at least one officer of the *Luftwaffe* is known to have commenced an investigation of Syrian air bases.

From the Hotel Metropole Roser began to extend a network of agents throughout the Levant, and it was this web which served as the foundation of the present espionage system linking the Middle East with Europe through Turkey. Serving as his chief assistant was Fräulein Paula Koch, who comes from an old German family in Aleppo and speaks excellent French and Arabic. A Syrian dentist who had been educated in Germany, named Negib Kanaan, was selected by Fräulein Koch as agent in Damascus, serving under Saddi Keylani, a veteran troublemaker who, married to a German woman, had worked for Berlin in Waziristan and who had a secret radio transmitter under his direction sending messages to be picked up by German receiving apparatus in Ankara and Istanbul. A German ex-monk, Alois Mazuth, formerly Brother Christopher of the Marist order, also worked for the Nazis in Damascus. In Beirut, a man named Rachad Barbir worked under Roser and served in addition as correspondent for the official *Deutsches Nachrichten Büro*. Several small radio stations were established in both the Lebanon and Syria.

In January 1941, the chief of the entire apparatus which Roser had established throughout Syria and also in adjoining countries arrived in Beirut — von Hentig, Wilhelmstrasse expert and key planner of German activities in the Middle East. Von Hentig, who had gained much experience in this area during the last war when he was a member of the group employed by the Germans in Persia to intrigue against the Allies in Central Asia, arrived fresh from a series of conferences with von Papen at Ankara. He was charged with preparing a base for Middle Eastern revolts to coincide with a military campaign across the Balkans, Crete and Cyprus to Syria, and a revolt in 'Iraq. In this connection he did extensive propaganda work and consolidated the German position with several important Arab officials. He was largely responsible for the popularization of a slogan still harped upon in the repetitious technique of Goebbels: "*Bissama Allah oua alard Hitler*" (In Heaven Allah, on earth Hitler).

German preparations for the establishment of out-and-out

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"collaboration" in the Levant between defeated France and the Axis are not important to this discussion. The mission of Otto Rahn (now in France) and the later work of Nazi agents was connected entirely with technical arrangements involving German aid to the Rashid Ali rebellion in 'Iraq and opposition to the British in the premature (from the Nazi viewpoint) Middle Eastern conflict following the failure of the German scheme to extend the Balkan campaign across the eastern Mediterranean. When the Allies occupied Syria the Germans withdrew, after carefully preparing their ramified network of agents to carry on undercover work. They even distributed arms to certain guerrilla groups charged with creating nuisance disturbances. At the last moment before the Syrian armistice Kurdish guerrillas and refugee 'Iraqi dissident tribesmen were receiving machine guns and Belgian rifles flown into Aleppo from Salonika.

IV

German efforts to keep the ground fertile for internal revolt in the Middle East and ready for assistance if the day should ever come for a full campaign in that area then entered a new phase, the one which still prevails as these lines are written. "Field operations" may now be said to be in charge of von Papen and Herr Chapeaurouge, head of the Oriental department of the Istanbul branch of the German Embassy. The Germans have prevailed upon the Turks to permit the establishment of a new Nazi vice-consulate at Iskenderun, in the Hatay, immediately across the border from northern Syria; and there, significantly enough, the principal officials are Herr Roser and his former assistant, Fräulein Koch. Numerous Germans and Italians are now functioning at both Iskenderun and Adana where the only possible type of work is obviously espionage of divers sorts.

The Oriental department of the German Embassy has been completely reorganized and divided into several sections, each charged with the affairs of a different Middle Eastern country. The responsible chief of each section supervises the activities of Germanophile refugees and employs their services for direct contact work with their respective countries. To the best of the writer's knowledge, the various sections as now comprised are: 'Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine. German efficiency has organized each group of refugees under a chosen *Gauleiter*. Thus, for example, Adel Arslan, chief of the

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Druse faction which declined to follow the Al-Atrash sultan into the Hauran and remained in the Lebanon during the last fifty years, is known to be head of the Lebanese group of refugees. In the event of a German conquest of the Lebanon he would undoubtedly serve as head of the Nazi-dominated state there. The refugees continue to meet secretly in Turkey and many of them travel between Istanbul and the frontiers of their respective countries. Contact with Syria, the Lebanon and Palestine is arranged by the German consulate at Adana or the vice-consulate at Iskenderun. In order to retain direct approach to the 'Iraqi and Iranian frontiers Herr Chapeaurouge frequently sends agents to Diyarbekir or Erzerum, usually on the pretext of establishing commercial contacts. The German liaison agents with Moslem countries are adequately furnished with funds to facilitate their work. Thus, for example, when Chapeaurouge wished to send a letter to an undercover agent in Syria last winter the Turk entrusted with the mission was paid 1,000 Turkish lira.

Chapeaurouge's system of propaganda and espionage works in two directions. The Germans send their own material into the Middle East and receive in return information for use in their propaganda broadcasts. After being collated by the D.N.B. office in Istanbul in the special Oriental section headed by Fräulein Kruss and employing five Arab and two Iranian assistants, the information is made the basis for false, exaggerated or warped reports broadcast back to the Moslem countries by Italian, German and Japanese controlled radio stations. For the purely Arabic world, the most insidious broadcasts are those which emanate from the secret "Arab Nation" station, the Athens "Free Arabia" station, the Italian station at Bari and the Berlin station, where Yunis Bahri, a disgruntled Baghdad newspaperman with a fine delivery, holds forth. Berlin also employs the Iranian Shahro, son of the late Parsee leader, whose strangely sensuous voice is especially appealing to the womenfolk of Teheran, Tabriz, Isfahan and other cities. The tenor of the messages broadcast is, in accordance with the propaganda dictates laid down in "Mein Kampf," almost entirely suited to low intelligences. Constant repetition emphasizes a few simple falsehoods in a way to appeal to the illiterate masses. Often the type of broadcast may sound ridiculous to the reader in the Occident but it can be strangely effective on the spot. Thus, the Shah of Iran told the writer in a conversation earlier this year that many of his subjects

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are being profoundly influenced by Japanese propaganda in the Iranian language which, instead of building up the virtues of Japan to the occidental-minded Iranians, explains that Hitler and Germany will rescue Iran from the British and Russian "bullies," that Hitler is a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, and that this is proven by the "fact" that he was born with the holy green belt about his midriff. The Germans meanwhile constantly tell the Iranians, thousands of whom are poor, illiterate, diseased, badly fed, that they are a chosen people, the original stock of the great Aryan race which is now working for its rightful place under the sun.

Broadly speaking, the Axis broadcasts and propaganda leaflets continually promise that the "day of liberation" from Britain is soon coming and that Islam must rise up to aid their German liberators when the *Wehrmacht* strikes, presumably either through the Caucasus or the Levant and Egypt. The Moslems are told that they are being starved by the British; that Britain and America have promised to give the best Arab land to the Jews; and that the United Nations are preparing Jewish domination of the Middle East in the event of their victory. Various broadcasts, for example, have taken as their theme early this year: that prices rise in Egypt as the British requisition food; that the Russians pillage Iran; that starvation exists in Syria, fomented by the British, while the British are arresting in large numbers patriotic 'Iraqi army officers; that the Jews have put the Lebanon out of business; that British troops have attacked the population of al-Jezzireh (northeast Syria); that a band of one hundred Jewish gangsters from Chicago and New York has settled in Palestine and is operating there in terroristic fashion. The secret "Arab Nation" station says "Arabs and Moslems, fight against the English and gain your independence; save your country from the colonizers." The Berlin radio says to them: "Continue the fight against England and know that you will *soon* (italics mine) be freed from the Anglo-Jewish yoke."

V

Enough has been said to disclose what extensive and careful work has been done by the Axis to prepare internal disorders in the Middle East, both to pave the way for any actual invasion of that area and to accompany it. That such a plan has been and still is contemplated by the supreme command of the *Wehrmacht*

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is a well-known fact. Possibly by the time this article is published an attempt — for better or worse — will have been made to launch such an effort either by way of the Caucasus, Turkey, the Levantine coast, or Egypt, or by means of a combination of two or more such efforts. During this past spring many observers, including some members of the British Military Intelligence Service as well as various foreign diplomats, confidently expected that a major effort would be begun at once. But the strengthening of Malta's air defenses and the American reinforcement of the British Mediterranean Fleet — a small, scarred but extremely valiant force — undoubtedly helped to postpone if not forestall such an attempt entirely. Every month gained now is of vital importance. American military power in the Middle East is still, at this writing, confined to preparations in the spheres of ordnance, supply and maintenance, and to expansion of the communications networks of roads, harbors and railroads in Iran, Syria and the Lebanon and Eritrea. Thus the way is being paved to carry out speedy transferals of striking power to meet impending threats at various points. Recent newspaper dispatches indicate that the immediate threat of a German overseas attack on Syria, supported by the main Italian Fleet, may have been reduced since April; but this is chancy evidence. The Royal Air Force, drastically weakened in December, January and February by the need of sending squadrons east to Malaya, the Netherlands Indies and India, has again been brought up to a more equable strength; and the release of the air, sea and land units employed in the Madagascar operation may possibly again bulwark the whole Middle East.

As these lines are written the Germans still appear hesitant about the advisability of menacing or attacking Turkey. Not only would this call for large amounts of man and air power, which necessarily would have to be withdrawn from operations in Russia, but the Germans cannot logically attack a Moslem power which is completely independent while at the same time assuring Islam that Hitler's only idea is to liberate it. Although the Turks are in an unhappy position they are still virtually certain to defend themselves bravely (if, perhaps, not for long) in case of an attack. In spite of the increasing success attending German propaganda in Turkey since the signature of the friendship treaty of June 1941, the Turkish view is much as it was expressed to the writer by an Izmir businessman last winter:

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"We are like the sheep of Panurge, and whichever way we are pushed we must go. The big Powers on both sides of us are at war. We will fight if attacked. We have the consolation that no matter who it is that attacks us his opponent will rush to our defense. It is not a happy thought. It would make us the worst battle-ground. But it would give us a chance."

During wartime it naturally is indiscreet to talk of Allied military strength; and the writer has purposely avoided any detailed discussion of this factor in appraising the situation in the Middle East. In consequence, no prophecy is made here as to the success of any potential Nazi campaigns aimed at the Middle East through the Caucasus, across the Taurus range, by means of the Levantine coast, or from Libya. The United Nations are laboring, beset as they are by demands from many areas for immediate aid, to build up their Middle Eastern defenses; and it is quite possible that, as the new Director of Military Intelligence of the British Middle Eastern Command asserted to the writer in April, the Germans are too tied up in Russia this year to try any big manœuvres in western Asia. Similarly, in spite of the difficulty of the task and the tardiness with which it has been undertaken, the United Nations are also gradually reducing the efficacy of the Axis espionage networks and lessening the grave dangers of Moslem revolts, while themselves working to build up a better counter-propaganda. The best propaganda, of course, will be to win some victories on the active battle-fronts; for the Arab worships strength.

Let the primary importance of the Middle East be always in our minds. It must be held this year, if the Axis Powers are to be kept apart and their eventual defeat made certain. The Middle East, remember, is —

(1) The only point from which it is feasible to strike at Hitler's rear.

(2) The seat of control over the Moslem world, ranging from Morocco, on the Atlantic Ocean, to India. The loss of it would probably mean the loss of the sympathies of almost all that world — a possibility of incalculable importance.

(3) A major and increasingly vital supply route to the U.S.S.R. Its loss would relegate the shipment of all Allied matériel to the vulnerable northern convoy route.

(4) The only functioning supply route to India and China by ship and by the ferry service across central Africa.

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(5) The barrier to a fusion of Japanese and German forces. Should it be lost, the Mediterranean would be free to Axis shipping, releasing naval units for use in exterior waters; and eventually raw materials could be sent from East Asia to Europe in exchange for German arms and manufactured goods to Japan.

(6) The only active British fighting front against Germany. Loss of it would confine Britain's rôle in Europe to the defense of United Kingdom air and naval bases.

(7) One of the most important United Nations oil centers. Its loss would not only eventually open up important fuel sources to the enemy but would relegate the United Nations to complete dependency on American petroleum.

(8) A powerful link in the wide chain about Germany which may some day be tightened to strangle her. Its destruction would be such a blow to the prestige of the United Nations that some of the enemies of Fascism might feel the situation to be irretrievable and might give up the battle.

Clearly, then, the Middle East is of essential importance alike from military, economic and communications viewpoints. Clearly, too, the Axis is well aware of this and is making extensive preparations to seize the area. To help safeguard it, the United States would do well to dispatch as soon as possible as much air strength as is available in order to hold the already established bases, and later to supplement the American aircraft with American troops, tanks and artillery. The arrival of American military forces would not only bulwark considerably the defensive strength of the region but would begin the difficult task of assembling offensive strength. Even if it were never used offensively it would force the Axis to withdraw troops from elsewhere to meet the potential threat. In addition, it would have the salutary propaganda value of convincing both the Arabs and the Turks of the interest of the United States in this war on *all* fronts. As one American officer now in Cairo told the writer: "I know it's a tough job to transport our troops over here. But, believe me, one regiment of Boy Scouts marching about at this moment would have a magnificent effect on native morale. And a few divisions of American troops might completely alter the picture of the European phase of the war."

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RIOM

By André Géraud
("*Pertinax*")

THE coup d'état which put an end to the Third Republic took place on July 10, 1940. On that day the French National Assembly — that is, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in joint session — conferred full powers on Marshal Pétain, "for the purpose of promulgating through one or several acts a new constitution for the French State." With the Germans only 25 miles away, the members of Parliament scarcely could resist the manœuvres and threats of Laval, proxy for the Marshal, who did not himself condescend to be present. The next day the constitutional provisions of 1875 were thrown overboard entirely and the way cleared for dictatorship. For Laval, it was only a beginning. He set himself the further task of dissolving the regional and municipal councils, dismissing wholesale the officials who remained loyal to the fallen régime, tracking down his personal foes, attempting to discredit democracy and the Republic forever.

Among other things, Laval decided to bring five men to trial: Edouard Daladier, Premier from April 10, 1938, to March 20, 1940, and continuously Minister of War since June 6, 1936; Léon Blum, Premier in 1936–1937 and again for three weeks in 1938; Pierre Cot, Air Minister under Blum in 1936–1937 and under Chautemps in 1937–1938; and Guy La Chambre, who succeeded Cot in the Chautemps Cabinet and held the same post under Daladier. Since popular resentment made omission of General Gamelin impossible, he likewise was included. Later on, after Laval went out of office, a sixth defendant was belatedly added — P. Jacomet, secretary general of the Ministry of War, detailed, from 1938 on, to supervise armament. The original indictments were not drawn up until October; but a Supreme Court of Justice had already been constituted on July 30 by Constitutional Act 5, with functions determined by a law of the same date.[1]

[1] It was amplified on September 24 by a decree specifically designed to strike at Paul Reynaud, Premier from March 22 to June 16, 1940, who had come to power too late to be indictable for the military defeat, and Georges Mandel, Daladier's Minister for Colonies, the soul of out-and-out resistance to Germany. According to the press, the former was tentatively charged with misappropriation of public funds, the latter with intrigues in London and Washington as well as with

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It is quite normal that after such an appalling national disaster, the men responsible during preceding years for the management of defense and the army should be called to account, and that no indulgence should be shown them. Until they receive their final release from the nation, they all are legitimately under suspicion. But it also goes without saying, among people who retain an elementary sense of justice, that an investigation conducted by disinterested persons and the strict observance of legal forms throughout any subsequent trial are the prerequisites to any declaration of guilt which can be considered acceptable. The Vichy Government, product of a coup d'état, is not competent to conduct such an inquiry and preside at such a trial.

Even the fundamental principle of the separation of powers is absent in the constitutional acts promulgated by the Vichy Government from time to time. The Marshal and his Ministers constitute at once the executive, the legislative and the judicial branches. But supposing the Vichy state were free of all original sin, supposing its edicts conformed to the ideas of public order held by the vast majority of Frenchmen, who after all have been accustomed for more than a century to representative institutions, still that state would be disqualified by one ineradicable flaw from sitting in judgment. It is a sovereign state only in fiction. It is in bondage to its German conqueror. It thus is incapable of assigning responsibility for France's disaster at the hands of that conqueror. Frenchmen will rightly esteem any judgment made in its name in such a connection an act of political revenge, an act of force, and the execution of the will of a foreigner. In view of this, the integrity of the individual judges who sit on the case is not particularly important.

II

The Supreme Court held its first public hearings on February 19, 1942. Seventeen months had elapsed from the start of the investigation — months filled with legal bickering between the presiding judge, M. Caous, formerly president of the criminal division of the Court of Juridical Appeals (Cour de Cassation), his colleagues, the attorney-general, M. Cassagneau, and the Minister of Justice. The latter office at first was held by Raphaël

currency speculation. Reynaud, whose conduct as Prime Minister was equivocal, has been left in prison and has not had to face any court. Mandel, who has never yielded in the slightest particular, is in the same position.

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Alibert, a partisan of the *Action Française*, then by Joseph Barthélemy, former professor in the faculty of law at Paris, former deputy, a light-witted person who had been violently in favor of Munich. M. Caous is of Breton and peasant origin. Persons who know him have told me that he is honest and enlightened. Now there probably are few Frenchmen more abysmally parochial than judges and state's attorneys. It seems, however, that this M. Caous has seen something of the world. Indeed, he has visited the United States, and it is possible that the Statue of Liberty stamped its image on his heart! I give these details, to the best of my knowledge, simply to provide as much background as possible. For a time another member of the court of juridical appeals, M. Lagarde, replaced M. Caous as presiding judge; but early in January 1942 M. Caous was reinstated. So far as we can judge by outward appearances, M. Lagarde had been found even less likely to fall in with governmental requirements than M. Caous.

Meanwhile two important events had taken place. For one thing, the indictment had been changed. The accused were no longer charged with having declared war on Germany without adequate reason, or with having provoked Germany to war. Their sole offense now was defined as having insufficiently prepared their country for its hour of trial. Secondly, by means of Constitutional Act 7 (January 21, 1941), Marshal Pétain had conferred upon himself all the prerogatives of administering justice. He now proceeded to condemn Gamelin, Daladier, Blum, Reynaud and Mandel to life imprisonment (October 17).

The first of these events, which took place after Laval's dismissal, perhaps indicated some feeling of shame and hesitation on Pétain's part, or at least the recognition of something distasteful in the difficult task which was at hand. However far they had gone astray, however strong might be their personal leanings toward collaboration, could French Ministers — whose daily task it was to keep within bounds the arbitrary demands of the forces of occupation — provide the Nazis with a further implement of torture without awakening terrible retribution from the French people? A full and detailed confession of guilt for the outbreak of the war would have been just that. Furthermore, even with the help of all the lies which Laval and Bonnet might cook up, would it have been possible to dispose of the formidable bill of particulars against Germany set forth in the French

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"Yellow Book" of December 1939? Bonnet's help was of course available. His asseverations have been recorded by a certain demagogue of the Right, Philippe Henriot, in a pamphlet, "How Peace Died: the Trial of the Guilty" (Comment mourut la paix, le procés des responsables). Pétain and his henchmen probably shrank from the risky procedure of utilizing the services of a minister who wanted to forget that he himself was, after all, the author of the declaration of war. Moreover, there is some evidence that their hands were forced by certain members of the Court.

It is difficult to see how the second event did not lead the Supreme Court to strike the whole procedure from its calendar. The sentence pronounced by Marshal Pétain on the basis of the findings of a "drumhead" court conducted by a former political chief in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a former Ambassador to Madrid and to Brussels, Count Peretti de La Rocca — an extravagant admirer of Franco and quondam emissary of Big Business at Burgos — meant that a new trial revived the hated procedure of double jeopardy. But Vichy had made up its mind to disregard any inconvenient juridical principle. It had proclaimed new laws creating new offenses and declared them retroactive over a period of ten years. It now did not hesitate to abolish the provision against double jeopardy.

Constitutional Act 7, put into force more than a month after Laval's dismissal, was really aimed at the latter. The Marshal had been incensed by some shady monetary dealings laid to that politician's door during recent negotiations with Germany. Peyrouton and Raphaël Alibert (then, respectively, Ministers of Interior and Justice), who had planned and executed the palace revolution of December 13, 1940, thought thus to get rid of him forever. But the Germans promptly extended their shield over Laval; and the unused weapon afterwards was directed against the Republican Ministers as the most convenient way of doing away with a supreme court which had proved troublesome. Whereupon Joseph Barthélemy had pangs of conscience. Had not the five men been sentenced without being heard? After some hesitation, the former procedure was resumed.

The Supreme Court held over twenty hearings, the last of them on April 2. It then adjourned for the Easter vacation. On April 14 a decree suspended further hearings.

In his Reichstag speech of March 15, Hitler had lashed out

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against the Court. All he cared about was that France should accept the guilt for the war. He saw that the heated arguments going on between the accused, the witnesses, the public prosecutor and the presiding judge over deficiencies in French preparations for national defense would inevitably lead the French people, probing into the causes for their defeat, to turn more and more against the collaborationists and, if that were possible, more and more against Germany. It must be admitted that this interpretation of Hitler's was quite justified. As the trial progressed, Pétain, Laval and many another, soldier and civilian alike, came to see with increasingly dreadful clearness just what awaited them on the day when, France once again free, they themselves would in turn be the subjects of searching and painful cross-questioning.

III

From the very outset the trial went askew. Everything had been planned to drive home the accusations lodged against the former Ministers who now stood in the dock. Gamelin (was he playing the Government's game?) answered the first of the presiding judge's questions by refusing to testify. He was horrified, he said, at the thought of taking part in any proceeding which amounted to an accusation against the French Army. Thus it seemed likely that the public prosecutor would aim his fire exclusively at Daladier, Blum, the other ex-Ministers and the single permanent official whose fate had been linked with theirs. Blum and Daladier, however, asserted boldly that it was the failure of the military which had been fundamental. From the start they took a very high-handed tone with the Court and the state's attorney. Moreover, several of the witnesses called were rather revealing in their discussion of army matters. The consequence was that the entire High Command as constituted in 1940 and earlier years was constantly under discussion. This meant, of course, that Marshal Pétain himself became involved.

There sat Gamelin, motionless, lips tightly closed. Almost it seemed as though all of France's other military leaders, even the one who in fact was the most powerful, were present though invisible, like God in Racine's "Athalie." But certainly they were not present in their most advantageous guise. The presiding judge and the public prosecutor allowed the name of the Head of the State constantly to be introduced into the pleadings. To any-

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one who recalls the speeches delivered before the Madrid Athenaeum in the months and years before Primo de Rivera's dictatorship this is a most striking fact. For there shafts often were aimed at Alfonso XIII, who was of course implicated in the Anual disaster; but, except by a slip, the speakers did not go further than more or less veiled allusions. Why was M. Caous so forbearing? Such a procedure cannot have been foreseen either by the state or by the Court as a whole. If it had, the Court would not have ruled against the accused when they objected to having all acts prior to June 6, 1936, the day when the Popular Front Cabinet assumed office, excluded from the purview of the trial. Nor would the Court have sought so strenuously to rule out Pétain's management of affairs while Commander-in-Chief (up to 1931), Inspector of Air Defense (1931) and War Minister (February-November 1934). Of course Blum and Daladier in any case had plenty of ammunition for attacking the Pétain of 1936–1940, in which period he was President of the Higher Council for National Defense and indulged himself in a bit of military writing. Nor did they fail to use it. But in practice they were allowed much wider scope. Pétain, incidentally, was not protected by a convenient provision against *lése-majesté*. Had his advisers forgotten to ask him to sign beforehand the appropriate, if mis-named, "Constitutional Act"?

IV

Daladier and Blum could boast, and no one could dare gainsay them, that as early as October 1936 they had set French rearmament in motion by obtaining from Parliament a credit of 14 billion francs, later increased to 20 billion. "This was the moment," said General Hering, one of the witnesses, "which marked the beginning of the renaissance of the French Army." To be more accurate, what the general described as the renaissance of the French Army had begun with the restoration of the two-year term of military service in the spring of 1935.[2]

It can hardly be sufficiently emphasized that the one-year term of military service brought the French military system to ruin. After 1936, the old skeleton began again to take on muscles, tendons, flesh. But the French Army, besides needing men, also

[2] This was thanks to the demand of General Weygand, who finally succeeded in overcoming Pétain's disinclination and hesitation — Pétain, who, as Weygand put it, was "more timid than a Member of Parliament." Weygand was Commander-in-Chief until January 21, 1935. On other subjects, unfortunately, his ideas coincided with Pétain's.

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needed up-to-date arms. And it is a fact that the leaders of the Popular Front were the first to give orders on a large scale for such weapons, seeking to rectify the damage done by their predecessors, the Pétains and Lavals, who in 1934 and 1935 had foolishly reduced the expenditure for armaments at the very time when Germany's leaders were already preparing the massive production which was to get into full swing in 1937. Unfortunately, however, the Popular Front did not subordinate its political policies to the fulfillment of this military program. "We were caught short," Daladier asserted before the Chamber of Deputies on December 22, 1939; "we were going to be ready early in 1941." Still, the fact remains that they gave the first impetus to a necessary movement which their predecessors had blindly postponed. He and his colleagues might have pointed out that in an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (October 15, 1936), Weygand was pleased to note that the parties formerly most opposed to military effort had at last changed their tune and were giving great heed to army needs.

It would also have been open to Daladier to insist that Pétain had compromised national defense (as the future was to demonstrate) by discouraging the fortifications planned for the Sedan sector. Pétain had been dominated by the unhappy idea that in this region the hills and forests of the Ardennes, backed by the deep ravine of the Meuse, made the approach of German forces next to impossible. In actual fact, the Germans traversed the Ardennes (following cavalry actions, and not in an unforeseen tidal wave) on May 11 and 12, and crossed the river on the day following. They thereby were able not only to defeat the 9th and 2nd French Armies defending this sector, but immediately undermined the 7th and 1st French Armies and the British Expeditionary Corps, placed in echelon northwards all the way to Holland. Struck at its base, the pyramid toppled over. In all this business Pétain had played a part, even though Gamelin's was the direct responsibility. Others were involved, too, of course, among them General Georges, Prételat, president of the committee on fortifications, and General Corap, commandant of the Amiens region and responsible for the execution of the works surrounding Sedan before his defeat at that place.[3]

But responsibility for these things is joint rather than individ-

[3] The same men, Corap excepted, were responsible for the fact that only field works of middling importance were erected from Longuyon (the western end of the Maginot Line) to the sea.

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ual. Pétain had assumed other responsibilities which were altogether personal by taking umbrage at General de Gaulle's ideas about what is now generally known as the Blitzkrieg, and specifically regarding the use, independently of the armed mass, of the tank-airplane combination as a tool for breaking through continuous fronts. At one of the Riom hearings the preface written by Marshal Pétain for a book by General Narcisse Chauvineau, of the Engineers, was read aloud. (Narcissus! . . . what an admirably appropriate name to pick out for a representative of the corporate entity called the French General Staff!) Both the book and its preface are specimen catalogues of all the mistakes it was possible to have made by 1940 in the realm of strategy and tactics. Pétain, while commander of a battalion or lieutenant colonel, had been a professor of infantry tactics at the war college some ten years before the First World War. Against Colonel de Grandmaison, advocate of the offensive spirit, he had preached the doctrine of "fire superiority," which he perhaps confused with the superiority of the defensive. While he was War Minister in 1934, he summarized his theory as follows, using as point of reference the vicissitudes of the last war:[4] "The French, led astray by a wrong interpretation of their experience in 1870 and by the study of Napoleonic campaigns, which always were distinguished by violent break-through tactics, hurled themselves foolhardily against the Germans in the first weeks of August. They were beaten and forced to give up the mysticism of the offensive and to fall back on a greater strategical prudence. From August 23 on, the Germans in turn made the same mistake. They never were able to recover from it." *Vive la tranchée!* Incidentally, let it be noted that Daladier in one of his Riom pleadings lauded General de Gaulle (who is under sentence of death by the Vichy Government) and asserted that he was proud of having been the one to make him a general. This is not true. Daladier rather stood in the way of the advancement of the prophet of mechanized warfare. But the mere fact that, with an eye to public opinion, he wished to stake out a claim to a share of de Gaulle's national and military reputation indicates the degree to which that reputation has established itself among the enslaved Frenchmen of 1942.

The solid part of Daladier's defense was his attack on the General Staff. In other things he greatly overstated his case.

[4] Speech of August 19, 1934, at Charmes-sur-Moselle.

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When he said that in 1940 the French Army possessed everything necessary to defeat the enemy he simply did not speak the truth. However, the figures which he produced of the number of warplanes still in existence on the day of the Armistice is substantially correct. Most of them had been sent to North Africa by the commander-in-chief of the air forces, General Vuillemin.

V

Daladier cannot be exonerated by mere proof that such-and-such a specific error is attributable to Gamelin or to some other general officer, and does not fall on his own head. Strictly speaking, he may be right; yet each error is his own fault also. For just short of four years, from 1936 to 1940, he was the civilian head of National Defense. And as far back as 1933 he already for some ten months had held the portfolio of War. His most pressing duty was to appraise Gamelin's character and abilities and to replace him if he judged him inadequate for his job. This he failed to do. And the worst of it is that he often had his doubts. At certain moments, with the insight sometimes characteristic of the pathologically weak-willed, he intuitively apprehended the soft spots in the High Command. But he was as unable to set institutions right as he was to change individuals. When he tried to organize a general staff for national defense — something which might have supplied a French equivalent to the unified handling of the *Wehrmacht* — he stopped halfway, yielding, in effect, to Darlan's opposition, for the Admiral was indignant at the idea of being subordinated to an army officer. Be it noted that for this proposed supreme command — which proved in the end an empty title — he had chosen Gamelin (January 21, 1938).

Now, if we limit our attention to war production, we must ask why on earth Daladier insisted on not creating a Ministry for Armaments until October 1939, when the war already was several weeks old? To have presumed that the work could be done by a mere bureau in the War Ministry, directed by a second-rate man like M. Jacomet, was sheer folly.[5] In a speech before the Chamber of Deputies on March 22, 1938, Daladier showed that he would not hear of setting up a Ministry for Armaments until mobilization had been decreed. To make such a change, he re-

[5] An indication of M. Jacomet's intellectual powers is supplied by the fact that at the end of 1937 he still believed in the possibility of limiting armaments by an international control of national budgets.

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peated over and over, would upset all that already was under way. A deputy asked whether the incidental disorder should not be avoided precisely and above all after war had actually begun. Nothing pried Daladier loose from his formula.

Probably it is wiser not to go into the question of the air force. Here Pierre Cot and Guy La Chambre can settle their accounts only at each other's expense. Each point on which you acquit the one must be levelled as an indictment against the other, and vice versa. The brutal fact is that in March and April of 1938 the monthly production of planes did not amount to 20, and that in November 1937 British Ministers had thought it necessary to draw the attention of their French colleagues to the dismal state in which the French aviation program was being allowed to languish.

The list of Daladier's mistakes and failings is indeed long. Granting all that has been said about him here, and more besides, the High Command nevertheless revealed itself as even more noxious than the War Ministry to the interests of France. Frequent references were made at the Riom trial to a supply of uniforms, blankets and shoes, valued at 2 billion francs, which eventually was unearthed at Troyes after the soldiers had suffered for a long time from a great shortage of such things. Quartermaster General Bernard — and Gamelin himself, breaking his silence — had to acknowledge that only the distribution services, which means the High Command itself, were to blame. That is only a single example. It may be asked whether Gamelin's ill-considered strategy would not have sufficed to counteract even the most thorough preparations, supposing such had been made. On this point I sympathize with Daladier's claim that others are more guilty than he.

I have said that at Riom there could be no proper justice. The trial thus became a political struggle. Daladier fought his case courageously. And in this he gave moral comfort to the French people, overwhelmed as they were by the capitulation and the travesty of the "national revolution." Daladier is indeed a strange fellow. Undoubtedly he is honest and devoted to his country. Yet he is curiously devoid of will-power when called upon to make a careful and well-thought-out decision. But though he lacks the ability to resolve the endless debate which goes on within himself, he can be stung into taking a position in public, and then he will strike yeoman blows. Then, and then

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only, does he live up to the name which the English and American press often bestowed upon him, "the bull."

The attitude of the generals called as witnesses deserves notice. There were a number, but I mention only former commanders of armies or members of the Superior War Council: Blanchard, Besson, Touchon, Réquin, Hering, Mittelhauser, Huré. They seem to have given honest testimony. They exposed the gaps in military preparations and to this extent confirmed the charges of the public prosecutor. But, apart from Réquin, who expatiated on the effects of Communist propaganda as his main explanation of defeat, they all tended in the same direction as Daladier, admitting, for instance, the gyrations of the Superior War Council in the matter of the use of tanks and airplanes. "I did not understand what a Blitzkrieg meant," said Mittelhauser, "before the Norwegian fiasco." Several criticized the Cabinets before 1936, that is, before the Popular Front. General Besson did not scruple to say that the French troops could have held their ground if they had not been thrown forward into Belgium — a biting indictment of the former Generalissimo. One man alone — Hering — uttered a few words in pity of his fallen chief.

VI

In the annals of Riom, the episode which now seems to stand out above all others is not Daladier's duel with the High Command, dramatic as it was, but the way in which the "national revolution," represented by the public prosecutor, was confronted with the institutions of the Republic. These found their voice in Léon Blum. Daladier also spoke for the Republic. But — and the point is not to be forgotten — Daladier is burdened with so heavy a past that to link his cause to that of the régime which was destroyed on July 10 would in truth be to give the Pétains and the Lavals too handsome an advantage. Daladier's public life was full of distressing inconsistencies both in national and international affairs; it will stand for the French Republic of tomorrow, as a symbol of something that must never happen twice.

Léon Blum is a different case. I myself have never had the least liking for the Socialist faith held by the leader of the "French section of the workers' international," to use an old-fashioned phrase. I never have understood how so keen a mind as Léon Blum's could, as a matter of doctrine, have refused until

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1935 to support military credits and could instead have placed unlimited hopes in disarmament conferences. Hitler's bloody saturnalias ought to have opened Blum's eyes more promptly to the cruel forces at work in our political universe. But by the time the chief of the Popular Front formed his government in June 1936 his conversion had been consummated. He understood the danger to which France was exposed. He remained, of course, a sort of French Pythagoras, an ideologist who insisted on believing that in the end humanity will be ruled by "divine numbers." In many ways he merits criticism. But no one can question his patriotism, the rectitude of his intentions, or his courage. And in the terrible suffering which has borne down upon our country, he is one of the very few political figures in whom we can discern nobility of spirit. Hence it was his right, more than any other man's, to say to the judges on February 19: "Democracy and the Republic are on trial. We shall ever be their defenders."

The 40-hour week is the principal sin thrown in the face of the man who was Premier in 1936–1937. At Riom it was alleged that by limiting working hours (under the law of June 21, 1936) in order to reduce unemployment, he put France in a position of inferiority to Germany, where men sweated away in the factories for 50 or 60 hours. Moreover, he decreased the efficiency of establishments producing war matériel by a measure of nationalization which was, to say the least, inopportune. And, speaking generally, he disturbed industrialists and employers by regulating the hiring and firing of workers and by providing for workers' shop committees. His acceptance of the Communists in electoral and parliamentary alliance was alleged to have introduced a poison into the whole community. Thus the disease from which France suffered in the pre-war years had its source in his government. It had reached such a virulent stage by the spring of 1940 — we add this on the strength of Pétain and Laval — that to ward off death France had only one recourse. She must at any price come to an agreement with the German and Italian dictators; she must seek salvation in Hitler's "New Order"; she must abandon her British ally; and, after the defeat, she must bend all her forces on internal renovation. Such was the thesis developed against Blum. It seeks to legitimize the counterrevolution of July 10, in which met and joined hands not only the men who might broadly be described as "French National Socialists" — Laval, Déat, Doriot — but also the age-old enemies of the

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"Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," with Charles Maurras as their champion.

Just as Daladier had turned the charges levelled against him back against the High Command, so Léon Blum turned the tables, but against the whole structure of Vichy. He showed — what was not very difficult — that the advent of the Popular Front and the legislation enacted while it was in office, with the whole train of dangers necessarily involved, had been dictated by the quasi-revolutionary movement which was sweeping through France before June 6, 1936. He showed also that this revolutionary movement had been called into being by the stupid monetary, financial and economic management of the many short-lived French cabinets between 1931 and 1933 (the time of the devaluation of the pound and the dollar), and of the administrations of Doumergue, Flandin and Laval in 1934–35. All of those politicians were advised and egged on by outstanding conservatives. Blind resistance to devaluation of the franc, which alone could have brought the French production costs into harmony with those of Britain and the United States, and ill-conceived efforts which aimed to accomplish the same end through budgetary and banking deflation, threw so many workers out of jobs and cut the wages of those who remained employed so drastically that a mass protest became inevitable. Vichy's plea of legitimacy, then, stands against a background of unequalled failure on the part of those who now claim to be regenerating France. Never did national income fall so low as under Laval in 1935; certainly it was not much more than half of what it had been under Poincaré in 1929. There would never have been a Popular Front if the gold content of our money had been reduced in 1934–1935. Admittedly, Blum undertook to forward a number of unhappy projects. The provisions of the 40-hour law, with its two-day week end, doubtless should have been very different. It can even be argued that they further exhausted the French national economy. But the miserable Vichy politicians of 1942 had been the first culprits. Blum has a good argument when he says that in 1936, during the weeks preceding his accession to power, internal revolution actually seemed more threatening than foreign war.

The men of Vichy not only were the ones who set fire to a train of terrible events in and outside France. They and their fellows sabotaged every effort by Blum, and then by Daladier, to remedy — however inadequately — the harm done by their badly framed

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legislation, and particularly the effort to quicken the tempo of armament deliveries. Not the least interesting thing about the Riom trial was the light it cast on such matters. For example, we find the Schneiders (proprietors of the Creusot works) refusing to coöperate with the Government in the establishment of factories in North Africa. What a rôle such factories could have played in 1940! In their Creusot plants, the Schneiders actually erected partitions to cut off completely the shops which were working on defense orders and had been nationalized, as though to advertise that they had ceased to concern themselves with what happened on the other sides of those walls. One of the relatives and business associates of the head of the family tried to get around Blum by approaching the Soviet Ambassador: if their factories were exempted from nationalization, he promised to deliver equipment long on order from Moscow. One name deserves to head the roster of infamy — that of Renault, automobile manufacturer and Hitler's follower from the beginning. His son-in-law, appropriately, is one of Pétain's Ministers. The 40-hour law permitted certain licensed exceptions, to increase, when necessary, the rhythm of output; industrialists made use of such privileges only in order to discharge employees. Such goings-on, and many more of the same sort, were aired before the court. And I pass over the dirty work which paralyzed French diplomacy in Spain and elsewhere. Because of the changes in the indictment, this subject did not come under discussion.

VII

In his "Réforme Intellectuelle et Morale," Ernest Renan draws up a balance sheet for the France of 1870. He was pessimistic about the direction which a republic based on universal suffrage would eventually take, and he urged his fellow citizens to entrust themselves to the traditional social hierarchy, to a monarchy which should be liberal but nevertheless forearmed against an overweening *demos*. The paragraphs in which he foresees an epoch of dictatorships designed to protect frightened societies — an epoch, he writes, which would be the bloodiest of any history has known — are worth rereading.

But, as things worked out, between 1934 and 1940 the French *demos* was a victim more of its leaders than of its own impulses. Its financial and economic leaders, its military leaders, pushed it into an abyss of material and moral degradation for which we

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find no parallel short of going back to the fifth century. The problem faced by those who must restore France after the victory of the United Nations will not consist merely in elaborating a new social and political régime. Whatever the second French Revolution may do, it will succeed only if it can recruit a better élite.

The importance of the Riom trial lies in its having presented Frenchmen with an ordered picture of their misfortunes. It is a summary picture: incomplete, sketchy, confused, questionable on many points. But the words of Blum and Daladier, spread about the country in spite of a lying or rigidly censored press, have set men thinking. A great boulder rests uneasily on the mountain top. The moment Germany is no longer there to keep it from toppling, it will plunge down.

Laval would have managed matters differently. He would have succeeded in finding be-robed servants to do his will, and above all he would have known precisely how to guide them step by step to the appointed conclusion. When the assassins of King Alexander and Louis Barthou were haled before the Aix-en-Provence assizes in 1935, he exclaimed, "As against what I conceive to be the interests of the nation, justice doesn't count." By this he meant that he had resolved to manipulate the court so that Mussolini would not suffer any disquiet. I can almost hear him crying out against the powers that staged the trial at Riom: "What muddling fools!"

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THE FIGHT FOR DEMOCRACY IN ASIA

By Owen Lattimore

BURMA has fallen. Japan now holds a land wedge that threatens to split India and China apart entirely. By her successes in the Philippines she also has tightened her grip over communications in her home waters and along the coast of China. With courage and ingenuity, the United Nations can still improvise and maintain new communications with China — certainly by air and probably also by land. President Roosevelt's promise to continue to get supplies to the armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek can be carried out. Nevertheless it is clear that the fall of Burma has ended a phase of the war. In the new phase that will replace it the United Nations must overhaul their grand strategy and examine anew the concepts on which they base their coördination of land, sea and air power, of areas of industrial production, of lines of supply, and of actual fighting fronts.

In this new phase the political factor will determine the effectiveness of all other factors. Up till now, the undermining weakness of the United Nations, in the Pacific theater, has been that they have been fighting a makeshift war. There has been some confused discussion of the relative importance of the Eastern war and the Western war; but there has been no clear definition of what the war is about. Obviously, only men who know what a war is about can fight it successful y. Even if we restrict our war aims so narrow y as to speak only of a war of survival, it is necessary to know what is to survive.

First and foremost, this is a war about Asia. If the Axis nations were to win, there would be drastic revisions of the structure of power in Europe and America; but they would find their richest loot in Asia. This is as true in terms of the power to rule as it is in terms of raw materials. The core of Fascism is the dogma of master-men and subject-men; and nowhere can a few thousands of masters rule so many millions of subjects as in Asia, if Fascism can once establish there its deadly technique of conquest and subjugation.

It is equally true that Asia will be the litmus paper that reveals the nature of the world order brought about by a victory of the United Nations. For the very reason that the United Nations represent on the whole the democratic world cause, and yet them-

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selves are not equally democratic in all respects, victory will face them with the responsibility of determining the degree of democracy that is to prevail over the world as a whole. The first step in discharging this responsibility — a step which cannot be evaded — involves a decision on the status of not one but several Asiatic countries. The consequences of victory will spread like ripples over Europe, America, Africa and the rest of the world; but Asia will be the main center from which the ripples widen out.

This political question is the real issue at the heart of the controversy over the relative strategic importance of the Eastern war and the Western war. As far as purely military values and decisions are concerned, no alarm would be created in Asia if the United Nations decided, in full and equal military consultation, to concentrate first on the defeat of Hitler. What causes in Asia an uneasiness which is already growing into fear, and from fear could easily be fanned into panic, is the unspoken suggestion that the political result of leaving Asia in abeyance in order to win a victory over Hitler would eventually be a peace dictated to Asia, in its main lines, by Europe and America.

II

In discussing the character of the war rather than war aims we start logically with the loss of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and Burma, and the unresisted overrunning of French Indo-China and Thailand. These losses represent a phase. What is the next phase or the phase after next? Is it to be a reconquest of these territories from the Japanese, or is it to come about as a liberation from the Japanese?

The Japanese have proclaimed the liberation of Asia — an Asia for the Asiatics. Their propaganda, in spite of their spectacular victories, has had as yet no great effect. Indeed, this propaganda has probably had more effect in Britain and America than it has had in Asia, and was probably intended more for us than for the colonial peoples. The Japanese know very well that Britain and America are shot through with racial prejudices, even though we have not organized these prejudices with the sinister cruelty in which the Fascists are so efficient. They hope, therefore, that this propaganda, supposedly directed at the Asiatics, will alarm and divide us. The Asiatics, on the other hand, know very well that this propaganda is a screen behind which the Japanese intend to establish themselves as a new master race. They also

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know that Japanese imperialism is harsher than that of Britain, America, Holland or France. For this reason most of the peoples whom the Japanese have overrun have submitted in an attitude of "non-violent non-coöperation" akin to that of India, though not politically organized as in India by the genius of a Gandhi and therefore on the whole ineffective. They have felt that the imperialisms which were being destroyed were milder than the new imperialism which was being imposed upon them; but they have not felt that the difference was great enough to fight about.

This is why only two Asiatic peoples have fought — the Chinese and the Filipinos. Neither of them was defending the established order of a foreign imperialism. China has not only been defending her own soil. She has also been fighting to attain full equality with other nations and to restore her full sovereignty, which for a hundred years has been impaired by treaties giving special privileges and private footholds in China to a number of foreign nations. The Filipinos have fought because they are the only colonial people whose future emancipation has been promised to them, not in vague terms premised on an unspecified future ability to rule themselves, but unequivocally and on an agreed date. They are thus the only colonial people whose troops have been armed and trained to defend a tangible hope of liberty, not the colonial rule of an alien sovereign.

Parenthetically, it is true that Thailand, the only free country in Asia except China, did not fight for its freedom. This raises a question of a kind to which there is never a simple answer. Thailand did not fight; but neither did Denmark, another free country. Part of the answer is that it is hard for a weak and small country to fight for its freedom unless the danger has been recognized in advance and the decision made to go down fighting. Perhaps more important, in the case of Thailand, is the fact that her nominal freedom had in fact always been a patronized freedom under the benevolent supervision of Britain and France, and that government, under this undeclared protectorate, was exercised by a small and corrupt clique. There is evidence that this clique had decided in advance to break away from the vague protection of countries whose colonial prestige had weakened rapidly in the dubious years of appeasement, and to court Japan as a new overlord. Instead of strengthening the national morale, they themselves undermined it by attacking the Chinese in Thailand.

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The unwillingness of the Asiatic colonies to fight for Western imperialism against Japanese imperialism has been widely recognized and understood in America, and in Britain too. Probably few people have as yet thought as far as the next phase. Yet there is a crucial decision that must be taken before this phase opens. The United Nations are determined to drive Japan back. If those of the United Nations that are colonial Powers attempt to set foot again in their lost colonies as conquerors or reconquerors, what will the effect be? The danger is that the propaganda of Asia for the Asiatics, which has been only weakly and unevenly effective while Japan has been advancing, may suddenly become very powerful if Japan can present herself as the defender of colonial Asia against white reconquest.

Moreover, the ranks of the United Nations, which have closed up tightly while they stand on the defensive, may begin to break as they turn from defense to counter-attack. Among them, Russia makes no distinction whatever between the citizenship of Asiatics and the citizenship of Europeans; and while there may be disagreements of one kind or another between the Soviet Government and the many peoples of the Soviet Union, the nationality principle is one of the strongest links uniting "the régime" and the people. The formulation of the Soviet nationality principle has been an integral part of the Bolshevik program from before the beginning of the Soviet revolution; and the development of it has been the personal work of Stalin himself. As for China, there is no doubt whatever that the restoration of colonial empire in Asia would alarm the whole nation. It is not that China seeks to take new territories and peoples under her protection, or to succeed to the former status of Japan in Asia. Far from it: for China, the problem is one of the trend of world development as a whole. China cannot but feel uneasy and threatened if the world as a whole is to show an evolution toward a new imperialism. For China, it is imperative to do away with the last vestiges of the partial imperial control which has hampered her for a hundred years; she can feel secure only if the environment of her new equality shows a general devolution away from imperialism.

There has not yet been time, either in China or elsewhere in Asia, to outline in clear detail the vision of the future. The future of the colonial world is in fact a complex of interpenetrating problems. Nevertheless, one thing is already taken for granted in China and the rest of Asia which has perhaps not yet been so de-

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cidedly taken for granted in the Western democracies: colonies lost in battle by countries unable to defend them and unwilling to grant them the full right of self-defense can never be subjected or returned to the status quo of December 7, 1941. Beyond that the alternatives are much more vague. It can hardly be assumed that it would be right or advantageous either to the subject peoples or to the peoples who formerly ruled to grant sudden and unequivocal independence to every lost colony. Probably the general alternative to the restoration of imperialism is the adoption of a new standard of values graduated by an absolute time-scale of emancipation and not by the subjective and relative scale of "fitness for self-government." Such a standard might well be called that of the Philippines as distinguished from that of India or the Netherlands Indies.

III

Whatever the aspect from which an attempt is made to survey these questions, it becomes clear at once that China is the political focus of all Asia. Only twenty years ago any European or American who asserted that the Chinese were politically competent and morally entitled to govern themselves with no restraint from the privileged Treaty Powers was assumed by other Americans and Europeans to be either a Communist or an irresponsible of the kind called "visionary." Lest it should be thought that I claim any greater foresight for myself, I should add that fifteen years ago, in the first political article that I ever published, I undertook to prove that in the first place imperialism is inherent in human society and that in the second place the Chinese are as imperialistic as anybody else; also that "since the Revolution, as is well-known, the Chinese have shown unity in only one thing — their attitude toward the foreigner. In domestic matters disintegration has proceeded rapidly." This article showed no comprehension whatever of the "transvaluation of values" that had just been brought about by the Northern Expedition, the rendition to China of the British Concession at Hankow, and the beginning of national unification under the Kuomintang.[1]

Today, China has become one of the Big Four of the United Nations. Chiang Kai-shek, who step by step against the stubborn reluctance of the Treaty Powers had to win the right to speak for the whole of China, has undisputedly become the symbol of

[1] "The Chinese as a Dominant Race," *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, London, 1928.

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the aspirations of hundreds of millions of people beyond the frontiers of China. America and Britain have given a pledge to negotiate afresh, immediately after the war, the treaties which govern the international relations of China and infringe upon her sovereignty; and if the wisdom of this pledge is questioned, the only doubt is whether it would not have been more statesmanlike to abrogate the whole structure of extraterritoriality, at once and unconditionally.

Obviously, the effects of such great and rapid changes as these radiate far beyond China, a fact which illustrates once more the extent to which the present war, all over the world, is a war about Asia. China has long stood at one end of a scale of values. It was a country that was not a colony, although many countries held in it privileges and rights of a colonial character. Below it were ranged the "enlightened colonialisms" of the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies; the vast bulk of India, combining many of the most enlightened and the least liberal phenomena of imperial rule and colonial subjection; the mandated colonial areas; and colonial systems of every intermediate ranking. In a scale of values of this kind, every interval is sensitive to changes in every other interval. Although China stands at the very end of the colonial scale, and not fully within it, a fall in the standing of China would instantly bring about a hardening of the imperial system everywhere. Similarly a rise in the standing of China is instantly followed by a loosening of imperial prestige throughout the colonial world, and by movements which range from demands for immediate emancipation to ones for increased representation and for visible advances toward ultimate self-government.

Nor are these effects confined to the colonial world. The modern status of China dates from the first of the Unequal Treaties, in 1842. The modern status of India dates from the disestablishment of the East India Company and the assumption of full control by the British Government in 1858. These dates, like the "year of revolutions" in Europe in 1848, represent the settling down of the world to what was regarded as a permanent order, after a give-and-take process of adopting and modifying the ideas which had emanated from the American and French Revolutions. We have therefore been living for a round century in a world in which the colonial system has formed an integrated part of the dominant democratic system; colonies have never been, as many people tend to assume, extraneous annexes of the democratic

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system in Western Europe and North America. That this integrated world order of subject peoples and free peoples was regarded as morally proper is well symbolized by the fact that China, after being attacked, defeated, and forced to sign a treaty which impaired her own sovereignty, had to pay an indemnity to the country which had inflicted the treaty on her. Similarly India, after attempting to throw off British rule in the great rebellion known as the Sepoy Mutiny, had the cost of the mutiny charged to her own public debt.

Because of the small economic weight of our visible colonial possessions as compared with our enormous home resources and production, we Americans habitually think that we are little concerned with the colonial factor in the existing world order. We deceive ourselves. The financial indemnity paid by China to Britain under the Nanking Treaty of 1842 was only twelve million Chinese dollars to cover the cost of the British expedition, in addition to six million dollars to cover the cost of opium destroyed by the Chinese. In order to pay this indemnity, however, China had to consent to a customs system and tariffs under foreign control — which determined the economic structure and development of China for a century. Under the most-favored-nation clause America could have obtained territorial concessions in China, but never did; she did, however, enjoy all the other advantages of the treaty system. Similarly the assignment of the cost of suppressing the Indian Mutiny to the Indian public debt was part of the economic framework and political system fixing the place of India in the world. In India as in China, America participated as one of the favored nations in a world order of which the colonial system formed an integral part.

IV

If, then, the changing status of China means a profound change in the colonial system, it means also a change in the very nature of the world order that has existed a hundred years. What system is to follow it? We know that democracy will be one of the test factors in what the future holds for us. We need, I think, to take two bearings on democracy, in order to form an idea of what it is and the direction in which it is tending to develop. First, what is the nature of democracy in general? Second, what is the nature of democracy in China?

The pedigree which traces the descent of modern democracy

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from the Greek city states is in a measure academic. The democracy of today dates from the American Revolution, which was largely responsible for the fact that France became a republic and Britain a democratic monarchy. The democratic tradition in Germany, Italy and the rest of Western Europe stems more from the French Revolution than directly from the American, and the Latin American republics also derive partly from the European tradition. However, the American Revolution was only one parent of modern democracy; the other was the industrial revolution.

Because of North America's virgin resources and vast, almost uninhabited territories, the industrial revolution was less of a revolution here than in Europe, and more of a purely creative phenomenon. There was much less in the way of vested interests to destroy. Without the Civil War we should hardly know that the United States had had to destroy an old society in order to confirm the security of a new one.[2] In Europe, on the other hand, the industrial revolution was just as revolutionary as the political revolution, both in its destructive and its creative functions.

Now it is a commonplace of economic history that colonial profits "threw the switch" that energized the industrial revolution in Europe. The colonial system which appeared in the middle of the nineteenth century to be settling down as part of a permanent world order had originated at about the same time as the industrial revolution. The latter part of the eighteenth century, in which the industrial revolution began to gather momentum, was the very period in which the exploitation of colonies was passing from a stage that often resembled plunder to a stage of more steady, large-scale enterprise.

Thus the liberation of the common people in Western Europe, and the destruction or weakening in various degrees of aristocracy, feudalism and monarchism actually went hand in hand with the reduction of the colonial peoples to a permanent subjugation. There is even a general correspondence between the chronology of political democracy in Europe, the degree of industrialization, and the degree of efficiency in collecting colonial revenue. In the same way there is a correspondence between the

[2] Incidentally, the Civil War, and the allocation of the Negroes to an anomalous ranking in which they are legally citizens but at the same time economically and socially an unprivileged and depressed class, may be called the American equivalent of the settling down of the colonial order.

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way in which the spread of both political democracy and colonial empire tended to slow down and "get stuck" after a general world balance had been struck between the two. Both political democracy and industrialization failed to penetrate deeply or spread evenly in countries like Portugal and Spain, whose colonial exploitation was inefficient, or countries like Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia, where a cumbersome feudalistic "internal imperialism" took the place of external colonies. By the end of the nineteenth century colonial conquest had also slowed down; it penetrated countries like Ethiopia, Thailand and China, but failed to subdue them completely.

We have now come upon the direct link between questions of democracy in China and elsewhere. Under a variety of impulses too complex to be treated here, the fermentation of both political democracy and industrial revolution began to work in China. The first political victory came forty years ago, with the overthrow of the Manchu empire; but China, lying at the edge of the colonial world, had from the beginning to contend against colonial limitations on both her political and her industrial development. Each forward step taken by China has therefore increased both the economic and the political pressure to revise a world system in which, for a hundred years, political democracy has been reserved for certain nations and integrated with an economic and political imperialism which those nations imposed on other parts of the world.

The issue not only between China and Japan but between China and the democracies narrows down to this long-established balance and integration between imperialism and democracy. Far too few people yet realize that this balance is bound to be destroyed *just as much by the renewed geographical spread of democracy as it would be by the renewed geographical spread of imperialism*. We have faced the challenge of the attempt by Germany, Italy and Japan to destroy the balance by spreading the area of imperialism; we have not yet fully faced the implications of democratic victory. These implications are easier to define in a country like Britain, which is visibly and demonstrably one of the most democratic democracies and simultaneously the mistress of the largest colonial empire in the world. They are less obvious in America, because our visible empire is much smaller; but they are no less important, for America is the greatest single power in a world in which democratic self-government and un-

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democratic imperial government have so long been integrated on a world scale, although separated into sharply marked compartments on a local scale. We are indirectly partners in the world imperial system, in spite of our small imperial holdings and of the way in which we have tried to get out of them, as in the Philippines.

China's resistance to Japan coincides with the line of cleavage between the democratic and the undemocratic aspects of our world. In the first place, China is not yet even a democracy. Her aspirations affect the balance of the world because she is trying to become a democracy. The society of China has long had many democratic characteristics; but according to the elementary textbook definitions, she is not a modern political democracy. She has neither free speech, free press, free right of assemblage nor a wide franchise. All of these things are inherent or expressed in the teachings of Sun Yat-sen and the political program of the Kuomintang as it has developed under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek; but none of them can be attained until the threat of imperial conquest has been defeated.

The attempt by Japan first to control China indirectly and then to conquer her outright is as much a war to prevent the spread of democracy as China's war of resistance is a war to spread democracy. That is why Japanese aggression has been a world issue, and not merely a local issue, from the day of the invasion of the Northeastern Provinces on September 18, 1931. And that is why the speeches of the Generalissimo have been studded both with arguments to convince the two greatest democracies that they could not evade world issues by trying to treat them as local issues, and with appeals to the Chinese people to live up to their responsibility to the world as well as to their own country.

Russia lay beyond reach of this challenge, not only because she demonstrated from the first her determination to resist encroachment, but because, since she was without imperial possessions and trade interests based on them, Japan's peculiar pressure could not operate against her. America and Britain hesitated, and finally were caught, because the duality of our interests made it hard for us to decide which front was more important, the imperial or the democratic. At first it looked as though we might save most of our private democratic preserves by concessions at the expense of "distant countries which we hardly know," and at the same

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time retain most of our imperial scope of action. Hence the concessions we made not only to Japan but to Hitler and the whole Fascist Axis, including Franco. The failure of these manœuvres only increased the pressure on our democratic front, until finally we stood on that front and fought — for survival. That survival implies the destruction of the old dualism between empire and democracy.

Here again China is the determinant, for the paradoxical reason that she is not a democracy. The very fact that she is creating a new democracy, not defending an old vested-interest democracy, focuses on her the attention of all peoples that do not have democracy. It also accounts for her own extraordinary fighting morale. The briefest historical comparison shows that the great periods have been those in which men saw the chance to create something new; in which, to paraphrase and amplify Browning, they could see something almost within their reach today which might actually be brought within their grasp tomorrow.

One-half of mankind lives between the Red Sea and the Yellow Sea. That half of mankind does not have democracy. Include Africa, and more than half mankind and half the world are involved. Among that half of mankind, culture and philosophy and religion are old. None of these old and valuable things can be adjusted to the machines of the twentieth century and combined with political freedom except through democracy.

The fundamental issue cannot be evaded. We cannot survive by defending the past; we must fight for the future. The survival of democracy demands the spread of democracy, and the spread of democracy means the end of imperialism, the end of the integrated imperialism-and-democracy to which we have so long been accustomed. When we failed to see what the issue was in 1931, the Chinese decided it for us in 1937. By fighting the Eastern end of the Axis to a standstill, they threw the Western end of the Axis against Britain and France in 1939. By fighting Hitler to a standstill, the British threw Hitler against Russia in 1941. By again fighting Hitler to a standstill, the Russians again threw the Eastern end of the Axis into action, this time against Britain, America and the Netherlands Empire. The final issue is now joined: it is the whole Axis against all the democracies. Mr. Wallace phrased it well in his recent speech, recalling the decision which Lincoln faced and took: the world can no longer survive half democratic and half colonial, half subject and half free.

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HITLER'S TRANSFERS OF POPULATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

By Hedwig Wachenheim

FRESH from his conquest of Poland, Hitler on October 6, 1939, announced to the Reichstag that there would be "a new order of ethnographical conditions, that is to say, a resettlement of nationalities in such a manner that the process ultimately results in the obtaining of better dividing lines." A day later he signed a decree transferring to the Reich all Germans who are "threatened with de-Germanization," and he entrusted to Heinrich Himmler, chief of the Gestapo, the duty of carrying out the resettlement program as Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom. So well did Himmler work that by March 1941 all German settlers beyond the Reich's new northeastern border and beyond the Carpathian Mountains, which are considered to be the Reich's strategical southeastern frontier, had been transferred to Germany.

Was this transfer of Germans to the Reich really based on a plan for new ethnographical divisions? The program was a tacit part of the Italo-German Pact of May 22, 1939. Mussolini was eager to clear the provinces of Venezia Tridentina (Bolzano and Trento) of their German-speaking people. He had been unable to Italianize them in the course of 16 years, and the region's industrial capacity and position near the frontier of his new but dreaded ally meant that it was one of vital strategic importance to Italy. The program also figured tacitly in the Russo-German Pact of August 23, 1939. Stalin was glad to free his future border zone of a population which might be disloyal in case of war with Germany. Hitler had always assumed the rôle of "protector" over the German-speaking citizens of the smaller countries in Eastern Europe. As long as he hoped to acquire the territories on which they lived without having to wage a war against the Western Powers, he proclaimed the inseparability of blood and soil. But by April 1939, when he began to realize that Britain might really fight for Poland, he was ready to sacrifice the German outposts in Italy and in future Russian territory in order to gain Italian coöperation and Russian neutrality. Hitler held back from the resettlement plan as long as the German minority in Poland was needed to undermine that country. Then, after

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Poland's defeat, he announced it, not as a change of policy enforced upon him by circumstances, but as a "new order" for the benefit of all Europe.

II

The process of resettlement began on October 15, 1939, with the signature of the German-Estonian Protocol on the transfer of the German minority in Estonia to the Reich. The first ship with German migrants left Tallinn on October 20. Differences over money claims delayed the signing of the German-Latvian Protocol to October 30.

In Latvia and Estonia, where the transfer was negotiated before Russia actually annexed those countries, the individual *Volksdeutscher* was free to make his own choice of citizenship. Migrants from Estonia were allowed to take with them their personal belongings and motor vehicles, a small amount of cash and, in the case of artisans and professional workers, some materials, tools and instruments. Latvia permitted all movable property, including livestock, to be taken. Other property was handed over to the Trustee at the German Consulate at Tallinn, in Estonia, and to the German Resettlement Corporation in Latvia; it was ultimately used by the German Government for the purchase of goods in addition to those paid for under the clearing system.

On September 23, 1940, Germany and Russia began to negotiate the transfer of German-speaking people from Lithuania, by that time a Soviet republic, as well as of some Germans who had stayed behind in the other two Baltic republics. A careful registration of all migrant property was made in Lithuania, which suggests that Russia transferred the property to the Reich in the form of goods.[1]

On November 3, 1939, Germany and Russia signed an agreement to exchange the *Volksdeutsche* of the Polish areas occupied by Russia for the Russians, White Russians and Ukrainians in the German-occupied territory. (The Germans announced later that many Ukrainians had preferred to remain in the Reich.) In the Russian-occupied territory a mixed German-Russian Commission selected the people to be transferred. These Germans, as well as those coming from Rumania, were granted German citizenship only after a careful examination in Germany. Lack of transporta-

[1] The agreements with Russia, Italy and Rumania on property transfer have not been published.

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tion facilities prevented those coming from eastern Poland and Rumania from carrying anything with them but their personal belongings.

The number of Germans transferred from the Russian-occupied areas exceeds the total number of Germans in those areas as given in the last census. Even the natural increase possible during the interval would not make up the difference, especially since that increase would be largely offset by the process of assimilation. The Nazis profited by the extensive studies made by the Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland, the Deutsche Akademie (both under Karl Haushofer) and the Deutsche Ausland-Institut in Stuttgart, which trace the origin and ramifications of German families abroad, their settlements, employment and political and cultural affiliations. These studies enabled the Nazis to disregard any postwar assimilation which may have occurred. The fact seems to be that since the Russians did not stop anyone who wanted to leave, there were some migrants who were glad to depart in order to escape the nationalization of their property and the collectivization of their farms.

The final agreement with Italy was signed on December 21, 1939. This agreement allowed the German-speaking people of the Italian provinces of Bolzano, Trento, Udine and Belluno a "free and spontaneous" option on the question of German citizenship, with the provision that those who chose it would be transferred to Germany. The polls closed on December 31, 1939, but the transfer need not be accomplished before the end of 1942. The original provision for the transfer of those who did not opt for Germany to other parts of the Italian Empire was dropped. Out of 266,985 eligibles, 185,085 indicated their willingness to go to the Reich, most of them from Bolzano. If this transfer is completed, and if Italy again raises the population of Bolzano province to its former size, the German minority will still constitute 20 percent of the population there.

Italy sold the real property of the migrants in the open market, and a fixed sum was then charged to her clearing account with Germany. The individual Italian seems to have recovered the equivalent of his property in Germany. It is doubtful whether the other migrants have.

On September 5, 1940, after Russia had taken Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia from Rumania, Germany and Russia agreed upon the exodus of the *Volksdeutsche* from these territories. On

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October 29, 1940, Rumania ratified an agreement which released the Germans of Southern Bukovina and Dobruja to Germany. Thus the "principle" of having no German settlements beyond the Carpathians was realized. There can be no doubt that Rumania was forced to accept the property of the migrants in payment for her oil and other products.

In all, approximately 490,000 Germans from Eastern Europe had been transferred to Germany by March 1941. The following table shows the total German population of the various countries, the number sent from each, the percentage of those who had been employed in agriculture, and also the number of those who had worked as self-employed farmers and were therefore ready for immediate settlement on German farms:

Country of origin	*German population*[1]	*Number transferred*	*Employed in agriculture (percent)*	*Self-employed farmers*
Estonia	16,000	12,868	20.0	2,206
Latvia	62,000	48,641		
Volhynia	46,900	64,554	85.9	8,473
Galicia	31,500	55,440	65.6	5,618
Bialystok	7,300	8,053	26.0	258
Gouvernement General	15,900[2]	30,275	83.1	3,727
N. Bukovina	76,000	42,441	30.7[3]	2,151
S. Bukovina		52,107	43.7	2,971
Bessarabia	80,192	93,548	81.7	13,921
Dobruja	12,165	13,988	79.9	1,644
Lithuania	29,231	50,000	——	——
Latecomers from Estonia and Latvia	——	10,000	——	——
Old Rumania[4]	——	7,000	——	——
Total	377,188	488,915		40,969

[1] According to last census: Estonia 1934, Latvia 1935, Lithuania 1923, Poland 1931, Rumania 1930. [2] Province of Lublin, from which this group came. [3] Including 12,500 from the city of Cernauti. [4] Legal domicile in the transfer area.

In addition to these migrants from Eastern Europe, 66,000 former Italian citizens were transferred to Germany. By March 1941, 8,000 had been settled in the Austrian province of Carinthia and 58,000 in Tyrol-Vorarlberg, just over the Alps from their former homes. This latter settlement is continuing, though slowly. It has been said that some emigrants from Italy also have been settled in the eastern fringes of the new German district of Katowice,[2] in Poland, and also in Moravia, but no evidence of this is available.

[2] The district of Katowice, part of Upper Silesia, is made up of Polish Silesia, Cieszyn, Hultschin and the western fringes of Kielce and Krakow. It has only 145,000 Germans in a population of almost 3,000,000.

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III

Most of the migrants from Eastern Europe were settled in the Wartheland,[3] part of the territory seized from Poland by Hitler.[4] This was the region in which Germanization was most urgently needed. Originally there were 9,000,000 Poles in the whole of the annexed territory, as compared with 600,000 Germans. Even after 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 Poles had been expelled, the proportion of Germans was still too small if the territory was ever to be successfully Germanized.

Germans from the Gouvernement General, which was under German control at the time of the transfer, were settled in the Wartheland immediately, on farms whose Polish owners had been transferred to the much smaller farms evacuated by the Germans in the Lublin and Chelm districts. The other migrants had to spend an initial period in camps. Hotels, schools, nunneries and monasteries were seized for the purpose, also lunatic asylums which had been emptied by "mercy" killings. Here the migrants filed their property claims and were examined as to working capacity and fitness to be German citizens and peasants. (No one can become a German citizen or peasant who is not of German descent or who has a hereditary disease.) The migrants were also given lessons in National Socialism and a good many of them probably had to be taught German. The farmers were trained in modern farming methods. Those who were able to do so had to work in nearby factories. They received one-third of their earnings in cash, the rest after their settlement on farms.

Agricultural and industrial workers, artisans and professionals were quickly absorbed as a result of the war boom and the ouster of the Poles. A decree which allowed the confiscation of Polish property not only for the defense of the Reich but also for the "strengthening of Germandom" furnished the necessary furniture, tools, instruments and farms.

IV

But Hitler's chief purpose was to build a "wall of German peasant farms" along the new 1939 border to protect Germany against the Polish tide.

[3] Wartheland is made up of the provinces of Poznan (excluding the northern strip) and Lodz (without the eastern section) and three or four Warsaw counties (the border line differs on various maps). Its population of 4,550,000 includes not more than 330,000 Germans.

[4] The miners from Galicia have been sent to Katowice.

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Infiltration of Poles into neighboring German areas has been a German nightmare ever since *Landflucht* (migration from rural into industrial areas) depopulated the eastern part of Prussia. In 1886 Bismarck began purchasing Polish estates for the settlement of German farmers, but the Poles circumvented him by buying up land whenever it became available. To discourage this, the Prussian Government in 1904 forbade the building of houses on land that had changed into Polish hands; and in 1908 the Prussian Parliament, on Bülow's insistence, passed a law which authorized the Government to confiscate Polish estates. The Junkers, however, sabotaged this law, which they thought set a dangerous precedent for a general land reform.

The German Republic in its turn was fearful of increasing the famine which existed in the early revolutionary days and so failed at first to enact any great land reform. However, under a law of 1919 (fully executed only after 1927) 57,500 farmers were settled on small-sized and medium-sized farms, most of them in the east.

Hitler's inaugural message of 1933 declared that the "back-to-the-land policy" was "the basic principle" of his program. Actually, however, the Nazis were interested in agrarian reform only in so far as it promoted self-sufficiency and decreased the need for imports. As soon as their armament program was under way they began not only to neglect farm settlement but also to admit increased numbers of migrant Polish farmhands. In 1934, 4,931 new farms were created — approximately the same number as in preceding years. Then the figure dropped rapidly, until it was only 1,456 in 1938 and 798 in 1939.[5] And an increasing number of these were not in the east, but in other parts of Germany. While the Nazis were talking about the inseparability of blood and soil, *Landflucht* was continuing at an accelerated pace in spite of an increase in agricultural prices, a ceiling on industrial wages and strict control of migration to cities.[6] The northeast suffered particularly from this movement.[7] But in 1939, when the Nazis had 40,000 German farmers available for settlement,

[5] Some 21,200 farmers were settled between 1933 and 1939; and 5,000 were removed when the army needed their land.

[6] The agricultural population of the old Reich decreased from 20.8 percent to 18 percent, and the percentage of workers engaged in agriculture and forestry decreased from 28.9 percent to 26.0 percent, between 1933 and 1939.

[7] The districts of Marienwerder and Königsberg increased their populations slightly because of shipbuilding and other war industries. But if these districts are disregarded, the regions adjacent to western Poland lost approximately 250,000 inhabitants between 1933 and 1939.

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they could not settle them in depopulated eastern Prussia. They needed them for the Germanization of western Poland.

The number nevertheless was too small to form a solid wall. The Polish provinces of Lodz, Pomorze, Poznan and Silesia, which form the bulk of the annexed territory, had more than 350,000 farm holdings when the Nazis took over. Only a negligible number could have been in German hands. The Nazis planned to eliminate all small farm holdings and to create medium-sized farms throughout the annexed area.[8] About 110,000 farmers from southwestern Germany (Baden and Württemberg), where small holdings prevail, were also to be transferred to western Poland. It was calculated that 40,000 farmers from western Germany could be placed on farms in Wartheland after the migrants from the east had been settled there, while the remaining 70,000 would be settled later in the frontier districts of Katowice and Ciechanow and in Pomorze.[9]

By August 1940 a total of 12,250 farmers had been settled in Wartheland. Then difficulties arose. Contrary to expectations the war had not been won. The Nazis needed the highest possible returns from the soil; but the newcomers were not familiar with the modern methods of farming practised in Germany. Above all, German industry was not in a position to deliver the farm implements and the material for the new buildings needed on the enlarged holdings. The great colonial scheme was given up in the spring of 1941 even before the Russian campaign began. Hitler, who never fails to twist a failure into an advantage, declared that the settlement plan had to wait the return of the soldiers who were entitled to farms as the reward for victory. Most of the remaining migrants were hurriedly settled on the farms best suited to the purpose. Some may even remain in the camps, others may be returned to Lithuania, and the farmers of the southwest are still on their "dwarf" holdings. The German farm wall crumbled before it was completed.

Pauperized and deprived of their land, the Poles now are working in greater numbers than ever before on the feudal estates of eastern Germany. They are not hindered; on the contrary, they are welcomed, because hands are needed. Hitler, who promised to

[8] The 3,600 big estates which are run by the Ostdeutsche Landbewirtschaftungsgesellschaft (*Ostland*), a unit of the Reich's Food Estate, were exempted from this program. *Ostland* also supervises the small farms as long as they are in Polish hands.

[9] It was also planned to settle 2,500 to 4,000 farmers from small holdings in the Saar region in Lorraine.

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draw new lines of ethnographical demarcation, has in fact enlarged the zone where the nations are intermingled. But the German goes eastward as the master, and the Pole goes westward as the serf.

When Germanization of the soil had to be stopped, Germanization of the individual began. If it is true that blood determines the individual's instinct and demeanor, then assimilation is "utopian." At any rate, that is the word Hitler used for it on October 6, 1939. Nevertheless, the Nazis now attempt it. When citizenship was granted to the *Volksdeutsche* [10] after the annexation, the process was selective. In March 1941, however, a "Registration of German Folkdom" was decreed, avowedly in order "to unearth the German folkdom hidden by Polish names and to free it from perversion."[11] Every family with one German grandparent or a relative in the Reich, and every Pole who gives indication of German descent or expresses his willingness to become a German, is closely examined to determine his fitness. "Willingness" is sometimes relative. The Poles have no right to own property; they get smaller food rations than the Germans; they do not benefit from tax exemptions; in many counties 15 percent of their wages are deducted and used for the reconstructions of the east; and they are liable to forced labor and deportation. In these conditions "willingness" can sometimes be exacted by terror or bought by bribes.

V

While western Poland was serving as the goal of the German westward migration, central, southern and eastern Poland were selected as the area towards which Europe's outcasts were to be directed.

How far these regions have been depleted by the three great eastward migrations cannot be said, for these movements were hidden by the Russian censorship. More than a million Polish soldiers and civilians, including 300,000 to 500,000 Jews, must

[10] A decree, now in force for practically the whole area from the Baltic Sea to Bulgaria, defines a *Volksdeutscher* or *Volkszugehöriger*, the latest official term, as a person who is not a German citizen but who professes to be a German and whose profession is confirmed by his descent, language, demeanor, education and other circumstances. In dubious cases, the decision rests with the local Nazi leader.

[11] The same method has been used in Luxembourg. The remaining people of Alsace and Lorraine also seem to be considered as Germans after the expulsion of the unconvertibles (particularly those who had moved in after 1918). French is banned from schools, courts and administration offices throughout the area. People are herded into organizations affiliated with the Nazi Party. In Alsace the schools and courses organized by the Labor Front correct the "perverted German" spoken by the population.

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have fled eastward and southward from the German onslaught in 1939. The Russians deported 2,000,000 Polish citizens to Asiatic Russia and Siberia after their occupation of eastern Poland. How many Poles, White Russians, Ukrainians and Jews were among them? Nobody, probably, knows. The number of people who fled from the Russian-occupied areas and from western Russia when the Russian armies were retreating in 1941 is also unknown.

The largest group deported to the Gouvernement General by the Nazis was made up of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 Poles from the German-annexed areas. Second in number were the Jews. There were 200,000 Jews left in Germany, Sudetenland and Austria by the time Germany declared war on the United States.[12] The Bohemian-Moravian Protectorate then contained at least 84,000. At the time of the annexation, 545,000[13] were in the annexed parts of Poland, most of them in the province of Lodz. Besides, there are approximately 6,900,000 Jews under German domination in the east.[14] How many of these were killed by the war, by starvation or by organized Nazi terror, and how many were able to flee into Russia or Turkey, or even into Italy, cannot be stated exactly.

In Germany and her five southeastern dependencies, where local anti-Jewish policy has been fully coördinated with the German, Jews are now concentrated in huts outside the cities or sent to labor or concentration camps. Many are deported to the Lublin "Reservation," in the Gouvernement General, or to the neighborhood of Pinsk. More recently they also have been sent to the ghettos of Kaunas and Minsk. Those in the camps and near Lublin and Pinsk have to work on roads and canals or on river-control and swamp-draining projects. The rest live in ghettos isolated from the outside world.

Reports indicate that most of the Jews from the annexed parts of Poland have been deported to the Lublin Reservation, with the exception of 160,000 to 200,000 who are concentrated in the ghetto of Lodz. The number of Jews deported to the Gouverne-

[12] The German armies trapped 72,000 Jewish refugees from the Reich in Northern and Western Europe, and 7,000 to 8,000 in Eastern Europe. There are 30,000 in unoccupied France.

[13] The figures on the Jews in Germany and the zone between the old German and Russian borders are drawn from reports of the Joint Distribution Committee. They are more recent than those of the last census. Russian figures are of 1939, as reported by the Institute of Jewish Affairs.

[14] Slovakia, 70,000; Greater Hungary, 800,000; Rumania, 275,000; Croatia, 31,600; German-occupied Serbia, 9,300; Bulgaria, 62,000; Greece, 73,000; Gouvernement General, 1,180,000; Eastern Poland (including Eastern Galicia, now also part of the Gouvernement General), 1,575,000; Lithuania, 240,000; Latvia, 94,000; Estonia, 5,000; Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, 442,000; White Russia, 450,000; Ukraine, 1,550,000.

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ment General or *Ostland* from old Germany, Austria, Sudetenland and the Protectorate is not under 40,000, by a very conservative estimate. In addition, Hungary deported at least 18,500 Jews to Galicia in 1941; 54,000 were dumped into the Ukraine from Rumania last fall; and this spring Slovakia seems to have begun sending her 70,000 Jews to Poland. But when no trains are available for deportation, or when Germany needs hands, this policy is shrewdly and coldly interrupted. Recently, Jewish artisans from the Ukraine have been sent into Germany proper.

It should be noted, however, that deportation to the Gouvernement General is not restricted to Jews. At least 30,000 Slovenes from Croatia have been sent there, as have Rumanians from Northern Transylvania. Recalcitrant Frenchmen from the occupied zone are among the latest arrivals.

The deportations do not represent merely a policy of racial and political hatred. Cheap labor is needed, particularly for vast canal-building and swamp-draining projects. Workers in Germany and the countries allied with the Reich would probably rebel if they were put at this work. In the "Annex" (*Nebenland*), as the Germans call the Gouvernement General, public morale is of no importance.

In contrast to the policy followed in the Protectorate, the *Volksdeutsche* in the Gouvernement General have not been made German citizens. In the hierarchical order established by the conqueror they form the second class, under the Reich Germans who govern the country. Third in rank are the Poles. Ukrainians, Ruthenians and even White Russians can be elevated above the rank of a Pole if their respective bureaus in Berlin agree. *Volksdeutsche* who have been convicted of committing hostile acts against the Reich after the 1939 campaign are degraded to the lowest rank, that of the Jews. The natives of the Baltic countries are treated slightly better than the Poles, because their police are needed to help guard the rear of the German army.

VI

In the Carpathian region, just as in the north, Hitler has failed to draw new lines of ethnographical demarkation.[15] Transylvania,

[15] The partition of Rumania increased the percentage of her Rumanian population from 71.9 in 1930 to 84.9 in 1941. The population of Rumania also includes 580,000 (4.4 percent) Germans, 528,000 (4 percent) Magyars and 237,000 (1.8 per cent) Slavs. These figures are from *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, p. 17. This uses the 1940 census, which is not available in the United States. Since then, 73,000 Germans and 54,000 Bulgars have been transferred to Germany and Bulgaria respectively.

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the Rumanian and Jugoslav Banat, and the areas taken from Slovakia and Jugoslavia by Hungary, all are still zones of mixed nationalities.[16]

The German claim that there are 2,000,000 of their race in the Carpathian region is, of course, highly exaggerated. Nowhere are the Germans in a majority. The actual figures are shown in the following table:

Country		*German population*
Slovakia		128,000
Hungary		750,000
Western Hungary	55,100	
Central Hungary	157,300	
Southern Hungary	207,000	
Scattered	59,000	
Annexed territories:		
From Slovakia	20,000	
From Rumania	60,000	
From Jugoslavia	191,400	
Rumania		520,000
Southern Transylvania	204,000	
Banat and Arad	276,500	
Scattered	39,500	
Jugoslavia		276,000
Banat (occupied by Germany)	126,000	
Croatia	150,000	

The Vienna award of August 30, 1940, provided for three voluntary transfers in this region. Rumanians in Northern Transylvania, which had been awarded to Hungary, were permitted to opt for Rumanian citizenship within six months. Acceptance of this citizenship made migration to Rumania within the next year compulsory. Transfer of property was allowed. The 452,000 Magyars in the Rumanian territory that was Hungarian before 1920 and that was not transferred to Hungary in 1940 were

The various awards of territory made to Hungary decrease her Magyar population from 92.1 percent in 1930 to 73 percent of a population of 15,000,000 in 1941. From Slovakia she acquired 448,000 Ruthenians (Hungarian census of 1910) and 374,000 Slovaks (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1939, p. 113), which, with the 105,000 Slovaks in her postwar territory (1930) and the 31,000 in the Baranya-Backa area taken from Jugoslavia (Jugoslav census of 1921) raises the number of Slovaks in her territory to 510,000. She also acquired approximately 442,000 Serbo-Croats from Jugoslavia. How many were killed in the recent terror or sent back into Jugoslavia is unknown.

[16] For Transylvania and the Rumanian Banat, see FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1940, p. 237. The Jugoslav Banat, at present occupied by Germany, has a population of 562,000, including 240,200 Serbo-Croats, 17,600 Slovaks, 69,500 Rumanians, 98,500 Magyars and 126,500 Germans (1921). The Baranya-Backa area has a population of 784,600, including 262,200 Serbo-Croats, 31,000 Slovaks, 277,600 Magyars, 1,600 Rumanians and 190,000 Germans.

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allowed to opt for Hungarian citizenship under the same conditions. As both countries were eager to uphold their claims to the whole region awarded to Rumania after the First World War, they discouraged migration. Hungary even sent back the Magyars who crossed the frontier, claiming that they had been illegally expelled. On the other hand, she welcomed Magyars from Bukovina (11,150 in 1930), who left when Russia annexed that territory.

Germans in Northern Transylvania were given two years to decide whether they wanted to migrate to Germany. Property transfer was allowed, partly freely, partly under the clearing system. How many went to Germany is unknown.

One more transfer resulted from the Rumanian partition. The treaty of September 7, 1940, by which Rumania ceded Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, provided for the exchange of the Bulgars in Northern Dobruja for the Rumanians in Southern Dobruja. This was to be carried out by a Rumanian-Bulgarian Commission within three months of ratification. Voluntary migration from other regions was also to be permitted; and the government which received voluntary migrants of its own nationality was entitled to expel a like number of nationals of the other country. Movable property, including livestock, could be transferred. Landed property was seized by the country from which the migrant departed, and he was entitled to damages from the country of his final settlement. All property claims resulting from the transfer of population were renounced by both countries. The Mixed Commission decided on the transfer of 54,000 Bulgars to Bulgaria, and, apparently, of 110,000 Rumanians to Rumania. Pressure seems also to have been exerted on the Turks. Military considerations probably dictated the policy of making the Dobruja a region of ethnical purity.

Apart from the agreement covering Northern Transylvania, there has been no attempt to transfer the Germans within the Carpathian region. They have been organized in "National Groups" established by bilateral treaties between the "country of their origin" (Germany) and the country of their residence. Once a person has claimed to be a *Volksdeutscher* and has been recognized as such by the leader of the National Group, he and his descendants are permanently bound to the group. Throughout the region family names which were once German must be Germanized again, a procedure which, for certain historical reasons,

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favors the Germans. Assimilation of Germans is prohibited. The members of the National Group have full rights of citizenship in the countries of their residence, and they also enjoy the rights granted to national minorities by the postwar treaties, such as the right to their own language before the courts and administrative agencies. In addition, they have full cultural autonomy and "free cultural intercourse with Germany," which means that their schools and universities, although paid for by the countries of their residence, are supervised by Germany. The groups constantly extend their self-government into the sphere formerly reserved to national governments.

The German minority in Croatia, for example, does not exceed 3 percent, but by an agreement concluded in October 1941, the leader of the German National Group is a Director of State immediately under the Poglavnik. He issues decrees "within the framework of the law." The county leaders of the group enjoy similar rights. Full bilingualism is decreed for districts with a German minority of at least 20 percent, and it may also be claimed where the German minority is between 10 and 20 percent. All Germans are entitled to show the German colors and to sing the German anthems. Government officials swear the oath of allegiance to the "new state" and to the "German Folkdom and Führer."

VII

By the transfer of Germans to the Reich, Germany has so far gained approximately 275,000 employable persons. This is a small number compared to her needs. Nevertheless, the Germans in the Carpathian region were not transferred to the Reich. They are more useful where they are as an instrument of control. Instead of transferring these strategically located Germans, the Nazis have organized a great centripetal migration which brings labor to Germany from all the European countries, whether allied, subjugated or neutral. Between April and December 1941 the number of foreign laborers in Germany increased from 1,500,000 (in addition to the 1,400,000 prisoners of war working there in April) to 2,100,000. Among these were more than a million Poles. Generally, 25 percent of the foreign workers are women. Since then, new contracts have been made and 700,000 Russian prisoners have been brought in. To avoid grumbling by German workers, foreigners are paid German wages, but it is doubtful

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whether they all get extras for the support of their families. The Poles, and probably the Greeks and Serbs also, have to pay a punitive tax of 15 percent on their gross earnings.

As long as the war lasts the need for labor and the unrest in the subjugated and associated countries will force the Nazis to continue transferring labor to Germany and concentrating outcasts in Poland and *Ostland*.

Will the victors attempt to resettle the dislocated populations after the defeat of Germany? It should be attempted, and could be done, only in connection with a comprehensive political program for Eastern Europe as a whole. That program would have to take account of the new frontiers, the political and economic conditions, present and future, in each of the eastern nations, the relations of those nations with each other, the future status of minorities, the availability of overseas outlets for future emigration, and the amount of financial assistance to be made available from outside in order that the transfers might be conducted with the minimum of hardship and the greatest hope of permanent success. After so much suffering, these peoples deserve no less.

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PRINCE OF ARABS

By Joel Carmichael

WHEN Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdur-Rahman al-Faisal Aal Saud, the present King of Arabia, was just past his twentieth year, he took a band of forty of his brothers, cousins and their servants, stole into the central Arabian city of Riyadh in the dead of night, took the garrison by surprise, killed the governor and proclaimed to the stupefied townsfolk that a Saud had come back to power in the city of his fathers. This spectacular coup took place in the year 1900. It hurled Ibn Saud into the political arena of the desert and placed his foot on the first rung of the ladder that was to lead him to mastery of the Arabian peninsula and his present key position in Near Eastern affairs.

Ibn Saud was born in this city of Riyadh in 1880. His family had fallen on evil days. When his great-great-great-grandfather, Muhammad Ibn Saud, ruled in the valley around Riyadh in the first part of the eighteenth century, a certain religious reformer had come to him for sanctuary. This reformer was Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, a man of great and fanatical piety, who was offended in his soul at the corruption fallen upon Islam and resolved to revive the word of the sacred Koran in its primitive virtue. The preaching of Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab and the swords of Ibn Saud's forebears conjured up a dominion throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula and offered a direct challenge to the Ottoman Empire. But the Turks roused themselves and swept away the creation of the Wahhabis; and once again the desert became a cockpit of petty tribal feuds and persistent bloodshed, intrigue and assassination. When Ibn Saud was born, Riyadh lay under the heel of Ibn Rashid, a capable and ruthless Bedouin chief.

At the time of Ibn Saud's birth his uncles and his father, Abdur Rahman, were engaged in an internecine struggle for the privilege of leading Riyadh in revolt against Ibn Rashid. But eventually Ibn Rashid made up his mind to wipe out this nest of vipers: exile became the portion of Abdur Rahman, who fled south with his family. After enduring the wild and primitive life of the desert tribes as long as he could, he obtained Turkish permission to settle in Kuwait, on the Persian Gulf, where he brought up his chil-

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dren in the unwavering belief that it was their mission to recreate the empire of Saud the Great. As for himself, the strength had gone out of him and he resigned himself to a life of exile.

Ibn Saud never resigned himself. After an unruly childhood among the tribes, he passed his adolescence lounging about the cafés and streets of cosmopolitan Kuwait. He was growing up into a gigantic, swaggering buck with inexhaustible physical vitality, an indomitable will to power, and a determination to restore the ancient luster of his family and take the rule of the land into his own hands.

The coup at Riyadh in 1900 was the first step; but the subsequent ascent was a continuous struggle. From that time on he was to have no peace, and until the final consolidation of his power he lived under the strain of incessant and indeterminate warfare. It was as difficult to hold the Bedouins together for any length of time as it is to make a lasting monument of grains of sand. But though he was never at rest anywhere in his widening domain, he retained a firm hold over the nucleus of his following. He was a full-blooded giant, a combination of uncompromising ruthlessness and capricious generosity which made him the idol of those who clung to him. He understood the desert people well, and kept steadily extending and tightening his grip on them. His enemies, at their best never more than raiding Bedouin chieftains, were worn down by his magnetism, vitality and patience, and one by one they were eliminated as effective contenders for an Arabian hegemony to which, indeed, they had never aspired. By 1912 he had removed the last opposition to him in Nejd, when he crushed an insurrection generated by his cousins (the so-called Araif clan), and so accomplished his transition from the status of a Bedouin sheik to that of a state power. He had become the sovereign authority in his own land, and from this vantage point could survey the world about him.

II

Ibn Saud never forgot his father's teachings. He was determined to unite not only Nejd but the whole of Arabia under his own rule. He was persuaded that Arabs could once again be great, but for this they had to be inflamed by an idea that would purge away their incessant bickerings, stabilize their shifting allegiances and weld them into a people. That had happened once before under the inspiration of the camel-driver Muhammad, the One

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Sent by God to unite his children and magnify them in Islam. And it had happened once again, and once again had led to power, when the Arab Calvin, the luminous Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, cleansed the desert life of its amiable impurities.

Just as his great ancestor had given the neo-prophet Abdul Wahhab a sword with which to fulfill his burning words, Ibn Saud determined to mold these Arabs of his into unity through an idea borne by the sword. Two things were necessary: first, a lambent idea; and then a radical transformation in the material pattern of their lives.

Nomadic rootlessness is the central fact in Arabian life. Society in the desert does not have a solid body. Aside from the coastal cities and the isolated towns in the center of the country civilization is spread out thin. Except in a few favored spots, the cultivation of the land is wearisome. The "freedom" of the nomads is in reality a brute compulsion created by the barrenness of the land. The Bedouins move from one poverty-stricken pasture ground to another in order to keep alive. Government must be imposed on these scattered wanderers across appalling distances. Each community is a law unto itself, separated from its fellows by vast spaces.

It was this unyielding land and this wayward people that Ibn Saud set himself to rule. He laid a relentless hand on the stiff necks of the quarrelsome desert dwellers who never before had been tranquillized, and constrained them within a wholly alien discipline. History's verdict may confirm the statement he himself is reported to have made: "Let no man tell me what to do with the Bedouins, for I alone know how to deal with them."

One of his ways of dealing with them was to exploit their very unruliness. He turned each tribe into an overseer of the next, and made each chief responsible not only for the behavior of his own tribe but for that of his neighbor's. Each sheik was called upon to punish his neighbor for any infraction of the law; and the neighbor was required to attack him in turn for any remissness in such punishment. If both were negligent, the King's wrath was visited on them both. But the real foundation of his power was the agrarian policy he instituted in 1912, after suppression of the Araif revolt gave him the internal security essential to any further development. He deliberately set out to resolve the immemorial contradictions between town and pasture by settling the Bedouin population and destroying tribal organization from the roots up.

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There was a close connection between this material reorganization and the spiritual idea which he adopted as the motor force of the transformation. Since there was no immediate economic drive in the desert towards this agrarian resolution of nomadism, the tempestuous Bedouins had to be given the reality of an idea. Now although Ibn Saud had been brought up as a strict Wahhabi Moslem, he had never fetichized the public observance of religion. But by 1912 he came to the conclusion that the binding force for the



agricultural colonies in which he was determined to settle the Bedouins could only be a revival of the austere precepts of his ancestor's patron, the first Wahhabi.

Wahhabi priests and preachers were sent out to warn the tribes of the menace of the infidel (which meant all non-Wahhabis) and to summon them to joint action in defense of the one true religion. The converts to the new dispensation were called *Ikhwan* — the "Brotherhood" in obedience to God.

The wells of Artawiya, in the northeast corner of Nejd, were

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chosen as the first refuge of the faithful. The inhabitants of the consecrated colonies were to have neither kith nor kin nor tribe: the only link with their fellows was to be the Brotherhood, which spread its mantle over all professing its principles without distinction of tribe or class. The supreme authority was the *Shar*, the corpus of Islamic law, which was to supersede all other law. The center of the community was a small mosque built by the settlers themselves, aided by Ibn Saud's pinched treasury. Around this they slowly raised a number of mud huts and began to till the soil. The hamlet slowly but steadily grew to a village and then to a town, with a population in 1930 of more than 10,000. It also became the center of a group of a hundred or more towns and villages scattered throughout the vast desert spaces of Nejd. According to an estimate made by Ameen Rihani, there were 73 of these colonies in existence in 1927, with a total population considerably above 100,000 and a standing army of 50,000 men. These figures have since gone up.

The bulk of Ibn Saud's regular army consists of this *Ikhwan* manpower. Indeed, this had been one of the principal results envisaged by his whole agrarian policy. Each colony weakens its parent tribe, and at the same time constitutes a permanent addition to the general agricultural prosperity of the country. But above all each community is a bulwark of the religious fervor which in Arabia passes for national spirit.

III

The growth and consolidation of Ibn Saud's power during the first decade of the twentieth century was achieved at the expense of his Arabian rivals. In these internal conflicts foreign influence always played a rôle. The entire Near East is a colonial area, and sooner or later any power arising in it runs up against the powers of the world outside. In the past, Arabia's shield had been her remoteness and her unloveliness. Now, unlovely though she remained, modern science had brought her nearer the hearts of the Great Powers.

The Turks had contented themselves with preserving a certain order within the peninsula and demanding no more than a reasonable degree of subservience. Ibn Saud saw that although he might be able to conciliate them for a time, sooner or later he would clash with their sovereign pretensions. And inevitably, as his power spread, the Turks began depending more and more on those

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Bedouin chiefs who saw their own positions menaced by the successes of Ibn Saud.

Effectively present, also, was the British Empire. From Ibn Saud's point of view, the British had the merit of being powerful and, what was more important, remote. They were opposed to the Turks and the Germans, and they could promise more. Ibn Saud could not avoid the displeasure of the Turks; but he did his best not to block off any possible channel of future friendship with the British.

In the years before the World War the feuds among the Bedouins became intermingled with the larger conflicts without. The friction between Ibn Saud and the old enemy of his family, Ibn Rashid, never died down; and, in addition, Ibn Saud's central position ultimately brought him into conflict with one Hussein Ibn Ali, a Turkish functionary and grandson of a dislodged Meccan Sherif. Hussein had spent his childhood years among the tribes of the Hejaz and most of his adult life in the courts of Istanbul. In 1908 the Sultan Abdul Hamid, involved in the difficulties which preceded the end of his reign, bestowed the Sherifate of Mecca on Hussein, then sixty years old. At this time Hussein's aims seem to have been quite modest and conventional. He merely desired to aggrandize himself and achieve a humble distinction in the service of the moribund Turkish Empire, whose northern mainstay, the House of Rashid, rent by fratricidal strife and weakened by a succession of incompetent rulers, could no longer vouch for the enclosure of the Wahhabi power. An uprising in the Asir province, south of the Hejaz, provided Hussein with an admirable opportunity to display his devotion to his Turkish patrons and his personal qualifications for replacing the Rashidite house. He crushed the subversive movement promptly and vigorously, and the Turks were led to hope that he might serve their purpose in central Arabia as well.

But the World War was casting its long shadow across the desert. Germans and British were pressing in closer and closer on the Near East. In the spring of 1913, Ibn Saud came into direct diplomatic contact with the British for the first time. The Turks, with the help of Hussein and the Rashid, were manœuvring to seal him up in the Nejd, and in order to forestall them Ibn Saud abruptly invaded the Hasa, on the Persian Gulf, and seized the Turkish garrison at Kut. The position of the Turks was so gravely compromised that they were compelled to conciliate Ibn Saud

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by an agreement to provide him with cash and weapons, while simultaneously arranging for a counterweight to him by doing the same for Ibn Rashid. Ibn Saud for his own part was engaged in sounding out the British. After an exchange of formal courtesies with him at Uqair, the British Government decided that in spite of the risks afforded by the proximity of the Wahhabis to the sea it might turn them into an effective obstacle to the rapidly growing German influence in Turkey's Arab provinces. In the winter of 1913–1914, accordingly, Captain W. H. I. Shakespear, the Political Agent at Kuwait, visited Riyadh. This marked the beginning of a rapprochement between the Wahhabis and the British, though succeeding events were to nullify its effects.

IV

Apart from a certain tortuousness of motive, one of the chief complications afflicting British policy in the Near East was the fact that it was executed by so many authorities. Because of this, the tactics used were often contradictory, even though the real objective with respect to the Arabs was simple. Nothing reveals this confusion better than the British juggling with Hussein and Ibn Saud.

The handling of Arab affairs at the outbreak of the First World War was formally divided between the Government of India, acting through the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force and its Political Officer, Sir Percy Cox, and the military authorities in Egypt, headed by Sir Reginald Wingate at Khartum and Sir Henry MacMahon at Cairo. At first, the Indian Government was entrusted with the supervision of Arab affairs as far west as Suez and Aquabah, as well as with the Mesopotamian campaign, but early in 1915 the extreme vulnerability of Suez and the Red Sea made it necessary to define the spheres of the two departments more clearly. The Indian authorities were left to look after Arabia all the way round to Yemen and the Asir, while Sir Henry MacMahon became responsible for all operations in the Red Sea as far south as Jiddah, the port of Mecca.

The only thing the British wanted to do with the Arabs was to turn them against Turkey. But the Indian Government and the Egyptian military pursued the same object by different and, as it turned out, opposed means. Sir Percy Cox, the Chief Political Officer of the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, attempted to secure an alliance with Ibn Saud, whereas Sir Henry MacMahon

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instituted negotiations with Hussein. The Indian Government staff was undoubtedly more intimately acquainted with the Arab scene and the relative strength of the contending parties, but its superior insight was nullified by its habit of lifeless routine. In the ancient feud between the two departments, moreover, Whitehall had always been closer to Cairo than to Delhi, and so it was the Egyptian staff which determined British policy in the Near East.

Sir Percy Cox sent Captain Shakespear to see Ibn Saud, and it was finally agreed that the latter should attack Ibn Rashid, who had declared his allegiance to the Turks the moment the war began. The Wahhabis took the field in January 1915, and the battle with the Rashid's forces was joined a few days later at Jarrab. Here something happened which, though trifling in itself, was to exercise a mischievous effect on British policy and change the course of history in the Near East. The Wahhabis were defeated and Shakespear, in a display of great personal bravery, lost his life. This battle was merely an isolated clash in the desert, and its loss was insignificant; but the Wahhabi setback discouraged Sir Percy Cox from pressing the alliance with Ibn Saud. Instead, Sir Percy concluded a treaty of friendship with him at the end of 1915, which lowered him to the level of half a dozen petty sheiks along the gulf and eliminated him as an instrument against the Turks.

The youthful British staff in Egypt were responsible for taking up once again the weapon of Arab coöperation. They hit on Hussein Ibn Ali as the man to raise a banner against the Turks. In 1916, there was a definite settlement by which the British agreed to recognize Hussein as the ruler of a vast territory comprising almost all Arab lands east of Sinai and south of present day Turkey (with some reservations concerning French interests) and to look with favor on his assumption of the Caliphate, in return for a revolt against the Turks in the Hejaz, to be instigated by Hussein and his sons. The insurrection began the same year, with the romantic Faisal as its figurehead and genius.

This conjured up a new Arab movement, and an Arab Bureau was set up as a special war secretariat of the Egyptian High Commissioner for the coördination of all operations and propaganda relating to it. This Arab Bureau was made up of vigorous and original young men, of whom T. E. Lawrence was the most distinguished. It steadily encroached on the functions of the Gov-

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ernment of India, and directed the Arab policy of the British Government until the end of the war.

V

Arabian affairs were in a state of turmoil when the conflict ended. Of the three important Arabian powers, Ibn Saud was in the worst position. Hussein had not come out too badly. His dreams of a vast Arab empire had not been realized, but he was the monarch of the independent Kingdom of the Hejaz, acclaimed by the European Powers, and invited to become an original member of the League of Nations. The House of Rashid was also regarded by the British with a good deal of sympathy, partly because of the old passion for a formal balance of power and partly because of the prejudices of various British officials, such as Gertrude Bell and Colonel Leachman, in favor of maintaining the bloody but picturesque dynasty as a makeweight against the dour Wahhabis.

Britain's Arab policy after the war was a matter of catch-as-catch-can improvization. There was no clear-cut design against Ibn Saud; but it was evident that what was taking place in a haphazard but effective enough way was the formation of a belt of Sherifian states which would lock up Ibn Saud in the inner desert. Hussein was ruler of the Hejaz. The British backed his son Faisal for the throne of 'Iraq. Trans-Jordan was presented to Faisal's brother, Abdullah. And the Rashid, Ibn Saud's hereditary enemy, ruled in Hail. Ibn Saud realized that this anti-Wahhabi league would incarcerate him behind an enormous arc reaching from Mecca to Basra, and in two vigorous operations he pulverized the edifice which was emerging as the mutilated version of the Arab Bureau's earlier and more elaborate designs.

First of all, he decided that the total elimination of the House of Rashid was necessary to his own security. At the end of 1921 he laid siege to Hail. The reigning monarch was puerile and many of the townsfolk were sympathetic, so the siege was a short one. The reduction of the Rashidite capital drove a formidable wedge between the Sherifian states at their weakest point.

The British were now on the second leg of their misguided course. Whereas previously they had consistently underestimated Ibn Saud's strength, they now misconceived his temperament. Perceiving that a final and decisive settlement of Arabian affairs would have to be made, they called a conference in Kuwait in

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November 1923. This conference might well have brought about some sort of equitable rapprochement, but aside from its being slighted by every member of Hussein's family but Faisal, the Colonial Office stifled the meeting at the outset by presenting Ibn Saud with a series of demands which were too absurd for any possible acceptance.

The failure of the Kuwait conference and the stopping of the British subsidy in the spring of 1924 left Saud quite free to act against the last of his Arabian rivals, Hussein, whose rash presumption in snatching at the Caliphate cast aside by the Turkish National Assembly in March 1924 had inflamed the Wahhabis. The lengthy conflict with Hussein now came to a head quickly. Bands of Wahhabis were wandering restlessly about at this time, seeking a pretext for action, and more or less by accident a column of them suddenly turned up at Taif, a summer resort near Mecca, where Hussein's eldest son Ali was stationed with his troops. The mere sight of the fanatical Wahhabis sent them flying. By the middle of October 1925 the Wahhabis were in Mecca.

Their ultimate victory had been a foregone conclusion since the Taif disaster, and in the fall of 1925 a British mission was sent out to come to a final understanding with Ibn Saud. After much procrastination and many false starts, the British Government bowed its head to what it could no longer avoid and recognized that Ibn Saud was the master of Arabia. Perhaps the fundamental defect in British policy towards the Arabs was its failure to realize that the *Ikhwan* movement had brought about a qualitative change in desert affairs. The Wahhabi state as resuscitated by Ibn Saud possesses a cohesiveness lacking in the Bedouin régimes with which the British had been accustomed to deal. They did not see that in spite of its apparent atavism Ibn Saud's religious revival was the beginning of a westernizing movement. At first, to be sure, its unappetizing fanaticism seemed no more than a recurrent spasm of Semitic orthodoxy; it was difficult to detect its material aims. But from the long view it may be said that Wahhabism created the conditions necessary for the modernization which its founder might have abhorred, since in order to eradicate the disintegrating tendencies of the tribal wilderness Arabia had to be given "the boon of discipline to control the license of her primeval chaos." Ibn Saud's régime was not distinguished by power alone. The changes which it wrought in desert life made his power more durable than that of his opponents. This was the fundamen-

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tal reason for his victory over Hussein. Although he spent the greater part of his life among the most insular of the Arabs, while Hussein lived much of his in Istanbul, Ibn Saud was the one who was aware of the twentieth century and its material developments and who adapted them to an authentically Arab framework.

In spite of Hussein's parochial limitations, his personality had a good deal of bite. His children, however, were at best never more than plausible Levantines. Faisal — romantic, charming, majestic Faisal — remained an obedient puppet throughout his career. Abdullah, now the Emir of Trans-Jordan, is frankly uninterested in exercising the power which he holds by virtue of British subsidy and British policy. But ever since Ibn Saud took power he has been the real, not the titular head of his people: he rules by virtue of his own right arm.

VI

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is spread out over 700,000 square miles, but its inhabitants do not exceed four or five million. This fantastic disproportion between space and population has been one of the difficulties in the way of Ibn Saud's creating a modern state. His government is an absolute monarchy, though modified by the fact that in the desert a man can rule only through the respect of his subjects. While doing his best to placate the religiousity of his extremist Wahhabis, he has gone ahead with his program of Europeanization as quickly as possible. He has established the King's Writ to such an extent that his country has the lowest police expenditure of any in the world. The governing élite which advises him is largely made up of Syrians, 'Iraqis and Egyptians due to the fact that the people of Nejd and the Hejaz have come into close contact with Europe only recently. Energetic efforts are being made to exploit the country's extensive mineral resources, especially the oil in the Hasa, and to reclaim great desert areas through irrigation. Elements of modern finance, modern agriculture and modern hygiene have all struck root, and are gradually tending to bring the primitive inhabitants into the stream of modern civilization. The impact of these innovations has been felt in the desert as well as in the towns.

Arabia is still mainly a wilderness, however, where men meet unencumbered by the frills of civilization and where personality remains a decisive political factor. Ibn Saud is a man of overwhelming physical presence. His huge and well-proportioned

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body radiates enormous vitality. His bearded lips, full and delicate when he is in good humor, become a quivering white line when he is aroused. His smile is quick and charming, his rage volcanic. His face is swarthy and aquiline, and though his sixty-odd years have given him spectacles and impaired his vision, his features have not lost their vigor. His gestures are graceful and expressive, and he uses the staff which is always in his hands to lend emphasis to his speech. He has a great voice, which can either roar or coo. A voluble and witty talker, he loves conversation; he is a shrewd and resourceful debater, with the urbanity of a Parisian and the downright abruptness of a cattle-rancher. He has an extraordinary capacity for combining limitless passion with an absolutely detached and cold-blooded realism. He is a man of enduring patience and inflexible purpose — altogether, a formidable man.

VII

The British Empire is now engaged for a second time in a World War in which the Near East is a vital strategic and economic factor. Despite their backwardness and limited numbers, the Arabs occupy a position of fundamental importance. Arabic-speaking peoples are scattered along half the coasts of the Mediterranean and encompass the junction of three continents. The Arabic language ties together a nationalist movement of great potential force. Although outside of Arabia the nationalist revival is not religious, nevertheless, for obvious reasons, the Arabs are the object of Moslem sympathies everywhere. This is especially important in India, a huge reservoir of men and materials which will become more and more of a factor in world affairs regardless of the outcome of this war. And the Moslems of India are their country's most active and warlike inhabitants.

Ibn Saud's attitude toward the war is clear. He is primarily an Arab and a Moslem. He must detest the Axis. But he has never loved the British, and although what he knows of Americans has made him sympathetic, what he does know is not very much. He has made alliances with the British out of necessity and self-interest, not because he considers them free from machinations or deceitfulness. He admires them, but his admiration is curbed by an acute appreciation of the point at which his own interests diverge from theirs. In turn, he has only contempt for most Arab politicians, whom he regards as corrupt, impious and overween-

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ing. He has made no secret of his congenital incapacity to accept any authority but his own. In any reorganization of the Arab world it will not be possible to ignore him. He will support the cause of the United Nations only in so far as it guarantees justice, freedom and opportunity for the Arabs.

Today the dominion of the British in the Near East is gravely threatened. The friendship of the Arabs has seldom been enthusiastic, and it now is farther than ever from being a matter of course. The British are aware that concessions would be both seemly and prudent. Concrete plans for such conclusions are of course hard to arrive at in the midst of a tremendous struggle, and British intentions with respect to the Near East are veiled in indecisiveness and confusion.

But an interested eye can occasionally perceive signs of the emergence of a shapeless entity referred to as an Arab "federation." In the vagueness necessarily characteristic of postwar projects today, one of the few likely things is that Ibn Saud is not being considered in connection with such a federation. The way the word is being used indicates that it is meant to imply a cluster of hand-groomed, federated "states" bound together solely for the greater convenience of London. To pursue such an aim would be to repeat the error of Lawrence and the persistent delusion of the Turks which made them cling to the idea "divide and rule" when it was division which made rule impossible. A federation which excluded the strongest and most vital power in the Near East would serve neither Arab nor British purposes.

It is not only the British Empire which is interested in the welling-up of the Arab national spirit, but any Power of world stature. The United States has been wrenched out of its indifference to even the remote parts of the world. The United States and the British Empire are being bound more and more closely together in the fortunes of war and peace. Americans are waking up to the existence of places and people so exotic that up to a short time ago scarcely their names had been heard of. Africa and Asia are now within the widening American horizon, and in the waste expanses of the Arabic-speaking world Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, despite his country's remoteness, looms up as a tower of strength.

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HAUSHOFER AND THE PACIFIC

By Hans W. Weigert

GEOPOLITIK DES PAZIFISCHEN OZEANS. By Karl Haushofer. Berlin: Vowinckel, 1924.

ONE of the methods which Karl Haushofer uses to hammer his ideas into the minds of his readers is the constant repetition of simple truths. He likes, for instance, to quote a remark by the English geographer and statesman, Sir Thomas Holdich, about "the absolutely immeasurable cost of geographical ignorance." And he never tires of citing Ovid's "fas est ab hoste doceri" (it is right to learn from the enemy), and Disraeli's "at last the best informed one wins."

These three simple maxims help also to explain the American public's sudden and amazing interest in German geopolitics and its master. Not so long ago our geographical education was insufficient and uninspired. Then all at once the man in the street and the political leader alike became aware that we might have to pay a high price for our ignorance. In the hour of danger we were ready at last "to learn from the enemy." The magic word "geopolitics" and the mysterious personality of its prophet kindled the interest of a broad public, and the interest was intensified by the manner in which this "secret weapon" of Hitler's was first presented. German geopolitics invaded the United States as some sort of super-science. We were given an exciting lesson on "the thousand scientists behind Hitler;" we were told that Haushofer and his followers dominated the thinking of Hitler and that it was Haushofer who directed the German General Staff's plans for world dominion.

Even if one turned from such journalistic approaches to recognized authorities in the field of international politics, one came upon remarks like the one by Colonel Beukema of West Point that history will rate Karl Haushofer as more important than Adolf Hitler because Haushofer's studies made possible Hitler's victories both in power politics and in war. No wonder, then, that everywhere "geopolitics" became the political catchword of the day, that the highest eulogy a political writer could earn was to be called "the American Haushofer" and that colleges all over

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the country hurried to organize "Institutes of Geopolitics."

But German geopolitics is not something which we can simply adopt outright for American use, for it has all the characteristics of a typical German *Weltanschauung*. It is an important point for us to keep in mind when we deal with geopolitics in theory or practice. Some of the proponents of geopolitics in this country have, coolly and cynically, surrendered to this *Weltanschauung*. They do not see that geographical materialism is nothing but a dynamic nihilism which flourishes only in a nation which has buried its gods and is worshipping Mars instead. Freedom and justice for all and not only for the mighty ones, the simple tenets of Christianity — such "impractical" concepts as these do not figure in modern German geopolitics. Nor do we find them in the theses of some American "realists." They forget that there are imponderables which can defeat the most precise schemes of power politicians.

It is also necessary to call attention to the wall which separates German geopolitical thought and ideology from the geopolitics of other nations. There is no such thing as a general science of geopolitics. It does not have a singular form. There are as many geopolitics as there are conflicting states struggling under geographic conditions which are, as in the case of sea powers and land powers, for example, as different as day is from night. As it has been said that every nation has the government it deserves, so it can be said that it has the geopolitics it deserves. The German definition limits its use to Germany, a warning which should be heeded by those who try to adopt the sinuous ways of Haushofer's geopolitics to American use.

On the other hand, German geopolitics has developed ways of thinking and "seeing" on a global scale from which we can and must learn. And an understanding of the roots and branches of German geopolitics sometimes enables us to look behind the curtain of German grand strategy and to understand its ultimate goals. But we shall be able to profit from studying the methods of the German school only if we are aware of the fundamental differences between the German and American situations.

Of more than thirty studies which Karl Haushofer wrote (in addition to his regular monthly reviews) on what he called the Indo-Pacific space, his "Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans" (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean), first published in 1924, has held its position as his most significant work — as the Bible of

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German geopolitics. Its subtitle, "Studies on the Relationship between Geography and History," clearly indicates that it was intended to contain more than an analysis of the geopolitical importance of the Pacific area. The book is, therefore, the ideal introduction to German geopolitics in general and to an understanding of the man Haushofer, so far as it is possible for Anglo-American minds to understand the truly Faustian nature of his genius. But to grasp his concepts of geography and history fully one must not fall into the error of looking at this book as something final. Only by carefully following Haushofer's monthly surveys since 1924 in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (varying in length from 1,500 to 4,500 words) can one begin to realize the man's creative power. Nor are his writings easy to master. To him as to Spengler, with whom he has much in common, "to write history is to write poetry." He himself speaks, characteristically enough, of the "demoniac beauty of geopolitics." But his poetry is obscure, his style is involved. Too often he seems wilfully to darken his political analyses and predictions. His ideal reader would be one who understands what is written between the lines.[1]

"Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean" begins with a discourse on the meaning and aims of geopolitics. "Geopolitics is the scientific foundation of the art of political action in the struggle of the state organisms for existence and for *Lebensraum*." Its aim is to become "the geographical conscience of the nation." The geopolitician must be an artist whose thoughts encircle the globe and whose creations work in the spheres of time and space, by the laws of which he is bound.

Such definitions, it need scarcely be said, do not lead far. If we disassociate geopolitics from its sinister glamor it might be defined as the younger and sometimes, in another sense, rather juvenile brother of political geography. While political geography deals mainly with the investigation of conditions which are significant in the relationship of earth and state, geopolitics uses these factors for actual political blueprints. It asks "dynamic" questions. Its domain is the prognosis of politics. Defined as prosaically as possible, it might be called applied political geography.

[1] Haushofer's rule, incidentally, "never to report anything that is untrue, but not necessarily to put down everything that is true," should carry a lesson to recent prophets of American geopolitics, among them N. J. Spykman, author of "America's Strategy in World Politics." (This remark is not meant to give the impression that Professor Spykman has reached a "true" conclusion when he incautiously stresses the advisability of maintaining Japan and Germany as military powers to balance the power of China and Russia after the war is won.)

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As early as 1908, when he first went to Japan, Haushofer had grasped what the rise of new forces in the East meant to the destinies of Europe. He had been deeply impressed by Friedrich Ratzel's fascinating concept of the "law of the growing spaces." It had led him naturally to the shores of the Pacific, which he describes as the largest "physiographic region on earth." He saw it as a power sphere, slowly awakening, for the first time in history, to the consciousness of being one of the largest land and sea spaces. "A giant space is expanding before our eyes," he wrote, "with forces pouring into it which, in cool matter-of-factness, await the dawn of the Pacific age, the successor to the aging Atlantic, the over-age Mediterranean and the European era."[2] Theodore Roosevelt had said the same thing when he spoke of the declining resources of the Atlantic area and predicted the dawn of the Pacific age. But Haushofer was more specific. He drew the outlines of an actual, if long-term, politics, following the elementary lesson taught by Leopold von Ranke that "politics is the attempt to safeguard and further national interests in the midst of a conflict of the Great Powers, both in the realm of ideas and realities."

When the General Haushofer of the First World War had led his division, unbeaten in battle, back to his suffering fatherland, he had begun immediately to draw new blueprints of gigantic dimensions. He knew that the war had ruined not Germany alone but all of Europe. He repeats many times what Lord Kitchener said to him in 1909: that he was opposed to the coming war between England and Germany because it would ruin Europe's future in the Pacific forever. America and Japan would be the only ones to profit from such a war, he added.

Deeply offended pride and hatred against the Powers which had humiliated his beloved fatherland caused Haushofer to welcome the rise of the colored world. He foresaw the coming doom of the white race with fatalism and even with malicious joy. This attitude is characteristic of Haushofer's thinking: he constantly points to the fatal mistake which the white winners of the war made when they permitted the Japanese to take over Germany's Pacific islands. The loss of Germany's foothold in the Pacific gave Haushofer a basis for the claim that German and Japanese vital aims no longer overlapped anywhere. Germany, he said, could therefore subscribe to the cry of "Asia for the Asiatics" and pre-

[2] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1925, p. 63.

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pare to coöperate with Japan on the ground of a "symbiosis of cultural politics."[3]

The following quotation from "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean" contains the whole of Haushofer's Pacific philosophy and indicates its roots of resentment and fatalism:

> By a dreadful decision, with consequences of utmost gravity for those who made it, the ocean-embracing cultural and economic powers of our own race have expelled us from their midst. They have left us in no doubt about the fact that only their destruction and decomposition will create another life for us who are now mutilated and enslaved. Thus they have forced us to search for comrades of destiny who are in a similar situation. We see such companions of disaster in the 900 million southeast Asiatics. They struggle, as we do, for their right of self-determination, against the same oppressors as ourselves; but they fight to some extent with more efficient weapons created by the living conditions of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, the arsenal of a Pacific geopolitics. We see that in these spaces the results of a punishing justice are partly in preparation and partly already consummated, to be felt by our merciless economic and political enemies and oppressors.

The right of self-determination plays a large part in this concept. But how different it is from Woodrow Wilson's ideal! The right of self-determination of small nations does not enter a mind which is preoccupied with the idea, first clearly defined by Ratzel, that every people must be educated up from smaller to larger space conceptions. Haushofer is dominated by his conviction that a declining space conception brings decay of the state.

Thus he looks to the awakened people of the Pacific:

> Thrown back upon the minimum of existence, driven from the sun into the shadow, cut off from the free sea, and even deprived, until 1936, of free traffic on our own rivers, the Germans find two-thirds of mankind as fellow-sufferers on the beaches of the Indo-Pacific spaces. They long to break the same chains, they long for the same liberation and for the achievement of the highest goal of nations and individuals alike, the free personality governed by its own laws. That is the ultimate reason why the Germans must not lose contact with the Pacific.[4]

By studying the Pacific the Germans must learn again to think and feel in large-space terms. Germany must play her part, if possible with Haushofer as director, in the great tragedy of world history in which the people of the largest continent will shake off the guardianship imposed on them by the sea Powers.

"The struggle of India and China for liberation from foreign

[3] "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," 1924, p. 162. Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent citations will refer to this edition.

[4] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1938, p. 820.

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domination and capitalistic pressure," he wrote, "agrees with the secret dreams of Central Europe."[5] Haushofer compares his own views with Canning's, after the Napoleonic wars: "While Europe was paralyzed by small-space conditions, Canning laid the foundations for an almost riskless growth in the early Victorian period by the recognition of the independence movements in the Near East and South America. Now the Indo-Pacific forces, moving in the same direction, look out with increasing confidence for help from the outside. . . . They look to Germany for help and it is there that they should find a greater understanding of their geopolitical fundamentals." He continues:

> The instinct of these things to come has become a living force, and the battlecry of the self-determination of small nations, which was used as a temporary tactical means to deceive the world, is now turned against its inventors. It has awakened the self-consciousness of the big neighbors of the small nations, of the great cultural spaces which are bound together by the eternal manifestations of their soil. Suddenly the cultural sphere of Central Europe, tormented for thousands of years like the others, becomes aware of a world-embracing community and destiny. It feels that it is liberated from artificial isolation; it sees itself accepted into the community of the struggling large spaces of the earth. It is for this reason that the geopolitical giant of the monsoon-lands and the struggle of its 900 millions for self-determination mean destiny for the people of Central Europe, too.

Nothing is left in Haushofer of the instinct of the unity of the white race as it was expressed by William II. He deliberately and sometimes even cynically denounces such feelings: "It is not up to the Germans to create a white bloc. This bloc was smashed by those who used colored troops in the Rhineland to keep down a white race. The opposite postulate, 'Oppressed peoples of the world, unite!' can be much better justified on ethical grounds."[6] The following quotation is even more outspoken: "We must counteract the oppression which we suffer from the uncultured colored peoples of a half-African power (France) by helping to liberate the cultured colored races which will rise against our oppressors. Thus we shall hold the strategic lines of a future geopolitics of the Pacific; there lies our chance to share actively in world politics in the spaces from which we have been displaced."[7]

Such are the factors and the emotional background which explain the destiny-laden connection between German geopolitics

[5] "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," p. 132.
[6] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1928, p. 1040.
[7] "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," p. 242.

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and the Pacific. But since German geopolitics and Haushofer are identical, we must also take into account the strong bonds which bind the man Haushofer to the Far East, particularly to Japan. German geopolitics would not have turned to the Far East and centered so definitely in the Pacific if Haushofer had not decided to make this part of the world the center of all his planning. It was not only in his "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean" that he tried to bring the East close to the German people. As far back as 1911 his doctoral thesis dealt with the geographic bases of Japan's military power; in 1913 he published "Dai Nihon," reflections on Japan's military power, her position in the world and her future; and other books and articles on Japan followed.

He would not have followed this course had it not been that in Japan and China he had received the deepest impressions of his life. Thus the September day in 1908 when as a 39-year-old Captain on the Bavarian General Staff he received the unexpected order to leave immediately on a two-year mission as Bavarian military attaché in Japan, was not only the decisive date in Haushofer's life; it was also an important date in history. For Haushofer then started to forge the weapons of a new German Far Eastern policy. In addition, he became "the geopolitical adviser of Japan itself," as one of his closest friends declared in 1929.

It is impossible to describe briefly the contents of Haushofer's "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," which, as already indicated, is not only a political book but an attempt to educate the German people for a global view of world politics. Only such a view would make them "see" the coming clash between "the pirates of the steppes and the pirates of the sea," to use a favorite formulation which Haushofer borrowed from Mackinder. It is thus — not in textbook language, but like a great artist and dreamer of world revolutions — that he takes up one momentous topic after another. Every point of the Far Eastern world on which he focuses his attention is illuminated by a new light. His mastery of his vast field and of hundreds of books and articles published all over the world is amazing. (That so many American critics dismiss him as just one more of Hitler's henchmen proves only that they have never gone to the trouble to read him.)

Always in the background of the "Geopolitics of the Pacific" stand Germany and Japan. It is this attempt to link the great spaces of the Pacific to the small spaces of Germany that makes this book and its author so powerful a current factor in practical

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politics. Japan is the nucleus of the revolution in the East. The two years which Haushofer spent there biased him in favor of Japan and against China. He likes to point out that Japan, so often accused of militarism, kept peace for two and a half centuries, until it was taught by America and the West how "to secure its living-space by defensive strokes."[8] Even his own disciples have been troubled by his emotional prejudice in favor of Japan. One of them explains pro-Japanese sentiment in Germany by the influence of "the wonderful hospitality in the enchanting frame of Japanese nature." Even more amusingly, he raises the question whether Haushofer would not have done better to speak of the "northern Japanese" instead of the "Nordic Japanese."

Haushofer sees Japan as a nation with two faces: one gazes towards the Pacific, the other towards Asia. In the past, because of her insular location, Japan has always turned to the ocean. Only in this century has she started her expansion in Asia.

As the years passed Haushofer could not help becoming more and more doubtful about the chances of Japan in her continental adventure. "Will power and purpose remain in balance?" he asks in 1938. "Or will the Pan Asiatic drive for world dominion drag the insular empire beyond the limitations of her strength? Are her leaders prepared to think in terms of continents instead of oceans, as they would have to think in order to accomplish so far-reaching a task?"

The following sentences written at the same time did not differ basically from what he had been writing since 1924:

> Vladivostok, from which bomber squadrons and submarines can be sent against Japan's most vulnerable arteries and communication centers, is the only place which "the proud, oceanic face" of the Japanese Navy is not able to control. Furthermore, the possibility of coöperation between Soviet Russia and the United States on the northern shores of the Pacific takes shape from month to month (1938). It would be a great mistake for the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle to delude itself about the rôle of the United States. Its antagonism against the Axis makes it possible to throw a bridge across the deep gulf between Wall Street's super-capitalism and Moscow's Bolshevism.[9]

Fully aware of the tragic possibilities of Japan's adventure, Haushofer worked for years on the gigantic tasks of persuading Japan to come to terms with China and Russia and, on the other side of the world, of convincing Hitler that he should live in peace with Russia. The persuasion of Hitler was, of course, the chief

[8] "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," p. 310.
[9] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1938, p. 937–42.

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problem. The editors of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* had stubbornly advocated reconciliation and friendship with Russia from the beginning, and Hitler's noisy crusade against the arch-enemy, Bolshevism, made no impression on them. Since 1924 they had written in favor of an Asiatic alliance including Russia, Japan, India and China, with Germany as partner. "Germany will have to decide," wrote one of the editors in 1925, "where she stands; does she want to be a satellite of the Anglo-Saxon powers and their super-capitalism, which are united with the other European nations against Russia, or will she be an ally of the Pan Asiatic union against Europe and America?" The answer is that "no nation is closer to Russia than is Germany; only Germany can understand the Russian soul; Germany and Russia have been friends for centuries; their economic structures are complementary; they must hang together." The German-Russian non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, was Haushofer's greatest triumph; it brought him close to the fulfillment of his most audacious dreams. "Never again," he prayed, "shall Germany and Russia endanger, by ideological conflicts, the geopolitical foundations of their adjustable spaces."[10]

The following sentences, written by Haushofer in February 1932, throw a dazzling light on the manner in which he viewed Russia's — and particularly Stalin's — foreign policy in the Far East:

> The attitude of Moscow and of the Eurasiatics towards developments in India, East Asia and the Near East deserves increased attention. Will Moscow be ready to jump into action at the right moment? And will such action be dictated by conceptions of Russian international policy or by a world revolutionary ideology? The policy towards Japan will be the test. Stalin's extremely cautious policy has been explained . . . by the claim that the Russian leader is not master of his own decisions. This, I believe, is wrong. Stalin's policy seems to me to originate from a much better understanding of the situation than the West is capable of perceiving. . . . In Moscow it is realized much better than elsewhere that the victor, in great-Asiatic dynamics, is the one who succeeds in letting the others discern his plans *last*, and who takes the initiative in the power-center *last*. Also, the limits of the dangers threatening from Japan are known there precisely, as well as the areas where one is secure from Japanese aggressive infiltration. Moscow, with great skill, has passed the option to the North Americans, whose nerves are considered inferior; and indeed certain symptoms can be found to support this assumption."[11]

[10] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1939, p. 773.
[11] *Ibid.*, 1932, p. 132.

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With the same patient farsightedness, Haushofer labored to guide Japan towards friendship with Soviet Russia and China.

In May 1940 he wrote: "If it were possible for the nations of the Rising Sun and of the Hammer and Sickle to end their mutual distrust . . . they would be invincible in their domestic seas."[12] It was destiny, alike for Japan and for Germany, to come to terms with Russia, "the geographical pivot of history." Sir Halford Mackinder had first given Haushofer this grandiose view of Russia in 1904. He never forgot it and made it the basis of all his grand strategy. Japan and Germany were two stations on the "inner line" which, in the age of the railroad and the airplane, gave continental Powers such decisive advantages over the aging sea Powers; but between those stations was Russia. "The geopolitical future will belong to the Russian-Chinese bloc." Therefore, he concluded, Japan must reconcile her aims with Russia's.

> The less friction there is in the relations between Japan and Russia, the less chance there will be for the Anglo-Saxons and the Chinese to impose a policy of divide and rule. Japan and Russia, if united, are invincible in East Asia. . . . A Mongolia led by Russia, a South Manchuria led by Japan, and between them a buffer region . . . that could be a more durable combination than all the constructions of Versailles. . . . Japan could become the continent-minded partner of a continental politics of the old world. . . . This would give Japan complete protection and freedom for action in the Pacific, a geopolitical possibility of immense importance not only for Japan and Russia but also for Central Europe and its enemies.[13]

Haushofer's concept of the grand strategy of the future, as set forth in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* in 1930 (p. 961) is more candid than he is accustomed to be in the pages of his journal:

> The ultimate solution of Japan's problem of over-population is expansion into the spheres of least resistance. . . . At this time, Japan's strategy still cautions her against a direct attack on Australia. But it should not be forgotten that the tropical north and northeast of Australia today give shelter to only a few thousand white men although they could offer homesteads for thirty million people. Heat and humidity make these spaces unfit for large-scale colonization by the white races; the climate is more suitable for the Japanese.

In this connection it is interesting to note Haushofer's criticism of the United States which, because of its "extensive colonial space structure," is unable to understand the dilemma caused in eastern Asia and Central Europe by population pressure. "It

[12] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1940, p. 292.

[13] Haushofer calls it the "Eurasian continental organization from the Rhine to the Amur and Yangtze." ("Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean." p. 142–3.)

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is an exceptional case," writes Haushofer, "when an American, Isaiah Bowman, becomes impressed by the population density of Japan and admits that 'it must overflow its boundaries.' "[14] Haushofer forgets to say, however, that Bowman added, "if not by people then by exports." This instance of Haushofer's utter disregard of all attempts to solve such problems by international economic coöperation is characteristic.

But Japan did not listen to Haushofer's admonitions to strike first against the British Empire (and France and The Netherlands.) Instead of turning to the south, Japan started her drive on the continent. Haushofer warned that this would draw the Chinese and the Indians together and would result in the formation of an unconquerable human bloc of 800 millions. He reminded the Japanese generals who won the upper hand over the admirals that they would have to win the peace, too.

Haushofer himself has no real illusions: "Japan has underestimated the immense spaces of China and she will never understand the spirit of modern China. She has not understood the greatness of Chiang Kai-shek, symbol of the new China, the first leader in history to represent the whole Chinese nation."[15] Again: "China is a sea which makes all rivers flowing into it salty; if Japan penetrates too far into China she will be drowned." If an empire could arise with "Japan's soul in China's body," it would be a power that would put even the empires of Russia and the United States in the shade. But this, Haushofer knew, was an old man's empty dream.

In the world of realities there was but one solution: the inner line would have to be held in peaceful collaboration with the powers of the "geographical pivot of history." Germany as well as Japan would have to seek peace and friendship with Russia and China. Then Japan, with her back secure against continental attack, could start her crusade for an empire in the Pacific. But neither Germany nor Japan listened to their would-be mentor. On June 22, 1941, Haushofer's plans were smashed by another dreamer in the Bavarian mountains. Since the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* is no longer available in the United States we cannot know how Haushofer reacted publicly to Hitler's invasion of Russia. But no matter what Haushofer the politician may have written, between its lines must nest fear, the mother of defeat.

[14] "Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," 3rd edition (1938), p. 212.
[15] *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, 1939, p. 30.

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SUGAR: INDEX OF CUBAN-AMERICAN COÖPERATION

By Ramiro Guerra

IN THE more than forty years of this century coöperation between Cuba and the United States on questions touching sugar has proved its value. This coöperation has developed in the manner characteristic of democracy; there has been a protracted discussion of the problems involved and a laborious adjustment of interests; and the final results have been acceptable to both sides. On February 28 of this year, the Defense Supplies Corporation on the one hand and the Cuban Institute for the Stabilization of Sugar on the other signed at Havana a contract for the purchase of the entire Cuban sugar crop of 1942. This action constitutes a real cause for satisfaction in days like these when common action is absolutely essential for the defense of our common liberties, our common culture, our common way of life. If we are to preserve the material and spiritual values of our civilization we must have unbroken and unbreakable solidarity among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Cubans and Americans are glad that in these dark days they can point to their coöperation as a valuable contribution to that solidarity and as a constructive example for the future arrangements of the post-war era.

But, as already indicated, the collaboration of Cuba and the United States on questions pertaining to sugar is nothing new. In particular, it has manifested itself in three periods of great importance.

In the first period, that from 1900 to 1913, the commercial treaty of 1902 assured to Cuba a 20 percent tariff preference on sugar, the Dingley Tariff rate of 1.685 cents per pound being reduced to 1.348 cents. As a result, the Cuban sugar industry, in large part destroyed by the War of Independence, was rehabilitated; production rose from 850,000 Spanish long tons, with a value of $34,850,000 in 1902, to 2,428,000 tons, with an estimated value of $106,078,000 in 1913; the amount of American capital invested in Cuba increased from $80,000,000 to $220,000,000 in that same period; and the average annual value of American exports to Cuba increased from $28,401,000 in the period 1900–1903 to $65,184,000 in the period 1910–1914.

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In the second period of coöperation, that from 1914 to 1919, the Underwood Tariff of 1914 granted to Cuba a new reduction in the duty on sugar, from 1.348 cents per pound to 1.0048 cents. The island increased its sugar production from 2,428,000 to 4,009,000 tons in quantity and from $106,078,000 to $454,478,000 in value; the total of American capital investments reached $1,500,000,000, of which $800,000,000 was in the sugar industry; and the value of American exports to Cuba jumped from an annual average of $65,184,000 in the years 1910–1914 to $177,000,000 in the years 1915–1919.

This second period came to an end at the close of 1919. In the summer of that year, the directors of the United States Sugar Equalization Board had failed to arrive at any decision as to whether the measures of control established during the war should be continued or terminated in order to reëstablish a free market for sugar. In Cuba, too, the Government and the producers had to make decisions respecting national sugar policy. After informal discussions with the members of the Sugar Equalization Board, a committee representing the Cuban producers, foreseeing the uncontrolled speculation which would inevitably follow the reëstablishment of the free market — for there still was a sugar shortage — proposed to the Sugar Equalization Board to sell the United States the whole 1919–1920 crop "at a price which would compensate the producer and would be within reach of the consumer," that is to say, as the crops of 1917–1918 and 1918–1919 had been sold. On July 29, having received no reply, the committee of Cuban producers renewed its proposal. But President Wilson had already decided to abandon control measures. On December 11, the expiration date for the agreement, the United States Government announced officially that controls were no longer in effect. The free importation and sale of sugar was thus reëstablished.

The unlimited speculation which the Cuban producers had foreseen and tried to avoid was not long in appearing. In some quarters the responsibility for this speculation, and for the very high prices which consumers in consequence were compelled for a short time to pay, was attributed, through lack of knowledge of the true facts, to what was called "the Cuban producers' inordinate desire for profits." In the confusion and irritation of the moment, this charge turned American opinion against Cuba and weakened the policy of coöperation between the two coun-

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tries. The replacement of the Wilson Administration by that of Harding on March 4, 1921, offered an opportunity for changes in economic policy, including the sugar policy. But the change actually effected as regards sugar was to make things worse for Cuba. On May 27, 1921, Congress approved an emergency sugar tariff which raised the duty on raw sugar to 2 cents per pound, with the result that Cuban raw sugar, which had previously paid 1.0048 cents per pound, now paid 1.6 cents. On September 22 the new sugar provisions of the Fordney-McCumber Act imposed a further increase, fixing the duty on raw sugar at 2.206 cents per pound, which meant 1.7648 cents per pound for that which came from Cuba. These tariff changes definitely put an end to the policy of Cuban-American coöperation which had been maintained for twenty consecutive years. Nine years later the Hawley-Smoot Act of June 17, 1930, again raised the duty on sugar. Under the general rate of 2.5 cents per pound, Cuban raw sugar had to pay 2 cents per pound on entering the United States.

The substitution of the high tariff policy on Cuban sugar for the policy of Cuban-American coöperation as regards sugar was effected with a definite purpose — to secure a higher price for sugar produced domestically in the United States and a greater share of the home market for the domestic sugar industry. This new policy was applied rigorously for more than twelve years. Far from obtaining the desired goals, however, it had just the opposite results.

The Fordney-McCumber Act and the Hawley-Smoot Act did not succeed in preserving and expanding the home market of the domestic sugar producers, but merely transferred Cuba's share in the American market to the insular possessions of the United States. It created a very difficult situation for the domestic sugar industry. It ruined the Cuban market for American exports. And in Cuba it provoked a disastrous economic crisis which reached its climax in a revolution.

II

When Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the Presidency of the United States in 1933, the sugar crisis required urgent remedies. In his message of February 8, 1934, therefore, the President submitted to Congress a plan which gave a new direction to the national policy in regard to sugar. With it began a third period of

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Cuban-American coöperation. It is with this period that the present article chiefly deals.

The plan put forward by President Roosevelt aimed to raise the income of American farmers; to contribute to the economic rehabilitation of Cuba; to grant adequate sugar quotas to the Philippines, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands; and at the same time to guard against higher prices for the American consumers. In order to put his plan into execution, he issued a proclamation on June 8, 1934, which reduced the general tariff on sugar from 2.5 to 1.875 cents per pound and thereby automatically lowered the duty on Cuban raw sugar from 2 cents to 1.5 cents; and thereafter Congress, acting on the executive recommendations, passed a series of laws, among which the Philippine Independence Act (March 24, 1934), the Jones-Costigan Act (May 9, 1934) and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (June 12, 1934) were of the first importance. The Jones-Costigan Act established a system of sugar quotas for all areas which supplied the American market. Cuba was included in this system, and shortly thereafter a Cuban-American trade agreement, signed on August 24, 1934, granted a new reduction of the duty on Cuban raw sugar from 1.5 to .9 cents per pound.

It was not long before the favorable effects of the new policy of coöperation began to be felt. Shipments of Cuban sugar to the American market had reached a low of 1,601,000 short tons in 1933. The system of quotas checked the decline and brought about a noticeable increase; thus the annual average for the years 1933–1940 was 1,931,898 short tons. The price of sugar also improved. From an annual average of 1.113 cents per pound (f.o.b. Cuba) in the period 1930–1933, it rose to 2.266 cents in the years 1935–1939. The combined effect of the increase in exports and the increase in price raised the average annual income of the Cuban producers. Moreover, just as in the two previous periods of coöperation, the increase of incomes in Cuba inured proportionately to American agriculture and industry. Between 1930 and 1934 the value of American exports to Cuba averaged only $39,197,000 per year, reaching in 1933 a low of $22,674,000. In the first five years in which the new plan was in effect the average went up to $72,912,000. In 1941, with an even higher income from sugar, Cuba imported from the United States goods to the value of $117,110,000.

Beneficial as the sugar policy of the Roosevelt Administration

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has undoubtedly been, it nevertheless has not brought about the complete rehabilitation of the island's sugar industry, nor has it permitted the Cuban producer to regain the position which he occupied in the United States market in the years before the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. The increase in American exports mentioned above is reckoned on the basis of the minimum figure to which they fell in 1933; the rise in the price of Cuban raw sugar is over the very low level to which it dropped in the year of the most disastrous crisis in the history of the sugar industry. There has been a limited improvement, then, and because of the serious economic situation in which Cuba found itself in 1933 this has been very important; but a comparison of statistics makes it plain that Cuba, at the time when World War II broke out, had not yet made a complete recovery.

III

The Roosevelt Administration's sincere desire to coöperate in bringing about the complete rehabilitation of Cuba, and its realization of the very great obstacles in the way of achieving this exclusively through concessions on sugar, have led the two countries to extend their coöperative efforts, especially with the aim of solving two of Cuba's other great economic and social problems, both of them closely related to the sugar economy. One problem is to provide wide and equitable distribution of the income from sugar so that it may bring the greatest benefit to the Cuban people; the other is to diversify agricultural and industrial production so that the country may not be wholly dependent on sugar.

The expansion of sugar production during World War I was too violent, and the lure of huge and quick profits too tempting, for anyone interested in the sugar business, whatever his nationality, to think of anything but building new sugar mills, promoting new plantations, acquiring land at any cost, clearing century-old forests to plant more and more cane, importing workers from Jamaica, Haiti and elsewhere so as to speed up the work as much as possible — all without taking into account the consequences which this abnormal growth of an enormous industry on an unsound basis might entail for Cuba in the near future. The fever of speculation on a grand scale swept over the whole country; the chance of quick profits dominated all calculations. It was the heyday of Pharaoh's "fat kine" in the Biblical story. Amid

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all the luxury and glitter no one gave a thought to the future. The lack of foresight was shocking, the waste was stupendous; and the sudden arrival of the hungry "lean kine" took the country by surprise and brought it overnight to bankruptcy. Cuba paid a very high price, in years of misery and revolution, for her mistakes and for the mistakes of others. But although ruined and bleeding, she was able to survive.

When the Roosevelt Administration initiated the new period of coöperation the hard lessons of the crisis had not been forgotten either in Cuba or in the United States. The interest of the United States in the economic rehabilitation of Cuba paralleled Cuba's interest in a wide and equitable distribution of the income from sugar. In Washington, considerations of a sound policy of good neighborliness and a high sentiment of social justice joined to create this interest. But there were also motives of a practical nature. The wide distribution of the income from sugar among the Cuban masses was an effective means of raising their purchasing power, and, consequently, of reëstablishing the Cuban market for American exports. To the dictates of political wisdom and of justice were united advantages in trade.

In Cuba there had been much criticism of the sugar industry, and although occasionally it had been flavored by an understandable sentiment of hostility and ill will, its basic objectives had been sound. It had exposed and condemned the mistakes which had been made and had suggested more or less adequate ways to remedy them. This work of criticism spread an acute feeling of the importance of economic problems among all classes in Cuba; thus the crisis brought its own salutary lesson and, at the same time, gave the revolutionary ferment one of its most useful consequences. The internal situation and that of the foreign markets urgently called for a reorganization of the industry on a new basis. The producers themselves were the first to recognize the need of such a reorganization and were willing to collaborate actively and loyally to bring it about.

The fundamental unity of views on this question between the Department of State in Washington and the successive Cuban governments after 1934, and the sustained support of Colonel Batista — now President of the Republic — facilitated the work of reorganization which had already been begun in the last years of the government of General Machado. National domestic policy dictated this work, and it has been carried through by Cuban

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governments and Cuban producers. But since American capital controlled about 60 percent of the production, opposition from the Department of State might have created serious difficulties for any substantial reorganization plan. Far from offering opposition, however, Washington, without neglecting to defend any legitimate American interest, accepted all reasonable and equitable reforms without hesitation and encouraged their execution. The crisis, for its part, had driven from Cuba the adventitious American elements in the sugar industry. At the same time, it had linked up the solid elements more closely with Cuba's destiny and had united them with the Cuban producers in the comradeship of the common disaster and the hard work of bad times. These circumstances facilitated the adoption of extensive legislation — in the form of decree-laws of the Executive and laws approved by the Congress with a minimum of friction and complaints. The resulting reorganization of the industry was so fundamental in its economic and social aspects that it constituted a veritable revolution.

Among the basic preliminary dispositions of the new structure of the industry were the restrictive measures and quotas put into effect during the Machado régime. These and subsequent measures, culminating in the Law of Sugar Coördination of September 2, 1937, converted the sugar industry of Cuba into a huge national enterprise for the growing of cane and for the manufacture and sale of sugar and molasses. The income from the sugar is distributed among the millowner, or *hacendado*, the grower of the cane, or *colono*, and the agricultural or industrial worker, skilled or unskilled, in the mills and in the fields, in the manner and in the proportion determined by the law. Of the income, 52 percent (determined according to the official average price of manufactured sugar) goes to the *colono*, who is responsible for all expenses connected with producing the cane; and 48 percent goes to the owner of the mill, who shoulders all the expenses of transporting the cane and of the manufacturing operations. The share which goes to the agricultural and industrial workers, who cut and bring in the cane and who do the specialized work in the mills, is taken out of the two percentages mentioned above and is determined (over and above the basic minimum wage for an eight-hour day fixed by law) according to a graduated scale of increases which parallels increases in the price of sugar. The official price is published fortnightly by the Ministry of

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Agriculture; and whenever there has been a rise in price the mills and the *colonos* are obliged to pay the corresponding increases in wages. Besides arranging the distribution of the income from sugar, the legislation insures the continued existence of all plantations, great and small, so as to avoid the concentration of the industry into a few hands; and it has checked the dangers of the *latifundio*, assuring the grower his quota of cane and granting him the right to remain permanently on the plantation, so long as he produces his annual quota and, if he does not work on his own land, pays the moderate rent fixed by law.

By this unique arrangement the official price of sugar automatically regulates the income of the *colono*, according to the quantity of cane he has delivered to the mill each fortnight during the season; and, as it rises and falls, it determines the workers' wages above the level of the basic minimum. One of the system's many advantages is that it maintains the vigilant personal interest of the workers and the *colonos* in the economic problems of the industry and in its position in foreign markets. The scope and significance of the American "ceiling price" of sugar, for example, and even the name of Leon Henderson, were known immediately by the workers and *colonos* from one end of Cuba to the other. They were awaiting, with no less interest than the most powerful sugar company, the results of last autumn's negotiations for the sale of the sugar crop to the United States; for the *colonos'* return on their bi-weekly deliveries to the mills and the workers' wages, both of them for the whole season of 1942, were being determined by the price agreed upon in Washington. This constant attention to the great economic problems of the sugar markets and sugar prices, and to the treaties and trade agreements connected with them, will gradually create a well-informed and intelligent public opinion, not only about the sugar question but also about the economy of the nation in general. Thus will be laid more and more solid bases for democracy in Cuba.

IV

Cuba's great sugar industry has many parts — active sugar mills, extensive fields of cane (*colonias*), reserves of land available for more extensive planting, private railways for transportation of cane from the fields to the mills and from the latter to the ports, ample storage space for sugar and molasses, and all the rest of the equipment necessary to handle the huge crops during the period

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of maximum production. At its disposal are specialized technical personnel for the work of cutting, transporting and grinding the cane, and for extracting, weighing, bagging, and storing the sugar; it has its own laboratory men, carpenters, iron workers and masons. This entire personnel, with that of the *colonias*, forms the great body of sugar workers, several hundred thousand in number. They are organized in associations of a technical character and in numerous syndicates, unions and other groups. Direction and administration of the mills and the *colonias* are in the hands of managers and growers of long experience. A high proportion of them — in the *colonias* practically all — conduct their own businesses, aided by expert and experienced subordinate men. Although each unit functions independently within the provisions of the law, the whole great productive machine, when it comes to certain general questions (distribution of quotas, permits for shipment, etc.), operates under the Cuban Institute for the Stabilization of Sugar, in which both producers and Government are represented.

Apart from the small quantity consumed on the island, almost the entire sugar production is exported — mostly to the United States, a part to the United Kingdom. This makes all mill-owners, planters and workers conscious of the importance of Cuba's maintaining good relations with both those nations, and especially with the United States; and the resulting feeling in favor of coöperation has been and still is a factor of great weight in the general political and economic relations between Havana and Washington. To the practical motives have now, since the war began, been added others of an ideological character. They combine to intensify the disposition in favor of coöperation, the determination to maintain solidarity with the United States in the struggle against the Axis and against all totalitarian tendencies and activities. Cuba's sugar industry as a whole understands that it has a part to play in the war. It will make sacrifices and assume the burdens of hard work in order to contribute to the victory.

Now let us deal briefly with the question of diversification. The economic history of the island tells us that, practically from the first period of Spanish colonization, a continuous effort has been made to multiply sources of wealth, and that this was understood, for very practical reasons, to involve agricultural and industrial diversification. The producers felt this pressure in order

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to satisfy their own needs — the most powerful stimulus to enterprise and work. In all periods, moreover, Cuba has had statesmen, economists, professors, planters and industrialists who appreciated the advantages of diversification as the basis of a well-balanced and stable national economy. Moreover, the disequilibrium of Cuba's economy, properly speaking, was due not so much to an excessive production of sugar as to the lack of other productive activities. In periods of high sugar prices it has been more profitable to the planter to produce cane than any other product, and he has followed the line of greatest gain. Conversely, in the years of low sugar prices there have been incentives to devote attention to other crops. The gradual decline in the price of sugar after 1925 pushed the Government of General Machado into developing an active policy of diversification, having as its double purpose to reduce imports of goods of primary necessity and to develop new products for export. The acute crisis of 1930–1933 justified that policy, and it gathered more and more strength. Successive Cuban Governments fostered it, and gave a strong impetus to the production of new articles both for consumption at home and for export.

Since the Roosevelt Administration has been favorable to the general idea of diversification, and since it apparently is convinced that Cuba's economic rehabilitation could not be carried out adequately on the basis of the limited sugar quota at recent prices, it has shown a lively interest in the Cuban policy of diversification and an intention to help towards making it a success. Thus American and Cuban views coincided in this matter as well as regarding the manner of distributing the income from sugar.

Although Cuba's progress in providing for the needs of home consumption has been very considerable, her production for export has run into a series of obstacles such as tariff barriers, seasonal limitations and quotas. In the trade agreement negotiated with the United States in 1934, and in the supplementary trade agreements of 1939 and 1942, Cuba obtained some concessions for its exports of fruits, fresh vegetables and other articles of national agriculture and industry. These concessions, however, were limited. Much more important were President Batista's recent approval of a plan for diversifying Cuban production and the granting by the Export-Import Bank of a credit of $25,000,000 to put it into operation.

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History, under basically similar circumstances, tends to repeat itself. World War I, at a critical moment, imposed a policy of Cuban-American coöperation. World War II, two years after its outbreak, has begun to produce a similar result. The developments of the year 1941 and those which are taking place in 1942 may be cited as conclusive evidence.

In January 1941, Cuba possessed an enormous stock of sugar in storage. Cuban raw sugar (cost and freight, for immediate shipment) was being quoted in New York at two cents per pound. The refiners were not interested in making purchases at this price. As the date for starting a new crop drew near, the situation seemed very dark for the Cuban producers. Their estimates of exports to the American and world markets, taken with the figures of accumulated stocks from the 1940 crop, did not justify them in thinking that the 1941 crop could be any more than 2,000,000 long tons. Such a small crop would have aggravated the already unfavorable economic conditions in the country and greatly reduced the total of workers' wages for the year, just when rising living costs made higher wages imperative.

After carefully studying the statistics, the Cuban Institute for the Stabilization of Sugar fixed the crop for 1941 at a figure as low as that of the worst year of the crisis of 1930–1933. At the same time, it prepared a plan for grinding an additional 20 percent, this to form a special reserve to be sold in the world market if favorable opportunities occurred. This emergency project sought to overcome the detrimental effects which the short crop of 1941 had had on the country. But how to finance it? No less than $11,000,000 was required, and such a sum could not be obtained through ordinary banking channels. An appeal was made to the friendly coöperation of the United States, and the Export-Import Bank of Washington said it was willing to lend its support. Negotiations were opened, and on June 13, 1941, a contract was signed whereby the Export-Import Bank granted the Cuban Institute for the Stabilization of Sugar a credit of $11,027,000, payable in five years at 3.6 percent interest, to permit the grinding of the additional 20 percent of the sugar crop. With this security the 20 percent was ground.

Meantime, however, in the months between January and June 1941, the sugar situation had undergone a considerable change.

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A strong demand for sugar had arisen both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, and the difficulty and slowness of transportation from more distant sources of supply obliged them to depend upon shipments from Cuba. The growing demand impelled the United States Department of Agriculture to order a series of increases in the year's sugar quota. The original quota was increased on March 19, for all areas; on May 9, for domestic beet sugar production; on July 9, July 19, July 30 and August 24, again for all areas, making the total very high. However, these increases in the case of some areas remained nominal. When certain areas could not supply their quotas it became necessary to redistribute them among those which had sugar on hand and could make shipments. Cuba's original quota for the year was thus increased by more than 38 percent.

The new situation now required the active coöperation of Cuba. In June the Government of Cuba and the Institute for the Stabilization of Sugar offered to place at the disposal of the United States, at the current market price, the additional 20 percent of the crop which had been ground as a reserve for the world market. In addition, the Institute took rapid steps to stimulate and to facilitate shipments of sugar of the 1941 crop and quickly authorized the exportation of sugar from the stocks of previous years. By December 1941 the Cuban producers had supplied the whole quota which had been assigned to them, including the additional 20 per cent of the crop, and they were in a position to liquidate in its entirety the loan from the Export-Import Bank. Cuba also produced during the year a large quantity of invert molasses and blackstrap, which was exported to the United States for the production of industrial alcohol, used in the making of explosives and other war necessities.

In its desire to forestall a possible shortage of sugar and molasses, the United States Government in October 1941 informed the Cuban Government that it was interested in acquiring, as a war measure, the island's entire 1942 production of sugar and molasses; and it requested Cuba's coöperation in making the purchase and in seeing that the crop be as large as possible. The Cuban Government and the Institute for the Stabilization of Sugar were glad to coöperate, with the result that on November 12, American and Cuban commissions met in Washington to negotiate the sale and to fix the conditions. The Cuban delegates expressed their willingness to contract for the sale of the whole crop; to designate,

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in accordance with American needs, what part of the crop should go into sugar and what part into molasses; to produce the molasses at the beginning of the season, in the middle of it or at the end, whichever would best serve the interests of American defense; and to offer whatever other facilities were within the power of the Cuban producers. The question of the purchase price was then discussed, along with other particulars. It is notable that from the start the discussions were devoted not so much to the price itself as to determining equitable principles and fixing the reasonable norms to which the price should be adjusted. In other words, these were not mere commercial negotiations; they proceeded on the high grounds that close solidarity between Americans and Cubans was absolutely essential in dealing with all the problems created by the war.

Having carefully examined the many aspects of the sugar question, the negotiators took into consideration the plans which were being discussed between the two Governments for a supplementary trade agreement, which would grant a new tariff reduction on Cuban sugar, and the probable extension of an American credit of $25,000,000 to advance the policy of agricultural diversification in Cuba and the execution of various projects intended to strengthen the Cuban economy. In the prevailing atmosphere of mutual respect and good will, both sides were able to accept certain reasonable conclusions in principle. The price of Cuban raw sugar and of the sugar contained in molasses was to be 2.5 cents per pound, f.o.b. in Cuban ports. This price was to be raised to 2.65 cents upon the signing of the supplementary trade agreement, then under negotiation. The Cuban delegates returned to Havana, reported these results, and obtained their Government's approval. The contract was signed, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, at Havana on February 28, 1942, and went into effect immediately. Thanks to the high degree to which the Cuban sugar industry is organized, and to its adequate industrial equipment, without which a rapid increase of production would have been impossible, Cuba has manufactured in the present year, 1942, the maximum quantity of sugar and molasses requested. The figure, which is a war secret, is of course very much greater than that for 1941. To realize this achievement Cuba has not had to ask for priority on a single ton of steel indispensable to defense in the United States, except for essential repairs.

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Though we may feel justifiable satisfaction with what has been accomplished, we must not fall into exaggerated optimism or slacken our vigilance. The war is constantly creating new problems which must be solved and new dangers which must be warded off. Cuban-American coöperation must become stronger and stronger not merely on sugar but on all questions. What would be the situation in Cuba, for example, if the instincts which were dominant in the sugar business during World War I were again to become masters of the field, repeating the lamentable errors of that boom period and threatening to destroy the laboriously established organization of the industry? Might there not be serious consequences if the great American nation, devoting its energies wholly to the vast military problems of the war, were unable to find time to pay attention to the above danger, and by this omission contributed to Cuba's again becoming a free field for wild speculative instincts? What would happen to Cuba if, after such a great expansion of production, there began to seem a danger that the present organization would break down as Cuban-American coöperation broke down, suddenly and disastrously, at the close of World War I?

These are not idle questions in times when obscure and powerful forces, both of creation and of destruction, have been loosed by the war. They are present in all countries. It is well that history, guided by wartime needs, has repeated itself in the speeding up of Cuban-American coöperation; it would be terrible if it repeated itself by giving birth to a new and frightful crisis in Cuba in the future.

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THE ECUADOR-PERU BOUNDARY DISPUTE

By Isaiah Bowman

ON July 5, 1941, the peaceful relations of Ecuador and Peru were ruptured by military conflict over a century-old boundary dispute. Small-scale operations were conducted at scattered points on a thousand-mile-long frontier. Almost at once (July 9) the representatives of Brazil, Argentina and the United States made suggestions for troop withdrawals and peaceful negotiations. In the midst of these preliminaries, and despite "acceptance in prin-



ciple" of the offer of the three friendly Powers, the Peruvian Army continued its advance northeastward along the Gulf of Guayaquil and eastward beyond the boundary on the Zarumilla River. Reference to the accompanying map will show that this action cut lines of communication between the western interior provinces of Ecuador and the sea. In the same period Peruvian forces also took river outposts in the Oriente, the Amazonian slope of Ecuador.

It was not until August 20 that Peruvian military observers left for the

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frontier. Five days later the observers from both sides met to compare preliminary findings as to actions in keeping with or in contravention of the agreement of July 15, whereby Peru was to withdraw its troops behind the line of the status quo. Scattered military action, flights over "enemy" territory, troop concentrations, aerial bombings, etc., continued through August and September. The Ecuadorian Army was almost completely disorganized; trade was disrupted; and the problem of the refugee Ecuadorian populations flowing from the invaded territory became a preoccupation of the Guayaquil municipal authorities. Then on January 29, 1942, came from Rio de Janeiro the welcome news that a "Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries between Ecuador and Peru" had been signed.

World War II may have stimulated the aggression which was charged against Peru by Ecuador and against Ecuador by Peru. But the World War also led to the Conference at Rio de Janeiro in January 1942. "The bee fertilizes the flower that it robs." One of the results of that conference was the agreement between Peru and Ecuador to survey the boundary and adjust the dispute. Thus the last serious territorial conflict in Latin America is in a fair way to be settled by the procedures, now in progress, of conference, survey and adjustment. The importance of this prelude to final settlement can hardly be exaggerated, in view of the mutual charges of "aggression" which are so strongly condemned when they relate to Europe and which are so destructive of that solidarity now required by the United Nations in the Western Hemisphere as elsewhere.

This triumph of diplomacy and good sense was the result of six months' unremitting and delicate negotiations. When Mr. Sumner Welles went to Rio in January, he had both an intimate personal knowledge of the dispute and long diplomatic experience in Latin America; and he was one of the leading figures of the Rio Conference. It is greatly to the credit of everyone concerned — countries, governments, personalities — that a conflict which had proved insoluble for a hundred years, and which had been marked so recently by bloodshed and bitterness, should have been brought to the present promising stage of field surveys and local adjustments, with high hopes of final settlement.

It should be stated explicitly, however, that the boundary dispute is not settled. The Rio agreement only provides a procedure intended to lead to settlement. That procedure, given in the Protocol of January 29, may be summarized as follows:

1) Peru will, within 15 days, retire its military forces to the line shown on the accompanying map.
2) Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States will coöperate by supplying military observers to note the retirement of troops; and the activity of the four Powers "will continue until the definitive demarcation of frontiers between Ecuador and Peru has been completed."
3) The Protocol and its execution are "under the guarantee" of the four countries mentioned.
4) Ecuador will enjoy, for the purposes of navigation on the Amazon and its northern tributaries, the same concessions which Brazil and Colombia enjoy, in addition to those which were agreed upon in the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation designed to facilitate free and gratuitous navigation on these rivers.

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5) It is understood that the agreed line will be accepted by Ecuador and Peru for the demarcation of the frontier between the two countries by technical experts on the ground. The parties can, however, in tracing the line on the ground, consent to reciprocal concessions which they may consider convenient in order to adjust the line to geographical realities. These rectifications shall be effectuated with the collaboration of the representatives of the United States, the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and Chile.
6) The Governments of Ecuador and Peru agreed to submit the Protocol to their respective Congresses and seek to obtain approval thereof within a period of not more than thirty days.

The antecedents of the dispute are now of historical interest only. Among other things they involve what we may call the classic ignorance of geography that has been responsible for most other boundary disputes in the new lands of the Western Hemisphere. Wrong geographical descriptions, embedded in treaty texts and in earlier colonial decrees and definitions, provided wide scope for later disputes. Then the progress of settlement came in to make its own contribution to confusion, with colonists of one nationality or another going up or down a border river carrying the national flag and insisting upon the "protection" of soldiers. Moreover, the cartographic distributions of population resulting from settlement are at variance with old uncertain lines; for settlements conform to real rivers and to resources as they are currently known to exist. If gold or oil are discovered, politically stimulated and subsidized colonization will surely follow. Trading interests and development company prospectuses and concessions heighten the national interest. It is only a question of time when "rights" based on documents are superseded by those alleged on the basis of settlement, however attenuated, and by "wrongs" charged to officials of both sides.

When the states of Latin America were formed following the Wars of Independence, they agreed in general to follow colonial boundaries. But the southern boundary of Ecuador, a state formed out of the southern part of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, had overlapping definitions. A royal cedula, dated 1802, complicated matters because it dealt with rivers and territories in unexplored parts of the eastern slope of present-day Ecuador and the language of the cedula remained extremely difficult to interpret. Added to the difficulty was considerable uncertainty as to the validity of the cedula as well as its meaning following the Wars of Independence. Spanish colonial law ruled that a cedula did not become binding until it was successfully applied. In this particular case, the wide extent of the territory involved, the limited number of settlements, and the impossibility of defining a line on a broad unmapped frontier, made it difficult for Peru and Ecuador to agree upon a definitive boundary. Ecuador has sent expeditions into the forests of the east, organized an institute for the study of Amazon history and geography, and laid claim to an Amazonian outlet. Peru has countered with settlements, investments, extension of military posts and the improvement of navigation facilities.

As time went on, documents increased in number and in points of contradiction. The commercial and political conflict between the two principal cities, Quito and Guayaquil, has troubled the course of negotiations for many years and is a matter of common comment on the streets of both cities today. At one time Jaén voted for union with Peru and Guayaquil stood for auton-

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omy. Ecuador was unable to put up a solid front against the claims of Colombia, Brazil and Peru. Civil wars weakened the state. From 1830, when the territory now called Ecuador separated from "Grand Colombia," to 1883 ten different constitutions were adopted.

The sum of the matter, so far as legal rights are concerned, is that each side can make out a plausible and to some degree a juridical case for its claims. To resolve the contradictions of claims it is necessary in nearly all cases anywhere to engage in what we may term "horse trading." The alternative is war over territory that is often not worth the price.

The present century has witnessed growing hostility between Ecuador and Peru as explorations disclosed resources of increasingly obvious value. On August 1, 1887, the two countries signed an Arbitration Convention which named the King of Spain as arbitrator. Both sides submitted their claims. They were as wide as the contradictions of the documents, that is to say, they were as wide as possible. It was not until 1910, following many vicissitudes and changes of conditions, and to the accompaniment of threats from both sides that they would not accept an unfavorable decision, that the arbitration negotiations failed and war was averted only by a narrow margin. Since then it has been clear that neither side would give in, the dispute having become a prime factor of national politics. No government of the day felt that it could afford to give way even to a slight degree without falling. In 1936, negotiations were taken up in Washington, President Roosevelt having been requested to use his good offices to bring the delegates of Peru and Ecuador into a working relationship. After two years the Washington conferences ended in failure and the parties drifted steadily toward a state of open hostility.

The rivers of the Ecuadorian Oriente, as the eastern slope is called, run southeasterly to the Marañon and the Amazon through heavily forested country. The settlements are small and negligible in commercial output; but commerce converges at Iquitos, a city of 40,000 population, at the head of steamer navigation on the Amazon and a center of activity for a region the size of Texas. Flowing northward to the Marañon and the Amazon are the Peruvian rivers Yavari, Huallaga, and the great Ucayali, open to navigation by launch. The importance of the lands along these rivers, and of their traffic, has been one of the factors making Iquitos a city chiefly of Peruvians. An oil concession east of the Ecuadorian Cordillera, in a region in which large investments have already been made, had been granted by the Ecuadorian Government. The development of petroleum resources is particularly important because the republic is both small and poor, and had been dependent largely upon a one-crop export (cacao) in securing foreign exchange for the satisfaction of import requirements. Ecuador now exports a higher percentage of the crude petroleum output of her Pacific littoral than either Colombia or Peru. If the Oriente extended to Iquitos, the problem of access to markets would be solved. The use of oil trucks on motor-roads-to-be, of pipelines, or of railways westward to the Pacific, are alternatives which would place a heavy burden on the industry. Article six of the Protocol attempts to provide Ecuador with "free and gratuitous navigation" on the principal eastern rivers.

The tropical forest that clothes the western slopes of the Andean Cordillera in the boundary zone thins out halfway to the western coast. In the valley of the Zarumilla River it merges into low thorn and open woodland, alternating

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with grassland. The livestock industry is important, and charcoal, fruits, vegetables and gold are also exported. There is petroleum at Talara, Peru, and the field extends northward partway to Tumbes, the small commercial center of northern Peru. The petroleum possibilities of the Zarumilla region, though unknown, are not overlooked.

The whole structure of naval defense on the Pacific littoral of South America was based until recently upon a few antiquated steel ships. A decade ago a little new armament, chiefly planes and tanks, was acquired by both Chile and Peru. Guayaquil, a principal port, is practically defenseless. Though motor roads now connect the chief cities, interior communications are still too poor, or motor cars and oil trucks too scarce, to permit the concentration of power quickly at any given point. There are few strategic key areas and all are highly vulnerable. The national budgets of Ecuador and Peru will not stand a rearmament program. Each has a tight economy, with too little diversity to absorb the shocks of war. The centers of production are too dispersed and small to support any suitable plan of defense. Fighting on credit is a devastating business; and even the threat of war sends exchanges tumbling and disrupts the export trade. It took Peru nearly 50 years to recover from the chief effects of the War of the Pacific. Bolivia and Paraguay will hardly recover in a shorter time from the effects of the recent Chaco War.

Nowhere is there a greater need for an outside moral authority in the settlement of boundary disputes. That authority has come into being slowly but surely. It is the moral authority of other Latin American countries. The United States insists on its own willingness to act in friendly concert of counsel, but is unwilling to bring "pressure" to bear. In some of the affairs of life, international and otherwise, form is indistinguishable from substance. Latin American individuals and peoples set great store by form, both in approach and in actual negotiation. All nations desire to save face. The business of diplomacy is to find a way to do it. If it were not for the face-saving process, governments would fall as fast as they were formed in time of national tension, particularly when *territory* is involved; for territory is still one of the most delicate subjects of negotiation, doubtless largely on account of its tangibility.

The economic aids which diplomacy can now enlist are more diverse in character, more indirect and more effective, than earlier forms of pressure used to be. To buy critical goods or refrain, to make credits or not, to supply shipping or send it elsewhere — these are only a few of the background items. If they are employed by all and understood by all, and if their effect is open, they help leave national pride intact. They do not have the rude impact on national sensibilities of a boundary relocation. They also point the way toward the distant international goal of general peace based on economic well-being. Territories and boundaries will be of less consequence in a future world in which economic advantages and disadvantages depend less upon national sovereignty than upon coöperative international arrangements. It is an unquenchable hope of the peoples of the world today that necessary elements of force can be pooled in the interest of all. In this way, outside moral authority may acquire the support which it now needs if it is to bring the world nearer to a state of reasonably assured peace.

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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By Grayson Kirk

THE importance of the Middle Eastern region to the present and future course of the war is hardly a matter for debate. Just as during the First World War, the pattern of events in the great area reaching from the Eastern Mediterranean to India may greatly shorten or prolong the period of hostilities. It may be too much to say that the war can be won for the United Nations in this region; but it would be hard to deny that an outstanding Axis victory there, involving the conquest of Suez and the Caucasus, might make the decisive military defeat of the Axis next to impossible.

The stakes are great. An Axis conquest would deprive the Allies of the oil of the Caucasus, Mosul and Iran. Even if the retreating United Nations forces carried out a ruthless "scorched earth" policy so that the Axis could not obtain oil in the conquered fields except after many months of new drilling and construction, the United Nations themselves, already deprived of the oil of Burma and the Netherlands Indies, would find their own fuel problem immensely complicated. Further, the last supply line to Russia, except the sea route via the North Cape, would have been cut, and the German and Japanese forces meeting on the shores of the Arabian Sea would be in a strategically strong position, because they would then be in effeictve control of virtually all of the eastern, western and southern coast line of the vast Eurasian land mass. China would be cut off from British and Amecrian sources of supply entirely, except as a thin trickle of war materials might be brought in through Russia. Under such circumstances the Axis could tighten an iron ring gradually and inexorably about both Powers. The British Isles, Australia, and tropical Africa would be the only bases remaining in the hands of the United Nations from which large-scale attacks, aerial and otherwise, could be launched upon Axis territory; and though attacks so based might serve to harass the enemy, they could hardly bring about his early destruction.

On this chess-board of mountain ranges, deserts, inland seas and oceans, the Allied position may be regarded, without too much simplification, as constituting a single front extending from Libya through Egypt, Syria, and 'Iraq to the Caucasus, where junction is made with the Russian forces. From the Allied point of view this front is essentially defensive rather than offensive in character; for at no point, as a glance at the map shows, is it a front from which an advance can be made easily into enemy territory. Therefore, the basic problem is to establish and maintain as much strength as possible in order to be prepared against any Axis thrust; and — what is equally, or even more, important — to use this front as a protective shield for the supply lines across Iran to Russia.

War materials flow through Iran by every available route, for the Russian need is great and the Iranian facilities at best are none too good. Most important, of course, is the much-publicized Trans-Iranian Railway. Recently, many improvements have been made under the guidance of British, Amer-

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ican and Russian engineers to expedite the movement of traffic through this all-important artery: the rolling stock has been greatly increased in quantity, new sidings have been constructed, and terminal facilities at both ends have been improved. Since the Trans-Iranian line is standard gauge, neither Russian nor Indian rolling stock can be used, with the result that England, the United States and Australia have all contributed locomotives, cars and other equipment.

At the southern end, the original problem was that of creating adequate harbor facilities at Bandar Shahpur. That terminal port, situated on a small arm of the Persian Gulf, though equipped to transfer supplies directly from steamer to railway cars, was so limited in size that it could accommodate only two ships at a time. Although this capacity has been increased considerably by recent improvements, it has been necessary to provide other means whereby supplies could be transferred from ship to rail. One such device has been the shipment of goods up the Karun River to Ahwaz, a town on the Trans-Iranian line. The Karun flows into the Shatt-el-Arab, as the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates is called, near the port of Khorram Shahr. Recently, this feeder route has been improved by the construction of a rail line from Khorram Shahr northwards 70 miles to Ahwaz. This should relieve the congestion considerably. There also has been a report that the Trans-Iranian is to be connected by a new rail link with Basra, the terminus of the 'Iraq railway.[1]

To supplement the facilities at Bandar Shahpur still further, steps have been taken to make more use of the port of Bushire. This may not offer great future possibilities, however, as ships must discharge their cargoes onto lighters some five miles from shore. Once on land, the supplies are taken by truck across the Zagros mountain ranges, through mountain passes 12,000 feet high, to Shiras and Isfahan, and thence on to Teheran, or are placed on the Trans-Iranian Railway at Qum. It was reported last November that the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, in charge of Iranian highway transport, had a fleet of 250 trucks at Bushire for this five-day haul northward, and that these facilities were shortly to be enlarged by new truck shipments from America.[2] There also have been reports that the port facilities at Bandar Abbas, whence a road leads via Kerman to Teheran, are being extensively improved.

The northern terminus of the single-track Trans-Iranian Railway is at Bandar Shah on the Caspian Sea. Never well developed, the port has had its natural usefulness partially destroyed in recent years by the shrinkage of the waters of the Caspian. To remedy this, Russian engineers have built a mile-long jetty out into the water, but even this can never make Bandar Shah a key port because of a lack of steamer facilities for the water trip to Baku. More promising is the effort to build a rail connection between the Trans-Iranian and Tabriz, which has direct rail connection with Baku. This spur had been built from Teheran as far west as Kazvin before the outbreak of the war. By September 1941, the line had been extended over approximately half of the remaining 300-mile gap to Zenjan; and it is quite probable that the Zenjan-Tabriz gap is now closed. Even so, there is at Tabriz one of those breaks in

[1] New York *Herald Tribune*, May 3, 1942. On Iranian communications generally, see E. M. Wright, "Iran as a Gateway to Russia," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1942; also *The Bulletin of International News*, March 21, 1942.

[2] New York *Herald Tribune*, November 25, 1941.

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

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gauge which cause railway maps of this whole region to give a falsely optimistic impression. Despite this, the existence of continuous rail connections between the Caucasus and the Persian Gulf will be of the utmost value in speeding up the flow of goods northward.

Two other routes of actual as well as potential importance are available. During the World War a narrow-gauge railway was constructed from India through northern Baluchistan to a terminus just inside the Iranian frontier at Zahidan (Duzdab). In subsequent years this line was allowed to deteriorate, and it appears that the track was taken up in some places. Now it has been restored, and supplies can be moved over it from Karachi to Zahidan, from which point transportation must be provided by trucks over bad roads north to Meshed and on to Firuze, a place on the Iranian-Russian frontier. A spur railway connects Firuze with Ashkhabad, which is on the main Bukhara-Merv-Krasnovodsk rail line. From Krasnovodsk it is necessary, of course, to move supplies by steamer across the narrow waist of the Caspian to Baku. Despite the difficulties of this route, a first test trip was completed in November 1941, and the press has since reported that the Zahidan-Meshed highway is being hurriedly improved by a force of 5,000 laborers.[3] Apparently a trucking service, with Indian trucks and drivers, has been created to serve this route.

Finally, an 'Iraq-Iran route is being utilized. From Basra there is direct rail connection via Baghdad northward to Kirkuk. At Khanikin this line runs quite close to the Iranian frontier, and truck transportation from Khanikin over the 600-mile route north to Tabriz is supplied by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation working in conjunction with a similar Soviet organization. Some 2,000 trucks were reported as operating on this route last winter.[4] An alternative route runs from Erbil (north of Kirkuk) to Tabriz via the Rowanduz pass.

On the western side of the long Middle Eastern front communications are likewise being improved as rapidly as possible. The most important recent development has been the gratifyingly rapid construction of a coastal rail link between Haifa, where rail communication with Cairo terminated, and Tripoli, in Syria, where rail connection with the Istanbul-Baghdad line is made via Aleppo. This 175-mile line, by now probably in operation, has been constructed in record time. Some 8,000 civilian laborers were put to work on it. Since a great deal of tunneling was necessary in the northern portion, the project was placed in charge of South African engineers who recruited a force of 1,000 miners from the diamond mines of the Union of South Africa.

Two other improvements in this sector have also been recently reported in the press. One is the construction of a steel swing bridge across the Suez Canal. Such a bridge was built during the First World War, but the opposition of the Canal company led to its demolition after the end of hostilities. A further announcement is to the effect that a new rail link "between Egypt, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, improving communications of the latter region with the Red Sea" is projected.[5] Although no details have as yet been announced, a fair inference may be drawn that a railway is being planned between Aqaba, on the Red Sea, and some adjacent point on the Hejaz railway. If so, a future

[3] London *Times*, November 19, 1941.
[4] New York *Times*, February 4, 1942.
[5] New York *Herald Tribune*, May 3, 1942.

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route of water and rail transport would have been established from the important new American base in Eritrea into Syria, by-passing Egypt entirely.

The gap on the United Nations front is, of course, the absence of direct rail communication between the Egypt-Palestine sector and Baghdad. Here the only rail line is mainly in Turkish territory, crossing into Syria at only two points. A direct east-west railway from Haifa to Baghdad was projected a number of years ago, but the 'Iraq Government was apparently unwilling to assume the financial burden incident to its share, and the scheme was dropped.

To complete the picture presented by the accompanying map we must reverse the situation and examine the situation as it appears to the Axis. Assuming the great desirability, in the Axis view, of an early thrust into this region, what are the obstacles and the advantages? Is it possible to envisage a two-pronged offensive drive along both sides of the Black Sea at the same time? If so, will Turkey be by-passed in favor of a direct blow at Syria?

We shall deal with the last question first. It seems unlikely that the Nazis can drive into Syria without going through Turkey and it is rather doubtful that they would do so if they could. Although this war has produced many seemingly unlikely or impossible events, the Nazis can scarcely be able to strike a major invasion blow at Syria without first taking Cyprus and establishing complete naval supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Syrian coast is too far away from Crete to permit of a successful air-borne invasion based on that island. The distance is too great for the use of the famous JU-52 transport planes; and we may doubt that Germany could put into that theater enough long-range transport planes, especially when unaccompanied by great naval strength, for her to feel justified in making the effort. Further, even if a landing could be made in Syria there still would be no available rail communication with 'Iraq except by violating Turkish neutrality.

On the other hand, an approach through Turkey would offer desirable communication facilities. The last gap in the line from Haydar Pasha (across the Straits from Istanbul) to Baghdad was closed in the summer of 1940.[6] Moreover, there are direct rail communications across Turkey via Sivas and Erzerum to the southern Caucasus, and the line could be reached not only from the Straits but from the German-dominated Aegean at Izmir as well. The only serious flaw in this route is the lack of a link between Diyarbakir and Mardin.

The key, however, to a possible German drive into this Middle Eastern area rests rather more upon the German-Russian front in the Ukraine than upon the state of Turkish communications. If the front could be stabilized so that the Nazis felt relatively free to move toward the southeast without fear of trouble with the Russians on their flank, they would undoubtedly do so and at the earliest possible moment. If, however, Russian military power is great enough either to threaten, or actually to take and keep, the offensive on the southern section of the front, the Germans may not feel themselves in a position to extend themselves still further by a push through Turkey. In any event, the hurried construction of new Middle East communications will put the United Nations in a better position to mass their maximum strength at a given point against any possible Nazi drive.

[6] See Philip W. Ireland, "Berlin to Baghdad Up-to-Date," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1941.

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NEWFOUNDLAND IN NORTH ATLANTIC STRATEGY

By A. R. M. Lower

TO MANY Americans, probably, the name Newfoundland has long stood for little except large black dogs and codfish. To strategists, however, the island's position at the crossroads of shipping in the North Atlantic has always given it special importance. And now the war, with the establishment of American bases on Newfoundland territory and the dramatic meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in Newfoundland waters, has brought it prominently into the consciousness of the wider public.

Newfoundland is a large island, roughly triangular in shape; each side is about 300 miles long and the total area is about 42,000 square miles. Its geology is Appalachian: long, parallel ridges run from southwest to northeast, with broken and irregular valleys between them. It is much more rugged, however, than the characteristic Appalachian region of the mainland and its valleys are not fertile. The surface of the island is strewn with glacial débris, and much of it is covered with peat. In fact, peat bogs or barrens are almost the commonest type of terrain. Twenty feet of peat had to be removed before a good bottom could be found for the runways of some of the new American air-bases. Pools and lakes are scattered everywhere among the peat and gravel.

The shoreline is rough and barren, bordered in places by flats, in others by high cliffs. Innumerable reefs and islands dot the coast, and there are many inlets as well as a number of large bays, such as Placentia and Trinity; but these are too exposed to serve as harbors. There are, in fact, few good harbors for large ships in Newfoundland. Mortier Bay, on the west side of Placentia Bay, is one of the best, but it has no connections by road or rail with the rest of the island. Argentia, the site of the principal American base, on the east side of Placentia Bay, is a good harbor. But its dangers were emphasized by the loss of the United States destroyer *Truxtun* and the supply ship *Pollux* last winter. These vessels, making up for Argentia, got 40 miles or so off their course in a fog and piled up on the other side of Placentia Bay.

The climate of Newfoundland has often been criticized. Fog and rain are frequent, although the fog is usually offshore rather than inland. The temperature, however, is more supportable than that of many regions on the continent. The winters at St. John's are little more extreme than at Halifax, which has about the same temperature as Boston. Perhaps the most serious climatic handicap is the backward spring, caused by the descent of ice from the north.

From early times the neighboring ocean rather than the island itself has attracted men. The Grand Banks, southeast of the island, were the original magnet which drew Europeans into the western ocean. They are still as rich in codfish as when they were first discovered, and they still nurture as hardy a race of sailors and fishermen. Ice in the water and fog in the air are the normal thing on the fishing grounds. Thick weather averages about 13 to 14 hours daily at Cape Race during July. The foggiest months are May to November, precisely the period when other climatic conditions are somewhat better.

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Ice from the north accentuates the dangers from fog. It is usually carried into east coast harbors, which it often closes for long periods in the spring. Ice keeps the Straits of Belle Isle closed until late in June, and there are icebergs in the open Atlantic as far south as latitude 40 degrees N and as far east as longitude 40 degrees W (well below the Banks) until late in the summer. Ice is still a menace to shipping, despite the efforts of science to combat it, for example, through the invaluable ice patrols of the United States Government.

Newfoundland lacks internal resources and consequently is unable to sustain a large population. Only 300,000 people manage to find a living on the island — and for most of them it is a rather precarious one. Historically they have lived from the sea; for the majority, life still depends upon the sea, plus what may be secured from a reluctant soil.

The area of Newfoundland under cultivation is only about 100,000 acres out of a total of something like 27,000,000. Nor does there seem to be much likelihood of this figure being greatly increased. There have been experiments with farm colonies as a means of relieving the situation caused by the collapse of the fishing industry during the depression,[1] but they have not been very successful. There may be some possibilities for settlement in the valleys of the west coast, but they are not promising. Not much can be grown on peat and gravel; the 100,000 acres under cultivation consist mostly of potato patches and garden plots. If the island community were cut off from the outside world it might well disappear or be reduced to small proportions through starvation. Its life depends on unbroken communications with the mainland. This dependence is a serious liability, especially when as at present submarines are making communications more and more precarious.

Within the present century forest and mineral resources have been added to the harvest of sea and soil. The forests of the island sustain two pulp and paper mills, one at Corner Brook on the west coast, the other at Grand Falls, near Botwood, on the east coast. There is a large lead-zinc mine, Buchan's, in the west center of the island and one important iron mine. Bell Island, in Conception Bay, just a few miles from St. John's, is said to have the largest deposit of high-grade iron ore (hematite, 52 percent metallic iron) in the British Empire. The iron and steel industry of Nova Scotia and of all Canada as far west as Montreal depends upon this mine. Germany, however, used to be the chief purchaser of ore in prewar years. German ship captains must be as familiar with these waters as are the local fishermen.

The people of Newfoundland are virtually all of English or Irish descent. Cheerful, adaptable, accustomed to privation, and among the best small-boat men in the world, they form a valuable asset to any maritime power. They are deeply traditional; they give their allegiance to Great Britain without question. But they are also attached to their own island and are extremely proud of being Newfoundlanders. They have no difficulty in reconciling loyalty to the distant metropolis with love for their own corner of the globe. Like other islanders, they possess "character." Whatever his social status, nearly every Newfoundlander is an individual, with something racy and original about him. He does not derive his personality from the spaciousness of his circumstances. It would be hard to imagine a country more niggardly in its gifts to its children.

[1] This was the fundamental economic calamity which led to the surrender of self-government in 1933.

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Apart from the considerable sums derived from the production of paper and minerals, which affect a relatively small proportion of the people, most of the island's income depends on cod. A few people, mainly the dealers on the international fish market, get a good share of this income and are in consequence wealthy; they constitute a kind of upper class. The middle class, the typical social group of the mainland, is conspicuously weak both in economic status and in numbers. The majority of the people are fisherfolk. A limited number of them may actually have prospered; a few more manage to win a tolerable existence. But the majority have a standard of living far below that of the average American, and undernourishment and the deficiency diseases that go with it are common.

This island is normally far removed from the main currents of North American life, but today it is becoming known at first hand to thousands of people from the mainland. Tourists and businessmen are supplementing the numbers of men in the fighting services of Canada and the United States who have been stationed in Newfoundland. The population of St. John's has grown overnight from about 35,000 to more than 60,000. This influx has placed a strain on island life. The Newfoundlanders have taken rather well the shock of the two more sophisticated civilizations, Canadian and American, and the most pressing problems of social adjustment seem to have been solved more or less satisfactorily. The strain on physical resources and accommodation has not been met so well. St. John's, for example, is extremely overcrowded, and there seems little likelihood of relief. This is producing the usual temporary prosperity for certain groups.

Stress is even more manifest in travel facilities. Except for the few to whom air services are available, the only ways of getting to Newfoundland are by sea from New York and Halifax to St. John's, or across from North Sydney, Cape Breton, to Port-aux-Basques, in the southwest corner of the island, and thence to other points by the Newfoundland Railway. The latter is the usual route. A ship crosses overnight three times a week.

Apart from the narrow-gauge railway, now crowded to capacity, the local means of communication are few. There are some paved roads in the Avalon peninsula, radiating from St. John's, and there are also two branch railroad lines there. The ordinary means of getting about, in a country where the majority of the people live within a stone's throw of the seashore, is by boat. Most people have their own small boats, and many have schooners; and the longer services, such as the one from St. John's up the east coast and thence to Labrador, are performed by government coastal steamers. In other countries the state builds and maintains the roads; in Newfoundland the state maintains a network of coastal steamer services.

The lack of internal road and rail communication would be a serious handicap if the island had to be defended against attack. Distances are not inconsiderable. It is, for example, 200 miles from St. John's to the Newfoundland Air Port on Gander Lake. This great base, built originally for civilian purposes, was until recently the central point in the whole Newfoundland defense system. Although it is now only one of many, it is still of great tactical value. But it is connected with Corner Brook (192 miles away) and St. John's only by the limited facilities of the island railroad. Positions in the Avalon peninsula are a little better off, for they are connected by a useable road and rail system.

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Internal communications must be considered in relation to external ones. The New York-Halifax-St. John's route is now highly dangerous and the ships which have hitherto been used on it are too valuable to risk. A direct service between Sydney and St. John's has been maintained by the Newfoundland Government's coastal steamships; it is less exposed than the Halifax route but more so than the passage across the Cabot Straits to Port-aux-Basques. The steamer route from Montreal to Corner Brook is still less exposed. This route has the disadvantage of being closed in winter, but it has also the great advantages of being within the relatively safe waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and of landing cargoes 142 miles nearer St. John's, thus relieving the railroad of considerable strain. This is the route from the continent that it would seem wise to expand.

From Montreal to St. John's by the St. Lawrence is about 1,050 miles; from New York to St. John's by the Atlantic is about the same. The two routes and their lengths emphasize Newfoundland's strategic position: it lies across the entrance to the St. Lawrence, it flanks northern oceanic routes from the United States, and it advances the outposts of North America 1,000 miles eastward. At present this is clear gain. American bombers, flying the Atlantic, can refuel en route in Newfoundland. Bases on the island make it possible to protect convoys for almost a third of their journey to England and for one-half of that to Iceland.

Newfoundland thus provides all the advantages of a secure advanced base. But the island would be just as useful to the enemy if ever he should be able to capture it. He then could close the St. Lawrence completely. His planes could harass the shipping leaving every Atlantic port as far west as New York. His submarines, based in Newfoundland, could threaten the whole Atlantic coast.

This rocky northern island, then, which lies across the seaways to North America like a great ship moored in a strategic waterway, must be held safe at all costs. As long as the ship is staunch and the crew alert no strange craft can pass it by. If it were captured, those who did so could blockade Canada and a large part of one coast of the United States. The island therefore should be prepared for defense as a ship is prepared, with adequate internal communications, provisions for a long voyage, and one captain. Newfoundland and its defenses must be stripped for action, ready to hit back hard if attacked.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE LOST PEACE. By HAROLD BUTLER. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 246 p. $2.75.

Mr. Butler, for a number of years connected with the International Labour Office, most recently as Director, modestly calls this a "personal impression." It is much more than that. Drawing on his rich experience, he diagnoses the fundamental reasons why collective security failed to become a reality in the terms in which Wilson and his associates conceived it, and indicates the ingredients which must be added in order to achieve success.

THE MAKING OF TOMORROW. By RAOUL DE ROUSSY DE SALES. New York: Reynal, 1942, 338 p. $3.00.

Penetrating and at times brilliant essays on the ideas and basic forces which have brought us where we are and which are moulding the future. The author is a distinguished French journalist long a resident of the United States, which makes his comments on our actions and outlook especially interesting, perhaps more so than some of his historical generalizations.

THIS AGE OF FABLE. By GUSTAV STOLPER. New York: Reynal, 1941, 369 p. $3.00.

An attempt to deflate some current myths — historical, political and economic — and to substitute for them a more realistic approach to the urgent problems about which the author thinks that modern man has managed to confuse himself quite thoroughly. The author is a well known economist, formerly in Austria and Germany, now in the United States.

TOTAL VICTORY. By STEPHEN KING-HALL. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 306 p. $2.00.

In order to have "total peace" we must, says Commander King-Hall, create a state of mind in which vanquished as well as victor will voluntarily accept the peace settlement. He outlines methods for bringing this about.

POST-WAR WORLDS. By P. E. CORBETT. New York: Farrar, 1942, 208 p. $2.00.

A review of the causes for the breakdown of peace and an appraisal of the various plans that have been proposed for achieving real international coöperation after the war, by a professor of law at McGill University.

STRATEGY FOR DEMOCRACY. By J. DONALD KINGSLEY AND DAVID W. PETEGORSKY. New York: Longmans, 1942, 342 p. $3.00.

Essays on some of the political, social and economic prerequisites for a victory of the democratic way of life, at home as well as abroad. Five other writers, in addition to the two principal authors, have contributed to this thought-provoking symposium.

THE DESTINY OF WESTERN MAN. By W. T. STACE. New York: Reynal, 1942, 322 p. $3.00.

A brilliant justification of the democratic way of life as the one best adapted to man's natural yearning for personal dignity and individual expression.

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THE WILL TO FREEDOM. By Harry Jewell Sarkiss. New York: Revell, 1941, 256 p. $2.00.

The path to freedom is strewn with pitfalls but there must be no faltering.

DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL UNITY. Edited by William T. Hutchinson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 140 p. $1.00.

Lectures delivered in 1940–41 by six experts.

NEW LIBERTIES FOR OLD. By Carl L. Becker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, 181 p. $2.00.

Provocative essays in which an eminent American historian places some of our present political problems in their historical perspective.

DEMOCRACY THROUGH PUBLIC OPINION. By Harold D. Lasswell. Menasha (Wis.): Banta, 1941, 176 p. $1.50.

Essays by an American authority on public opinion problems.

STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND SOCIOLOGY. By Hu Shih and Others. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941, 194 p. $2.00.

Papers by eleven scholars, American and foreign, read at the Bicentennial Conference of the University of Pennsylvania. One of the topics concerns minority problems.

A DECLARATION OF DEPENDENCE. By Fulton J. Sheen. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1941, 140 p. $1.75.

Essays by a prominent Roman Catholic spokesman on a variety of political and religious issues as they relate to the present war.

DEMOCRACY OR ANARCHY? By F. A. Hermens. Notre Dame (Indiana): University of Notre Dame Press, 1941, 447 p. $4.00.

A treatise demonstrating the evil effects of Proportional Representation on democratic processes in various countries.

DESIGN FOR POWER: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD. By Frederick L. Schuman and George D. Brodsky. New York: Knopf, 1942, 324 p. $3.50.

Professor Schuman has for several years been a Jeremiah who is now having the rather grizzly satisfaction of seeing some of his worst predictions come true. The present volume is not so much a sequel to his two previous books — "Europe on the Eve" and "Night Over Europe" — as a summary of them brought down to the climactic events of this last winter. The text is embellished with numerous maps by Mr. Brodsky.

TWELVE DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE MIND. By Gorham Munson. New York: Greystone, 1942, 280 p. $3.50.

A case history of the propaganda technique from St. Paul to Goebbels.

THE FAILURES OF PEACE. By Kent Forster. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, 159 p. $2.00.

A review of attempts during the First World War to reach a negotiated peace.

NORTH AMERICA: WHEEL OF THE FUTURE. By Hawthorne Daniel. New York: Scribner, 1942, 300 p. $2.75.

The thesis of this book is that North America is destined, because of its position and its industrial strength, to be the center of economic and political power during the next phase of the world's history. Though not entirely convincing, Mr. Daniel's exposition offers interesting points of contrast and similarity to the teachings of Geopolitik.

TEN YEARS. By Dwight E. Lee. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 443 p. $3.75.

A sober, reliable synthesis of European diplomatic history during the period from 1930 to 1940. The author, professor of history at Clark University, has managed to digest a large mass of material and to place the events of the decade in perspective.

SOMETHING WENT WRONG. By Lewis Browne. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 360 p. $3.00.

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A "summation of modern history" which seeks to show that man has failed to utilize the fruits of the Industrial Revolution for socially desirable ends. This idea, though not new or entirely acceptable, is presented in clear and occasionally epigrammatic prose.

THE TRAGEDY OF EUROPE. By Sir John Marriott. London: Blackie, 1941, 228 p. 8/6.

A readable, coherent chronicle, primarily of the last two decades, together with some sound interpretation, by a well-known English historian.

OUTLINE OF ZIONIST HISTORY. By Lotta Levensohn. New York: Scopus, 1941, 157 p. $1.50.

A brief précis by a Zionist writer.

JEWS IN A GENTILE WORLD. By Isacque Graeber and Steuart Henderson Britt. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 436 p. $4.00.

An important contribution to a realistic understanding of the problem of anti-Semitism. In addition to the two authors, sixteen other experts contribute chapters.

A QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL ORDER. By Jackson H. Ralston. Washington: Byrne, 1941, 205 p. $2.00.

Politico-juridical essays by a prominent American authority on international law.

EL DERECHO DE REVOLUCIÓN. By Ignacio María de Lojendio. Madrid: Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, 1941, 183 p. Ptas. 14.

A theoretical treatise which considers the subject from the historical and philosophical as well as the juridical points of view.

THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE IN ISLAM: A STUDY IN MUSLIM INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Majid Khadduri. London: Luzac, 1940, 132 p. 6/.

A scholarly monograph by an 'Iraqi professor.

INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION. VOLUME VII, 1935–1937. Edited by Manley O. Hudson. Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1941, 1026 p. $4.00.

The latest addition to the compiler's "collection of the texts of multipartite international instruments of general interest."

INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL POLICY. By Oliver J. Lissitzyn. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1942, 478 p. $5.00.

A scholarly treatise in which the whole field of the relationship between commercial aviation and government policy is thoroughly examined both in its domestic and international aspects. This comprehensive monograph, prepared by a former Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is equipped with several maps, an appendix and a bibliography.

GRAND STRATEGY. By H. A. Sargeaunt and Geoffrey West. New York: Crowell, 1941, 246 p. $2.00.

This thoughtful little book abounds in new ideas and suggestive interpretations. It may briefly be described as an attempt to show that war is merely one of the facets of man's social activity, and that a nation which desires victory in war will therefore seek as far as possible to integrate its strategy with its political institutions, its social ideas and its peace objectives, as well as with the more obvious factors of physical resources and geographic situation.

PEACE BY POWER. By Lionel Gelber. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 159 p. $1.50.

A straightforward expression of the doctrine that only power can impose and maintain the coming peace. The author, a Canadian scholar, is obviously dismayed at much of the current peace planning, which he finds unrealistic and hence dangerous.

MECHANIZED MIGHT. By Major Paul C. Raborg. New York: Whittlesey, 1942, 284 p. $2.50.

The history and practice of mechanized warfare outlined by an American officer.

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RADIO GOES TO WAR. By Charles J. Rolo. New York: Putnam, 1942, 293 p. $2.75.

A comprehensive picture of the development of radio as a weapon in modern warfare, by one of the original members of the staff of the Princeton University Listening Center.

WAR WINGS. By David C. Cooke. New York: McBride, 1941, 206 p. $2.75.

An illustrated handbook concerning American and British fighting planes.

THE DESTINY OF SEA POWER. By John Philips Cranwell. New York: Norton, 1941, 262 p. $2.75.

A new approach to the theory and practical problems of sea power in which the author seeks to integrate naval with aërial and land warfare.

GREAT SOLDIERS OF THE TWO WORLD WARS. By H. A. de Weerd. New York: Norton, 1941, 378 p. $3.50.

Profiles of a dozen military leaders, including Colonel Lawrence and Churchill, by the editor of *Military Affairs*.

FATAL PARTNERS: WAR AND DISEASE. By Ralph H. Major. Garden City: Doubleday, 1941, 342 p. $3.50.

An historically-minded professor of medicine traces the effect of medical knowledge — or lack of it — on the course of military campaigns since classical times.

BOMBS AND BOMBING. By Willy Ley. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941, 124 p. $1.25.

Practical information and advice, with diagrams.

THE SEA OF MEMORIES. By Charles Moran. New York: Scribner, 1942, 320 p. $3.50.

Two dozen colorful vignettes of important episodes in the military and naval history of the Mediterranean Sea, by a retired American naval officer.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1942. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1942, 202 p. $2.50.

The fifteenth annual volume of this standard reference work, revised to January 1 of this year, takes account of the political changes which have occurred throughout the world during the past critical year. Detailed information is given for countries which have been overrun by the Axis but which have governments-in-exile. The French section, which includes new decrees recently issued, gives a description of the Vichy régime. The usual data on the composition of governments, the leaders and programs of political parties, and the political affiliations and editors of leading newspapers and periodicals of all countries have been brought up to date.

General: Economic and Social

THE STRENGTH OF NATIONS: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY. By George Soule. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 268 p. $2.50.

An editor of the *New Republic* analyzes modern society from a new "psycho-social" approach and presents a strong case for the use of new social and psychological techniques if we are to get the world out of its present suicidal rut.

THOSE RAW MATERIALS. By C. A. Ward. London: Allen and Unwin, 1941, 392 p. 15/.

Technical information for the layman about the world's principal raw materials — what they are used for, where they occur, and how they are prepared for the market.

WORLD SHIPPING. By A. C. Hardy. New York: Penguin, 1941, 223 p. 25 cents.

A conveniently small manual of useful data about trade routes, ship types, cargoes, ports, coasts, canals, etc.

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STUDIES IN ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. By Wesley C. Mitchell and Others. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1941, 183 p. $2.00.

Thirteen papers presented at the Bicentennial Conference of the University of Pennsylvania. Among the contributors are some of our leading economists.

THE ECONOMICS OF TOTAL WAR. By Henry William Spiegel. New York: Appleton-Century, 1942, 410 p. $3.00.

A well-organized textbook, by an assistant professor at Duquesne University, emphasizing the lessons of the present war.

WAR ECONOMICS. Edited by Emanuel Stein and Jules Backman. New York: Farrar, 1942, 501 p. $4.00.

Various aspects of the development of a war economy examined by half a dozen economists. The material is frequently detailed and the discussion is on a practical line. The treatment is comprehensive rather than original.

WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION. Edited by Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, 333 p. $3.50.

Papers presented at the 1940 meeting of the American Historical Association.

RANSOMING THE TIME. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Scribner, 1941, 322 p. $3.00.

Essays on a variety of religious and philosophical topics by an eminent French Catholic thinker.

THE CHURCH AND THE NEW ORDER. By William Paton. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 188 p. $1.50.

A program for action, by the Secretary to the International Missionary Council.

The Second World War

DEFENSE WILL NOT WIN THE WAR. By Lieutenant Colonel W. F. Kernan. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 193 p. $1.50.

The fundamental thesis of this provocative little book will meet with general assent, except from the few remaining adherents of the Liddell Hart school of limited-liability, indirect-approach, defensive strategy. It is rather with some of Colonel Kernan's subsidiary arguments that sharp dissent will arise, especially among those who feel that he has been overemphatic in his condemnation — or not entirely balanced in his interpretation — of the Mahan doctrine of naval strategy and of its importance in modern warfare. The author's urgent proposal is that the center of Axis power — *i.e.*, Central Europe — be attacked at the very earliest possible moment by way of Italy. Sound as this conception may be in the large, naval stategists may nevertheless ask whether Colonel Kernan has taken full account of the tremendous amount of naval and transport strength, and of air power, required to carry through such an invasion.

VICTORY THROUGH AIR POWER. By Major Alexander P. De Seversky. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942, 354 p. $2.50.

The author, one of America's most noted airplane designers and prophets of the decisiveness of air power, has many suggestions to offer concerning matters of broad strategy. He is particularly emphatic against letting the determination of strategy, especially the all-important strategy of the air, get into the hands of the brass-hats.

THE AXIS GRAND STRATEGY. Compiled and edited by Ladislas Farago. New York: Farrar, 1942, 614 p. $3.75.

"Blueprints for the total war" as revealed in 178 excerpts from the writings of various German authorities. This useful compilation is issued under the auspices of the Committee for National Morale.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WAR AND SURVIVAL. By Leonard B. Loeb and Others. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1941, 149 p. $1.50.

Lectures on "political and military aspects of the present war," by members of the faculty of the University of California.

FROM TOBRUK TO SMOLENSK. By Strategicus. London: Faber, 1941, 308 p. 10/6.

The third volume in a very useful series on the course of the war, by a well-informed author who chooses to remain anonymous for the time being. The period covered here is roughly from February to August 1941.

MODERN BATTLE. By Major Paul W. Thompson. New York: Norton, 1941, 220 p. $2.75.

An American engineer officer makes a somewhat technical examination of some fifteen significant campaigns and battles in this war up through Crete. Maps and sketches.

NORWAY AND THE WAR: SEPTEMBER 1939–DECEMBER 1940. Edited by Monica Curtis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 154 p. $3.00.

Some three score documents, arranged chronologically, concerning Norway's neutrality, the Nazi invasion, and the acts of the Norwegian Government-in-Exile. This volume is published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the series "Documents on International Affairs."

NORWAY REVOLTS AGAINST THE NAZIS. By Jacob Worm-Müller. London: Drummond, 1941, 152 p. 5/.

The author, until recently professor of history at Oslo University, was a Liberal Party representative in the abortive negotiations by which the Nazis hoped to obtain the collaboration of the Norwegian people. His account of these efforts and of the early days of German rule in Norway is invaluable for the light it throws on Nazi methods and on the metamorphosis from inert stupefaction to organized resistance through which the Norwegian people have gone. Professor Worm-Müller later escaped to England.

RETURN TO THE FUTURE. By Sigrid Undset. New York: Knopf, 1942, 251 p. $2.50.

The Norwegian novelist's own account of her escape from Norway and of some of the ideas with which this experience left her.

WITH THE FOREIGN LEGION AT NARVIK. By Captain Pierre O. Lapie. London: Murray, 1941, 138 p. 5/.

A personal, illustrated account of the Allied expedition to Norway, by an officer of the French Foreign Legion.

HOLLAND FIGHTS THE NAZIS. By L. de Jong. London: Drummond, 1941, 138 p. 5/.

What the Nazi invasion has done to Holland and what the Dutch are doing to the Nazis in return, illustrated by word and picture.

DÉMOCRATIE, BEURRE ET CANONS. By Robert de Saint Jean. New York: Maison Française, 1941, 367 p. $1.50.

A diary running from October 9, 1939, to June 17, 1940, throwing interesting light on political affairs in France.

THE FALL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC. By D. N. Pritt. London: Muller, 1941, 177 p. 5/.

A vigorous but not entirely balanced account.

LA GUERRE N'A PAS EU LIEU. By Max Beer. New York: Maison Française, 1941, 298 p. $1.50.

A somewhat personal interpretation of the recent history of France, particularly of

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her performance in the war. The author emphasizes the shortcomings of the country's leaders and declares that in reality the war is only beginning for France.

TRUTH ON THE TRAGEDY OF FRANCE. By Elie J. Bois. London: Hodder, 1941, 416 p. 7/6.

A well-known French newspaper writer stresses the shortcomings of Paul Reynaud.

SCUM OF THE EARTH. By Arthur Koestler. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 287 p. $2.50.

A grim, moving story of a year's experience in wartime France, including a stretch in one of the notorious concentration camps set up for refugees and "enemy" aliens.

LAST TO LEAVE PARIS. By Peter Fontaine. London: Chaterson, 1941, 148 p. 5/.

An Englishman keeps just ahead of the Nazi Army advancing into France and escapes with this interesting diary.

FROM THE LAND OF SILENT PEOPLE. By Robert Saint John. New York: Doubleday, 1942, 353 p. $3.00.

This is one of the most graphic and exciting of the books of personal experience which have so far come out of this war. It is the story of events and impressions indelibly engraved in the consciousness of an American journalist during his escape from invaded Jugoslavia through Greece and Crete to Alexandria.

BALKAN CORRESPONDENT. By Derek Patmore. New York: Harper, 1941, 319 p. $3.00.

Mr. Patmore went to Rumania after the outbreak of the war to act as correspondent for a British news agency. His lack of background for the journalistic profession is only too obvious from the many superficialities which mark his narrative.

MEDITERRANEAN FRONT. By Alan Moorehead. New York: Whittlesey, 1942, 306 p. $2.75.

An exciting eye-witness account of the campaigns in Libya, Ethiopia, Greece, Crete and Syria. The author is an Australian newspaperman, and his book constitutes some of the best reporting so far on this war.

THE VOICE OF FIGHTING RUSSIA. Edited by Lucien Zacharoff. New York: Alliance, 1942, 336 p. $3.00.

A collection of battle stories, pep talks and other inspirational pieces by a number of Soviet writers, including Stalin.

ACTION ON ALL FRONTS. By Ralph Ingersoll. New York: Harper, 1942, 330 p. $3.50.

The editor of the New York newspaper *PM* reports on his 1940 trip around the world via China, Russia and the Mediterranean.

LET THERE BE MERCY. By John Maloney. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 337 p. $3.00.

Vivid notes on a journey that took the author, an American war correspondent turned Red Cross observer, into most of warring Europe during 1940.

JOURNEY FOR MARGARET. By W. L. White. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 256 p. $2.50.

The very personal story of an American journalist who went to England and adopted a child and in so doing got a look at the English people on the home front.

WHERE STANDS A WINGÈD SENTRY. By Margaret Kennedy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, 251 p. $2.00.

A diary kept by the author of "The Constant Nymph" during the hard months between May and September 1940.

DAWN OF VICTORY. By Louis Fischer. New York: Duell, 1942, 270 p. $2.75.

The author's comments on what the war is doing to British institutions — a phe-

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nomenon he recently observed at first hand — are more convincing than his chapters on Russia and on the war in general.

THAT DAY ALONE. By Pierre van Paassen. New York: Dial Press, 1941, 548 p. $3.75.

The author of "Days of Our Years" spins more yarns, this time about experiences in wartime Europe.

CONVERSATION IN LONDON. By Stephen Laird and Walter Graebner. New York: Morrow, 1942, 120 p. $1.50.

The Berlin and London correspondents of *Time*, in comparing notes on life in wartime Britain and Germany, make a number of interesting points.

THE ARMIES MARCH. By John Cudahy. New York: Scribner, 1941, 304 p. $2.75.

In recent years Mr. Cudahy has served as American Minister to Eire and Ambassador to Poland and Belgium; during the spring of 1941 he paid a flying trip to Germany, where he interviewed Hitler. He has been charged by some of his compatriots with being too tolerant of totalitarian ideals, or at least lacking in moral indignation at the manner in which the Nazis are putting them into effect. After reading this account of his experiences abroad one can understand how these criticisms came to be made.

SEA POWER IN CONFLICT. By Paul Schubert. New York: Coward-McCann, 1942, 252 p. $2.50.

A popular description of the apparatus of naval warfare — ships, bases, raiders, etc. — and thumb-nail accounts of the more important naval engagements in this war.

THE WAR AT SEA. By Gilbert Cant. New York: Day, 1942, 340 p. $3.00.

A readable chronicle and commentary on naval operations up through Pearl Harbor.

WAR AND NATIONAL POLICY. Edited by Grayson Kirk and Richard Poate Stebbins. New York: Farrar, 1942, 131 p. $1.00.

A timely syllabus and bibliography.

The United States

AMERICA'S STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS. By Nicholas John Spykman. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 500 p. $3.75.

Sooner or later the philosophy and the method of German geopolitics were destined to be adopted by American writers and applied to this continent — to the American *Raum*. This, in effect, is what Professor Spykman of the Institute of International Studies at Yale has done in the present work. Though a pioneer work in so far as American scholarship is concerned, Professor Spykman's treatise presents about as good a case for the geopolitical interpretation of America's position in world power politics as can be made. At the same time it exemplifies the limitations and dangers of that approach, especially in its failure to give due weight to the historical traditions and psychological peculiarities which are often as much a part of a nation's power potential as its geographical position, natural resources and industrial apparatus. His failure fully to take account of these intangible factors may in part account for Professor Spykman's tendency to emphasize the weaknesses of the American position.

AMERICA AND WORLD MASTERY. By John MacCormac. New York: Duell, 1942, 338 p. $2.75.

Mr. MacCormac, of Canadian birth, has served the *New York Times* nearly two decades as correspondent in various places. His book is largely devoted to an analysis of the Anglo-Saxon position in the world today and what it is likely to be after the present "revolution" has shaken things down. Some critics may feel that the author does not give a sufficiently important rôle in the future to the numerically stronger non-Anglo-Saxon peoples among the United Nations.

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AMERICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By Allan Nevins. New York: Oxford University Press, 1942, 140 p. $1.00.

A compact little summary, intended originally for the British public.

THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER. By Whitney Hart Shepardson. Claremont (Cal.): Claremont Colleges, 1942, 64 p. $1.75.

Three lectures, into which has been packed a great deal of sound observation and good common sense.

WHAT EVERY CITIZEN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT . . . New York: Norton, 1941–42, 10 v. $2.50 each.

This series was conceived as a means for providing the American people with reliable, yet non-technical information about the agencies and instruments charged with their defense. The authors of each volume have been selected with an eye both to their right to speak as experts in their fields and to their capacity to present their subject interestingly. Though there is naturally some diversity in the approach and style of the various authors, the series as a whole maintains a high standard of readability. Each volume is illustrated with numerous sketches. Two of the books, those by Messrs. Baldwin and Ford, already appear in revised editions. The volumes forming part of this series are as follows: "The Army," by Harvey S. Ford (1941, 253 p.); "The Navy," by Hanson W. Baldwin (1941, 219 p.); "The Coast Guard," by Hickman Powell (1941, 194 p.); "The Marines," by Captain John H. Craige (1941, 211 p.); "The Air Forces," by Lt. Col. Harold E. Hartney (1942, 226 p.); "The Army Engineers," by Lt. Col. Paul W. Thompson (1942, 210 p.); "Our Arms and Weapons," by Major James E. Hicks (1941, 252 p.); "The Merchant Marine," by Carl D. Lane (1941, 201 p.); "Civilian Defense," by Walter D. Binger and Hilton H. Railey (1942, 200 p.); "Modern War," by Fletcher Pratt (1942, 184 p.).

THIS IS YOUR WAR. By Marquis W. Childs. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 200 p. $1.50.

The sacrifices which every American must make for victory.

THE ROAD WE ARE TRAVELING, 1914–1942. By Stuart Chase. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1942, 106 p. $1.00.

Mr. Chase is preparing a series of six "exploratory reports" on American postwar problems. This first one is a retrospect over the period 1914–1942.

WHEN PEACE COMES. By Allan Ramsey Wurtele. New Orleans: Pelican Publishing Company, 1941, 325 p. $2.50.

An American engineer and industrialist diagnoses a lot of political and economic ills and offers some remedies. He warns that the real test for our democratic way of life will come when the war is over.

ARMS AND THE AFTERMATH. By Perrin Stryker. Boston: Houghton, 1942, 157 p. $1.75.

Chapters on what the war is doing, and will do, to American industry.

FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 634 p. $4.00.

A legal and historical treatise by the leading authority in the field.

POLITICS AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Macmillan (Cambridge: The University Press), 1941, 127 p. $1.25.

American government succinctly outlined, primarily for English readers.

WHOSE REVOLUTION? By Roger Baldwin and Others. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1941, 296 p. $2.50.

A coöperative "study of the future course of liberalism in the United States" by some ten American liberals of various hues.

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ROOSEVELT: DICTATOR OR DEMOCRAT? By Gerald W. Johnson. New York: Harper, 1941, 303 p. $3.00.

After analyzing the policies of the New Deal and its leader, Mr. Johnson concludes that both the policies and the man are democratic and therefore deserve the sincere support of the American people.

CORDELL HULL. By Harold B. Hinton. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 377 p. $3.00.

As befits the subject, this is a friendly but honest chronicle of the long career of a public servant who will certainly go down in history as one of the great statesmen of these times. The author was formerly on the Washington staff of the *New York Times*.

WASHINGTON DATELINE. By Delbert Clark. New York: Stokes, 1941, 322 p. $3.00.

A temperate, informative description of the relations between the press and the various agencies of the Federal Government.

CONFUSION ON THE POTOMAC. By Carlisle Bargeron. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1941, 248 p. $2.50.

An attack upon New Deal leaders by means of innuendo and cheap gossip.

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FOOD ADMINISTRATION, 1917–1919. By William Clinton Mullendore. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941, 399 p. $4.50.

An official, documented history by a member of the staff of the Administration. Former President Hoover contributes an introduction.

PREFACE TO PREPAREDNESS. By C. Leonard Hoag. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, 205 p. $2.50.

A monograph on the Washington Disarmament Conference with special emphasis on the public's opinion toward it.

AMERICAN OPINION OF SOVIET RUSSIA. By Meno Lovenstein. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, 210 p. $2.75.

This annotated study describes and explains the gradual shift in the attitude of the American people since 1917.

AMERICAN REGULATION OF ARMS EXPORTS. By Elton Atwater. New York: Columbia University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1941, 287 p. $2.00.

An historical-juridical study of American practice.

THE AMERICAN MARITIME INDUSTRIES AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1789–1914. By John G. B. Hutchins. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 627 p. $5.00.

A scholarly history by an instructor in economics at Cornell University.

NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS COMPOSITION, 1919–1938. By Simon Kuznets. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941, 2 v. $5.00.

A meticulous analysis of its composition and distribution in the United States.

PAYING FOR DEFENSE. By Albert Gailord Hart and Edward D. Allen. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1941, 275 p. $2.50.

A symposium prepared with the aid of the economic staff of Iowa State College.

FEDERAL FINANCES IN THE COMING DECADE. By Carl Shoup. New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, 121 p. $1.00.

Needs and possibilities weighed statistically.

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BOOM OR BUST. By Blair Moody. New York: Duell, 1941, 336 p. $2.50.
Economic stability for America via the spending route.

INTELLECTUAL AMERICA. By Oscar Cargill. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 777 p. $5.00.
The history of ideas in the United States and of the influences that have formed them.

THE STORY OF AMERICAN CATHOLICISM. By Theodore Maynard. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 694 p. $3.50.
A summary and interpretation by a convert.

OUR HAWAII. By Erna Fergusson. New York: Knopf, 1942, 304 p. $3.50.
A tourist's guide for other tourists of pre-Pearl Harbor days.

Western Europe

DEADLINE. By Pierre Lazareff. New York: Random House, 1942, 369 p. $3.00.
M. Lazareff was, before fleeing collaborationist France, editor of the largest newspaper in that country, *Paris-Soir*. In this informative but not very well constructed book he takes his readers behind the scenes of French political and journalistic life to show them the venality, stupidity and downright treason which paved the way for the collapse of the Third Republic.

THEY CALLED ME CASSANDRA. By Geneviève Tabouis. New York: Scribner, 1942, 436 p. $3.00.
For some years Madame Tabouis made it her business to present an "inside" view of European diplomacy in the Paris newspaper *L'Oeuvre*. In these memoirs one will find her highly personal version of the dreary road followed by France to collapse.

ALL MEN HAVE LOVED THEE: A SONG OF FRANCE. By Harold C. Geyer. New York: R. R. Smith, 1941, unp. $3.75.
In this quite unusual, impressionistic book, an American art student who passed several years in Paris in the middle thirties has sought to recapture the flavor of French life, political and otherwise, during the latter years of the Third Republic. The book, in large format, is embellished with numerous of the author's etchings.

PEOPLE UNDER HITLER. By Wallace R. Deuel. New York: Harcourt, 1942, 392 p. $3.50.
So many books have been written about Nazi Germany that another one must be extra good to arouse interest or elicit praise. The present work of Mr. Deuel, who served several years as Berlin correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, needs no apology for it is one of the very best. Objective, factual, utterly impersonal — it builds up a picture of life under Hitler so terrifying, yet so convincing, that it should become one of our primary sources for knowledge of the Third Reich.

THE ROOTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM. By Rohan D'O. Butler. New York: Dutton, 1942, 304 p. $3.00.
A carefully assembled and interpreted mass of facts and quotations amply demonstrating that the origins of Nazi ideas lie deep in German history.

THUS SPEAKS GERMANY. By W. W. Coole and M. F. Potter. New York: Harper, 1942, 412 p. $3.50.
An impressive collection of quotations from representative Germans during the last two centuries indicating a trend of ideas that has led inexorably to Nazism.

TIME WAS: DEATH OF A JUNKER. By Heinrich Hauser. New York: Reynal, 1942, 308 p. $3.00.
The death of the whole Junker class as seen through the eyes of one of their number who is now in exile in the United States. A dramatic, almost haunting story.

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SATAN IN TOP HAT. By Tibor Koeves. New York: Alliance, 1941, 359 p. $3.00.
A biography of Franz von Papen based largely on secondary sources.

VON RIBBENTROP IS STILL DANGEROUS. By Douglas Glen. London: Rich, 1941, 287 p. 16/.
An unflattering picture of the man, his collaborators and his policies.

MUNICH PLAYGROUND. By Ernest R. Pope. New York: Putnam, 1941, 260 p. $2.75.
An American correspondent, resident in Munich from 1936 to 1939, lifts the curtain on the Nazi hierarchs at play, catching them in quite unconventional poses.

JEWS IN NAZI EUROPE. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1941, v.p. $1.00.
A survey of conditions between February 1933 and November 1941.

THE SWEDISH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM. By Paul H. Norgren. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 339 p. $3.50.
A scholarly monograph on the history and operation of Sweden's institutional machinery for preserving industrial peace.

LES ITALIENS TELS QU'ILS SONT. By Count Sforza. Montreal: Editions de l'Arbre, 1941, 208 p. $1.25.
In this charming and tolerant little volume, a former Foreign Minister of Italy, now leading the Free Italy Movement in the United States, presents his people, their history and their national character.

THE REMAKING OF ITALY. By Pentad. New York: Penguin, 1941, 287 p. 25 cents.
Five authors, one Englishman and four Italians, maintain that the real tradition of Italy is liberal and that England and not Germany is her natural affinity.

BENEDICT XV. By Rev. Henry E. G. Rope. London: Gifford, 1941, 319 p. 7/6.
A friendly appraisal of the character and policies of a pontiff who reigned during a very difficult period for the Vatican — 1914 to 1922.

THE VATICAN AND WAR IN EUROPE. By Denis Gwynn. London: Burns, Oates, 1941, 217 p. 7/6.
A Roman Catholic writer traces the Vatican's policy in international affairs since Pius X, with perhaps a little too much tenderness for Fascist susceptibilities.

¿QUIÉN ES ESPAÑA? By Manuel de Burgos y Mazo. Sevilla: Editorial de la Gavidia, 1940, 241 p. Ptas. 15.
An analysis of the physical and moral foundations of Spanish national solidarity.

HISTORIA DE LA SEGUNDA REPÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA. By José Pla. Barcelona: Editorial Destino, 1940–41, 4 v. Ptas. 60.
History from the Nationalist point of view.

EL ESTADO NACIONALISTA TOTALITARIO-AUTORITARIO. By Luis del Valle. Saragossa: Athenaeum, 1940, 270 p. Ptas. 6.
A treatise, based largely on German and Italian works, by a professor of political law at the University of Saragossa.

Eastern Europe

SOVIET RUSSIA. By E. Strauss. London: Lane, 1941, 342 p. 12/6.
One of the better informed and more thoughtful books on Russia. The author, formerly connected with the labor movement in Austria, has real perspective on Russian history; his narrative thus has a continuity lacking in many works on the Soviets.

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THE SOVIETS EXPECTED IT. By Anna Louise Strong. New York: Dial Press, 1941, 279 p. $2.50.

Miss Strong enjoys a reputation as a very sympathetic interpreter of Soviet Russia to Anglo-Saxon audiences. In this book she sets out with her usual enthusiasm to justify Soviet foreign policy.

RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC FRONT FOR WAR AND PEACE. By A. Yugow. New York: Harper, 1942, 279 p. $3.00.

"An appraisal of the three five-year plans," particularly as regards the shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Though largely written before the Soviets became involved in the war, this volume is timely in that it describes the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian economic machine.

"WE MADE A MISTAKE"—HITLER. By Lucien Zacharoff. New York: Appleton-Century, 1941, 213 p. $2.00.

An interesting picture of Russia's military power which, though useful as a corrective to anti-Soviet literature, sometimes errs in the opposite direction.

OSNOVANIE KOMMUNISTICHESKOGO INTERNATIONALA. By I. S. Yuzefovich. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR., 1941, 276 p. 75 cents.

A new account of the founding of the Third International, prepared under the auspices of the Soviet Institute of Science.

THE SOVIET EXPERIMENT. By Harry Best. New York: R. R. Smith, 1941, 120 p. $1.25.

A sociologist examines the fundamental ideas conditioning the Soviet experiment.

TORNADO ACROSS EASTERN EUROPE. By Josef Hanč. New York: Greystone, 1942, 337 p. $3.00.

A sound and comprehensive survey of the tangled problems in which the dozen or so peoples east of Germany and west of Russia, from the Arctic Ocean to the Aegean Sea, have become enmeshed by geography, history and the perversity of fate. As a Czechoslovak diplomat with wide experience, and as a scholar and editor, Mr. Hanč is admirably fitted to render sane interpretations of recent events in Eastern Europe and to make sober suggestions for the future.

AGRARNYE OTNOSHENIYA V BYVSHEI POL'SHE, ZAPADNOI UKRAINE I ZAPADNOI BELORUSSII. By I. I. Goldstein. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1941, 296 p. 90 cents.

An account of the agrarian problems in the former Polish Republic, with special attention to Soviet-annexed areas of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia.

A HISTORY OF HUNGARY. By Dominic G. Kosáry. Cleveland: Benjamin Franklin Bibliophile Society, 1941, 482 p. $2.75.

A rapid review, half of it being devoted to the last century. There are bibliography, genealogical tables and statistical data in the appendix.

ATHENE PALACE. By R. G. Waldeck. New York: McBride, 1942, 357 p. $2.75.

A spicy account of international intrigue and Balkan politics as observed in Bucharest during the last half of 1940.

FLIGHT IN WINTER. By John Clinton Adams. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942, 281 p. $3.00.

The dramatic story of the retreat of the Serbian Army through the mountains of Montenegro and Albania to the Adriatic Sea and the island of Corfu, where it was restored as a fighting unit and sent to the Salonika front. A useful book to read under present circumstances. Some may feel, however, that the author, assistant professor of history at Dartmouth College, has not succeeded in making an entirely happy compromise between the scholarly and the popular approach.

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The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE INVASION OF BRITAIN. By Admiral Sir Herbert W. Richmond. London: Methuen, 1941, 81 p. 2/6.

An account of attempts from 1586 to 1918, by an English naval expert.

LORD HALIFAX. By Stuart Hodgson. London: Christophers, 1941, 262 p. 10/6.

A conventional review of the career of the present British Ambassador in Washington.

FACING THE FACTS IN FOREIGN POLICY. By Algernon Cecil. London: Eyre, 1941, 129 p. 5/.

An intelligent but somewhat opinionated "retrospect and prospect" on British policy.

STAFFORD CRIPPS: PROPHETIC REBEL. By Eric Estorick. New York: Day, 1941, 285 p. $2.50.

An authorized and very friendly account of the Leftist leader's career, liberally illustrated with excerpts from Sir Stafford's pronouncements.

THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE OF GREAT BRITAIN. By H. E. Dale. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 232 p. $2.75.

Its history, duties and functions in the country's political scheme.

MOBILIZING CANADA'S RESOURCES. By A. F. W. Plumptre. Toronto: Macmillan, 1941, 306 p. $3.25.

Two years of the Dominion's experience with wartime industrial, financial and labor problems reviewed by a Canadian economist.

CANADIAN WAR ECONOMICS. Edited by J. F. Parkinson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1941, 191 p. $1.75.

Ten authorities contribute essays on a variety of topics.

CANADA AT BRITAIN'S SIDE. By W. L. Mackenzie King. Toronto: Macmillan, 1941, 332 p. $3.00.

Important war speeches by the Canadian Prime Minister.

THE UNKNOWN COUNTRY. By Bruce Hutchison. New York: Coward-McCann, 1942, 386 p. $3.50.

An excellent bird's-eye view of Canada and her people, by a Canadian journalist.

CANADA MOVES NORTH. By Richard Finnie. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 227 p. $3.50.

An enthusiastic description of the present actualities and future possibilities for white settlement in the Northwest Territories.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN AUSTRALIA. By Brian Fitzpatrick. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1941, 529 p. 21/. (New York: Stechert, $5.25.)

A scholarly history of Australia's economic development from 1834 to 1939 by a research fellow in the University of Melbourne.

The Far East

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE PACIFIC AREA. By Various Authors. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941–42, 3 v.

A useful series which contains a wealth of factual information arranged by countries — though it must be remembered, of course, that statistics for the Far East are meager and that those available are often not much better than approximations. The area surveyed includes the eastern as well as the western shores of the Pacific Ocean. The following titles have appeared thus far: "Population and Land Utilization," by Karl J. Pelzer (1941, 215 p. $2.00); "Transportation and Foreign Trade," by Katrine R. C. Greene and Joseph D. Phillips (1942, 208 p. $2.00); "Industrialization of the Western Pacific," by Kate L. Mitchell (1942, 322 p. $2.50).

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I. P. R. INQUIRY SERIES. By Various Authors. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941–42, 3 v.

Further titles in an increasingly useful series: "American Policy in the Far East, 1931–1941," by T. A. Bisson (1941, 206 p. $1.75); "Government and Nationalism in Southeast Asia," by Rupert Emerson and Others (1942, 242 p. $2.00); "French Interests and Policies in the Far East," by Roger Levy and Others (1941, 209 p. $2.00).

THE JAPANESE ENEMY: HIS POWER AND HIS VULNERABILITY. By Hugh Byas. New York: Knopf, 1942, 107 p. $1.25.

The author served in Japan from 1914 to 1941, first as editor of *The Japan Advertiser* and later as correspondent for *The Times* of both London and New York. He warns us against underestimating the strength and intelligence of our enemy. Though he expects an Allied victory, he predicts a long and costly conflict.

THE SETTING SUN OF JAPAN. By Carl Randau and Leane Zugsmith. New York: Random House, 1942, 342 p. $3.00.

An American journalistic couple report on a round trip they made through Japan, China, the Philippines, Malaya, the East Indies and Australia shortly before that part of the world was enveloped by total war.

OUR ENEMY JAPAN. By Wilfrid Fleisher. Garden City: Doubleday, 1942, 236 p. $2.00.

A sane, factual appraisal of Japan's military and economic power by a newspaperman long resident in that country.

HOW JAPAN PLANS TO WIN. By Kinoaki Matsuo. Boston: Little, Brown, 1942, 323 p. $2.50.

A translation of a book published in Tokyo in 1940 by the Foreign Office Press as propaganda for arousing pro-war enthusiasm among the Japanese people.

CHINA BUILDS FOR DEMOCRACY. By Nym Wales. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941, 310 p. $2.50.

A circumstantial, illustrated account of the origin and operation of the industrial coöperatives in Free China.

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A report on China's struggle by an American on the staff of Nanking University.

CHINA FIGHTS ON. Volume I. Chungking: The China Publishing Company, 1941, 365 p. $8.00.

The war messages of Chiang Kai-shek, October 19, 1938, to January 23, 1940.

THE RICE ECONOMY OF MONSOON ASIA. By V. D. Wickizer and M. K. Bennett. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1941, 358 p. $3.50.

A scientific monograph on an important aspect of the economic geography of the Far East, the Indies and India.

CRISIS IN THE PHILIPPINES. By Catherine Porter. New York: Knopf, 1942, 156 p. $1.50.

A compact handbook of political and economic information.

INDUSTRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Jack Shepherd. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941, 133 p. 75 cents.

Facts and figures arranged by country.

WESTWARD THE COURSE! By Paul McGuire. New York: Morrow, 1942, 434 p. $3.75.

A popular description of the lands and the peoples of Australasia and the East Indies.

Latin America

LATIN AMERICA. By Preston E. James. New York: Lothrop, 1942, 908 p. $6.00.

Here is a sound, scholarly and carefully organized survey of the human geography

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of the republics of Latin America and the island colonies in the Caribbean. Unlike so many of the current works on our southern neighbors, this is not a superficial report after a quick trip, but a synthesis of data gathered during many years of research and travel. The author, professor of geography at the University of Michigan, is now chief of the Latin American section of the Office of Coördinator of Information.

INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY. Edited by Walter H. C. Laves. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 228 p. $1.50.

The Harris Foundation Lectures delivered at Chicago in the summer of 1941 by a group of distinguished Americans and Latin Americans.

POR LA COOPERACIÓN INTERAMERICANA. By Alberto Sayán de Vidaurre. Buenos Aires: Author, 1941, 350 p. Pesos 5.

Essays and documents illustrating the benefits of Inter-American solidarity.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: 1940. Edited by Miron Burgin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 570 p. $4.00.

The sixth annual issue of an indispensable bibliographical guide covering cultural and social as well as political and economic publications.

MEXICO'S SCHOOL-MADE SOCIETY. By George C. Booth. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941, 175 p. $2.50.

How social reform is being effected through education.

THE HAITIAN PEOPLE. By James G. Leyburn. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, 342 p. $4.00.

This is easily the best informed and the most comprehensive treatise on Haiti to appear in English. The author is associate professor of sociology at Yale. After analyzing the life of the Haitian people in its many aspects, he has put it back together again in a masterly synthesis and in language comprehensible to the layman. It is to be hoped that other scientific, all-round studies on this model will be made for other similar countries and regions.

THE PANAMA CANAL IN PEACE AND WAR. By Norman J. Padelford. New York: Macmillan, 1942, 327 p. $3.00.

The history, operation and present importance of the Canal viewed primarily from the standpoint of the political scientist and lawyer. A substantial, scholarly treatise.

THE NAZI UNDERGROUND IN SOUTH AMERICA. By Hugo Fernandez Artucio. New York: Farrar, 1942, 311 p. $3.00.

Señor Fernandez is a Uruguayan professor who, with much industry and courage, has been instrumental in exposing the subversive activities of the Axis south of Panama. In this book he has collected a mass of information about those activities in each of the South American republics, though he fails to provide adequate documentation. He is naturally best informed about his own country and its neighbor, Argentina. Whether or not some of his fears are justified only history can reveal, but in any case his warning is certainly one that the Americas can ignore only at their peril.

THE BATTLE OF SOUTH AMERICA. By Albert E. Carter. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1941, 332 p. $2.75.

A chatty report on the author's peregrinations through the southern republics and on the state of public mind he found there in regard to the war and its impact on the Western Hemisphere.

THE PAGEANT OF SOUTH AMERICAN HISTORY. By Anne Merriman Peck. New York: Longmans, 1941, 405 p. $3.00.

The history and culture of South America expounded in simple and readable language.

POLITICA INTERNACIONAL DE LA GRAN COLOMBIA. By Francisco José Urrutia. Bogotá: Editorial "El Grafico," 1941, 204 p. (New York: Brentano, $1.25).

A diplomatic history by a distinguished Colombian, formerly Minister of Foreign Affairs and Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Agriculture

Agricultural statistics, 1941. Washington, 1941. 731 p. 75¢.

Formula for determining parity prices. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Senate, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Res. 117. Pt. 2, July 16–December 19, 1941. Washington, 1941. p. 101–549. 65¢.

Colonies

Colonial Development Advisory Committee. Eleventh and final report covering the period 1st April, 1939–17th July, 1940. London, 1941. 16 p. (Cmd. 6298.) 3d.

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Exchange of letters between the secretary of state for foreign affairs and General de Gaulle concerning commercial and economic relations between the United Kingdom and the Cameroons under French mandate. March 18, 1942. London, 1942. 6 p. (France No. 1 (1942). Cmd. 6345.) 1d.

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The Program of the Department of State in cultural relations. Washington, 1942. 32 p. (Dept. of State Publication 1702. Inter-American Series 21.) 5¢.

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National resources development; report for 1942 by the National Resources Planning Board. Washington, 1942. 227 p. 55¢.

Towards our true inheritance; the reconstruction work of the I. L. O. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1942. 77 p.

Approaches to social security. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1942. 100 p. (Studies and Reports, Series M, No. 18.) 50¢.

Ethiopia

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Office consolidation: foreign exchange control order, regulations of the Foreign Exchange Control Board, foreign exchange acquisition order. Ottawa, Foreign Exchange Control Board, 1942. 54 p. 25¢.

The Proclaimed list of certain blocked nationals. Supplements 1–4, February 28–May 1, 1942, to Revision I of February 7, 1942. Washington, 1942. 4 v. (Dept. of State Publication 1698, 1713, 1722, 1734.)

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RATIONING

THE PLAN for distributing War Ration Book One for individual consumers. Washington, Office of Price Administration, 1942. 53 p.

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ST. LAWRENCE WATERWAY

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INTER-AMERICAN coffee agreement. Agreement and protocol between the United States of America and other American Republics. Agreement signed at Washington, November 28, 1940. Agreement and protocol proclaimed by the President April 15, 1941. Washington, 1941. 53 p. (Treaty Series 970.) 10¢.

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ALLOCATION of tariff quota on crude petroleum and fuel oil. Proclamation by the President, issued December 26, 1941 pursuant to Article VII of the reciprocal trade agreement between the United States of America and Venezuela signed November 9, 1939. Washington, 1942. 5 p. (Executive Agreement Series 226.) 5¢.

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

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

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

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
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

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

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

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
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

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

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